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vForeword
The financial and economic crisis has been a challenge for the European integration 
process, and, in many respects, the study of South-North EU migration in times of 
crisis reveals as much about contemporary mobilities in the EU as it does on 
Member States’ willingness to build solidarity across borders.
To study this phenomenon, we considered the involvement of scholars and insti-
tutions from both Southern and Northern Europe as the only possible option. This 
edited volume is thus the result of true collective work involving many different 
actors whom we wish to sincerely thank for their support and dedication throughout 
this project.
We first wish to thank the IMISCOE Research Network and Universidad 
Pontificia Comillas in Madrid to have hosted our first workshop on South-North EU 
migration in August 2014, during which the idea of this book was initially dis-
cussed. Second, different Belgian institutions have allowed this idea to be trans-
formed into a fully fledged publication project. We hereby wish to thank the 
University of Liège, which granted us a special research fund to support this book, 
as well as its Social Science Faculty (FaSS) and its Centre for Ethnic and Migration 
Studies (CEDEM). We would also like to thank the Belgian National Fund for 
Scientific Research (FRS-FNRS), for financing and hosting our second conference 
in December 2014 at the University of Liège. Third, we’d like to thank warmly 
Warda Belabas from the IMISCOE editorial board and Bernadette Deelen from 
Springer for their support and dedication throughout the publication process. Lastly, 
as the joint editors of this volume were based in Portugal, Spain and Belgium, we 
can confirm that this book’s manuscript has itself been continuously moving 
between Southern and Northern Europe. However, a few institutions have given us 
the necessary stability to work comfortably on the manuscript. We would thus also 
like to thank the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology, which financed 
vi
Mikolaj Stanek’s postdoctoral fellowship at the time this volume was prepared 
(SFRH/BDP/84148/2012), the Centre of Social Studies at the University of Coimbra 
in Portugal, the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC) and the Library of the 
Belgian Royal Academy.
Liège, Belgium Jean-Michel Lafleur
Salamanca, Spain Mikolaj Stanek
March 10, 2016
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 Chapter 1 
 EU Migration and the Economic Crisis: 
Concepts and Issues 
 Jean-Michel  Lafl eur and  Mikolaj  Stanek 
1.1  Introduction: South-North EU Migration in (Post-)Crisis 
Europe 
 The global ﬁ nancial and economic crisis has been hitting the European Union 
severely since 2008. Although the economic crisis began in advanced economies 
and then spread all over the globe, its impact and implications are far from being 
equally distributed geographically. This is particularly visible within the European 
Union. While some countries, mainly in the North, have weathered the crisis rela-
tively well and have managed to recover from the initial ﬁ nancial downturn, others, 
especially in the South, have been suffering from long-term ﬁ nancial instability, 
high unemployment rates and worsening living conditions among wide segments of 
the population. In this deteriorating socio-economic environment, EU citizens have 
developed a wide variety of strategies to respond to the crisis, such as undertaking 
training in order to adapt to the changing needs of the job market, reducing house-
hold expenditure, or taking to the streets to oppose the management of the crisis by 
their governments (Promberger et al.  2014 ). 
 Traditionally, geographic mobility has been considered by social scientists as a 
key strategy employed by individuals and households in order to cope with eco-
nomic hardship. Today, there is sufﬁ cient evidence showing that many European 
citizens have responded to the deterioration of their living conditions by moving to 
other countries or continents. Nonetheless, despite the media interest in this new 
European migratory phenomenon, in-depth and systematic analysis is still needed. 
 J.-M.  Laﬂ eur (*) 
 FRS-FRNS, Centre for Ethnic and Migration Studies (CEDEM) ,  University of Liège , 
 Liège ,  Belgium 
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2 This edited volume focuses on migration as a speciﬁ c strategy developed by EU 
citizens to adjust to an adverse socio-economic environment. In particular, we pro-
pose to look at the mobility of EU citizens proceeding from the Southern European 
Member States that have been most affected by the crisis (Greece, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain) and moving to Northern European Member States, where the job market 
has remained attractive in spite of the crisis (Belgium, France, Germany, United 
Kingdom). In other words, this book seeks an answer to the following question: 
have old South-North migration routes within Europe reopened? 
 More precisely, our objective for this volume is twofold. First, we intend to iden-
tify the scale and nature of this new Southern European wave of emigration and the 
socio-economic integration of these migrants within Northern European destination 
countries. This will be achieved through a quantitative analysis of the most recent 
data on the ﬂ ows and proﬁ les of this new labour force using databases from both 
sending and receiving countries (labour force surveys, census records, migration 
ofﬁ ce statistics on national and EU levels, Eurobarometer surveys, etc.). Such anal-
ysis will, overall, point to the differences and similarities between this current wave 
of Southern European migration and previous ones. However, as the different chap-
ters in this volume show, quantitative data often presents limitations that invite us to 
use such information with great care. For instance, the measurement of the migra-
tion ﬂ ows of EU citizens can be undermined by the voluntary non-registration of 
EU migrants with the authorities in both the home and the host country. EU migrants 
do not have a strong incentive to register as permanent residents in the host country. 
In fact, they may have important reasons not to deregister as residents in their home 
country; for example, to avoid losing entitlements to health care provision, social 
security rights or unemployment insurance, amongst others. Alternatively, not reg-
istering with the host country authorities may be a conscious strategy by EU citizens 
concerned about the removal of their residence permit if they are in a ﬁ nancially 
precarious situation (see Chap.  7 ). In addition, the circular nature of migratory 
moves applies to a non-negligible number of Southern Europeans. Some migrants 
may thus not be interested in registering upon arrival if they plan a short-term stay. 
Such data limitations entail the possibility that recent migrants—like the newly 
arrived Southern Europeans—are under-represented in ofﬁ cial data, while longer- 
term migrants, who arrived well before the crisis, are over-represented. As under-
lined in Chap.  8 , well-settled migrants with stable housing and jobs are more likely 
to be included in large surveys such as the Labour Force Survey than are new 
migrants in a precarious housing situation. 
 Second, this book will look at the politics and policies of immigration from the 
perspective of both the sending and the receiving nations. Because of the uncertain-
ties regarding the proﬁ le and motivations of those who leave their home country, 
Southern European governments have been speculating on the impact of this loss of 
labour force and on the appropriate policy response to adopt. Similarly, Northern 
European governments have had mixed attitudes towards this new inﬂ ux of EU citi-
zens. Reactions in Northern Europe have varied: some countries have set up pro-
grammes to actively recruit and train these migrants, while others have promulgated 
the stigmatization of mobile EU citizens. In this volume, each chapter has designed 
J.-M. Laﬂ eur and M. Stanek
3its own methodological approach to capture the policies and debates triggered by 
these new ﬂ ows, but press and parliamentary documents have also been a privileged 
source used to make sense of these most recent evolutions. This approach shows 
how contentious the issue of intra-EU mobility is, even when it concerns citizens 
from EU-15 Member States whose right to move within the EU had not previously 
been questioned for several decades. 
 Overall, the strength of this edited volume is to compile in a systematic way a 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of these renewed Southern European migration 
ﬂ ows. As this new wave of emigration has triggered debates and policy responses at 
the local, national and EU level, this book thus seeks—through a systematic analy-
sis of these case studies—to shed light on the lessons that can be learned from this 
changing climate in EU migration. 
1.2  Conceptualizing Crises and Migration 
 Crises are generally considered as “turning points” (Alink et al.  2001 , 300) that trig-
ger social phenomena—like migration—as well as public policy reforms. In the 
ﬁ eld of migration, economic crises are traditionally considered as opportunities to 
implement restrictive immigration policies. For instance, the Great Depression of 
the 1920s and the Oil Crises of the 1970s were both occasions during which states 
implemented stronger barriers to immigration. Scholars have noted that the 2008 
ﬁ nancial and economic crises triggered two important transformations: migration 
policies have evolved at a rapid pace and migration ﬂ ows have been taking new 
forms (Papademetriou and Terrazas  2009 ; Papademetriou et al.  2009 ; Cerna  2013 ). 
 First, with regard to policy-making, the economic crisis has prompted the public 
authorities of many Member States to adopt increasingly strict migration and inte-
gration policies. For authors such as Kuptsch ( 2012 , 19), migration policy reforms 
in receiving countries during the global economic crisis have consisted mostly of 
four types of measure: making new immigration more difﬁ cult, protecting native 
workers from the perceived competition of foreign workers, adopting programmes 
and measures to encourage return migration and clamping down on irregular 
migrants. But while the connection between crises and stricter migration policies is 
appealing, the causal link is not always obvious. Considering that migration policies 
in Europe were already becoming stricter before the crisis, it remains unclear 
whether or not many of the reforms that are described in this book would have been 
adopted without the occurrence of the crisis. In other words, we should be aware of 
the risk of focusing on endogenous or exogenous events as simplistic explanations 
for migration policy reforms. 
 Deﬁ ning crises and theorizing their role in policy-making is not an easy endeav-
our. One possible point of departure to understand the effect of the 2008 ﬁ nancial 
and economic crisis is thus to determine what deﬁ nes a crisis and to identify the 
lines according to which this deﬁ nition may vary. Nohrsted and Weible ( 2010 , 3) 
have noted that crises are usually considered as “periods of disorder in the  seemingly 
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4normal development of a system and widespread questioning or discrediting of 
established policies, practices, and institutions”. Yet, the nature of a crisis may differ 
according to certain variables. First, a crisis may be caused by either an internal or 
an external shock. For policy-makers, the geographic scale at which stimuli for 
policy reforms occur necessarily affects their ability to react. The intensity of the 
crisis provides the second line of variation. Crises—whether global or not—do not 
necessarily produce similar social, economic and political effects, nor do they affect 
equally all states to the same extent. However, existing research has not yet identi-
ﬁ ed any correlation between the scale of a crisis and the importance of the reforms 
adopted in reaction to it. Third, crises also trigger diverse responses according to 
policy-makers’ prerogatives and, most importantly, according to their subjective 
interpretation of what is an appropriate response to the crisis. As we will see in the 
volume, several EU Member States have been severely hit by the 2008 ﬁ nancial and 
economic crisis. Yet, in spite of the broadly similar effects of the crisis on their 
socio-economic situations, states have reacted by adopting reforms in different pol-
icy areas or even by adopting diverging reforms within the same policy area. 
 The understanding of crisis-related migrations is further complicated when 
migration ﬂ ows are themselves considered as crises. For instance, the growing 
inﬂ ux of migrants and asylum seekers in the summer of 2015 has clearly been 
framed as an “immigration crisis” by both policy-makers and observers alike. 
Attaching the concept of crisis to ﬂ ows rather than to their causes has important 
consequences on the policy-makers’ agenda: instead of tackling the social, political 
or economic root causes that trigger migration, policy reforms tend to focus solely 
on reducing ﬂ ows to pre-crisis levels. 
 Alongside the critical approach to the concept of crisis that we aim to adopt in 
this volume, we also intend to be equally critical of the concepts used to describe the 
migration ﬂ ows occurring during the recession. Our objective in this book is to 
concentrate on internal ﬂ ows within the European Union, which we refer to inter-
changeably as mobility and migration. 
 As noted by Aybek and colleagues ( 2015 ), mobility and migration studies have 
historically different origins. Mobility studies have emerged in a context of progress 
in communication and transportation technologies since the late twentieth century. 
From this perspective, international migration—deﬁ ned as long-term relocation 
across an international border—is just one among several possible transformations 
in people’s lives (along with long-distance commuting or internal migration for 
instance). Similarly, King and Skeldon ( 2010 ) invite us to consider the segmenta-
tion between internal mobility—usually understood as short-distance internal 
migration—and international migration research as artiﬁ cial. Indeed, the existence 
of international migration is highly dependent on the deﬁ nition of borders which are 
social constructs that are likely to change over time (Favell  2007 ). The fact that 
post-war Southern European guest workers progressively became mobile EU work-
ers as their home state took part in the European integration process is a good illus-
tration of how political projects can change the vocabulary used to describe people 
on the move (see Chap.  2 ). 
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lic debates and policy circles to describe changes of residence from one EU Member 
State to another, whereas the concept of migration denotes the arrival within the EU 
of citizens proceeding from third countries (Glorius et al.  2013 ). However, in this 
book, the terms mobility and migration are both used to reﬂ ect changes of residence 
of EU citizens between different Member States. Combining these terms acknowl-
edges that—in spite of both the speciﬁ c context in which it occurs and its diverse 
characteristics—new Southern European migration presents some similarities with 
older twentieth century ﬂ ows proceeding from those countries, with more recent 
ﬂ ows from other parts of the EU but also with ﬂ ows proceeding from outside the 
EU. This conceptual choice therefore aims to go beyond the implicit qualitative 
assessment hidden behind these two terms in policy debates according to which 
mobility—unlike migration—refers to voluntary and mostly desirable movements 
of EU citizens. By looking at the conditions in which Southern EU citizens decide 
to leave their home country and the treatment that some of them receive upon arrival 
in destination countries, we shall thus reconsider the validity of such an 
assessment. 
 This conceptual choice does not, however, lead us to consider EU internal migra-
tion and immigration of third country nationals to the EU as fully equivalent phe-
nomena. Differences obviously remain in the context of departure and in the legal 
framework regulating the crossing of borders and access to the labour market. Even 
within the category of EU migrants, diversity also prevails: research has shown a 
multiplicity of socio-economic proﬁ les, ranging from individuals belonging to the 
North Western European middle class (Recchi and Favell  2009 ) to blue collar work-
ers from Central and Eastern Europe (Black et al.  2010 ). Furthermore, as shown 
very clearly through different typologies produced on new Central and Eastern 
European migration, categories of EU migrants that are sometimes perceived as 
relatively homogenous continue to display varying degrees of attachment to both 
their sending and receiving societies (Engbersen and Snel  2013 ). Based on this 
experience, this volume has taken great care to avoid presenting new Southern EU 
migrants as a homogeneous group, in spite of the various characteristics they may 
share. 
1.3  Migration Flows in Times of Crisis and the Resulting 
Policy Responses 
 As this volume will demonstrate, migration ﬂ ows in the European Union have 
changed during the economic crisis. In spite of growing unemployment, protection-
ism and xenophobia in destination countries, migration ﬂ ows have not uniformly 
decreased in the EU. Focusing on the migration dynamics between Southern and 
Northern European Member States is particularly revealing of this diversiﬁ cation. 
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6 With the crisis, migration of EU citizens to other Member States has been on the 
rise: around eight million economically active EU citizens live in another Member 
State, representing 3.3 % of the labour force in 2013, compared to 1.6 % in 2004 and 
2.4 % in 2008 (European Commission  2014b ). While South-North migration of EU 
citizens signiﬁ cantly increased during this period, East-West migration within the 
EU—a phenomenon that preceded the crisis—did not signiﬁ cantly slow down dur-
ing the same period (Kaczmarczyk  2014 ; Zaiceva and Zimmermann  2016 ). 
Similarly, the migration of third country nationals ﬂ eeing their homeland to enter 
the EU due to political or economic instability has also continued (Fargues and 
Frandrich  2012 ), and numbers increased signiﬁ cantly in 2015. This means that, 
overall, although some migration ﬂ ows may have signiﬁ cantly decreased with the 
economic crisis (e.g. Romanian migration to Spain), other ﬂ ows have continued 
almost unaffected by the recession, increasing or even reappearing after we thought 
they were in decline. 
 In explaining the renewed Southern European migration to Northern Europe, 
many observers have identiﬁ ed two crisis-related factors. First, high unemployment 
in the Southern EU Member States most affected by the crisis has pushed some of 
their nationals to look for employment opportunities abroad (either in Northern 
Member States or outside the EU). Similarly, many third-country migrants living in 
these countries have also either returned to their home countries or emigrated again 
to another country (see Chap.  6 on Spain). Second, rising levels of social exclusion 
and changing labour market conditions are another trigger for emigration. In 
Southern Europe, labour market reforms and cuts in wages have also rendered the 
position of many workers more vulnerable. Overall, it is worth noting that the share 
of non-mobile EU citizens at risk of poverty or social exclusion increased during the 
crisis and reached 22.8 % in 2013 (European Commission  2014a ). In other words, 
beyond unemployment, increased social risks and bleak prospects offered by the 
labour market in Southern Europe may explain why individuals who held jobs dur-
ing the crisis still went to look for alternative employment abroad. 
 Even though labour market conditions have worsened and social exclusion has 
clearly increased, this volume questions the role of the crisis as the sole factor 
explaining contemporary Southern European migration to Northern Europe. It does 
this in three ways. First, we examine South-North EU migration ﬂ ows as long-term 
processes whose origins precede the crisis. The case of Portugal (see Chap.  5 ) best 
epitomizes this element. In Southern Europe, the intensiﬁ cation of departures often 
preceded the ﬁ nancial and economic crisis but received little interest for years 
because those ﬂ ows were overshadowed by larger inﬂ uxes of foreigners moving to 
these countries. For instance, in spite of the continuation of emigration throughout 
the 2000s, it is only when foreign immigration into Portugal stopped that the coun-
try started to think of itself again as an emigration country. Framing all contempo-
rary migrations from Southern Europe as crisis-related ﬂ ows might therefore hide a 
more complex reality: certain proﬁ les of migrants—such as low-skilled workers—
were already moving before the crisis, which in itself only served to intensify the 
phenomenon. 
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also ﬁ nd their roots prior to the crisis. In recent years, many Member States have 
undertaken reforms to curb social expenditure as part of their ﬁ scal consolidation 
efforts. This has led to cuts in the levels of social protection beneﬁ ts/services in 
some countries as well as efforts to restrict access (European Commission  2014a ). 
Some of these reforms, however, preceded the crisis. Moreover, and most impor-
tantly, the process of segmentation of the labour market had been initiated long 
before the crisis, but it was seen subsequently to accelerate with the crisis. As shown 
very clearly in the case of Italy (Chap.  4 ), disparities in social protection between 
the precarious youth and older well-protected workers are long established. In 
Member States such as Germany and the United Kingdom, the numbers of workers 
in temporary and precarious low-paid jobs were already signiﬁ cant before the crisis. 
Despite the fact that these countries have exhibited better resistance than others to 
the effects of the economic crisis, the share of workers occupying such jobs there 
has similarly risen signiﬁ cantly during the crisis (see Chaps.  9 and  10 ). 
1.4  New Migration, New Controversies and New Responses 
 While South-North migration is not at all a new phenomenon, we will demonstrate 
in this volume that the context in which it is occurring nowadays renders this new 
wave more controversial than previous ones. In addition to the deterioration of 
European economies and the changing conditions of the labour market described 
above, the legal and political contexts in which those migrations are occurring are 
signiﬁ cantly different from that of twentieth century guest worker programmes. 
First of all, the EU integration process has removed many administrative barriers to 
migration, but only for some migrants within the EU. Post-war guest workers pro-
ceeding from countries like Italy, who later became Member States of the European 
Community, have progressively enjoyed more rights than those coming from third 
countries like Morocco. Yet, these early migrants had arrived in Europe under 
broadly comparable regulations before World War II. As shown in Chap.  7 
(Belgium), the favourable economic context in which those migration ﬂ ows 
occurred and the legislative framework that supported the political integration of 
those migrants greatly contributed to their integration. For this reason, post-war 
Southern European migrants were often referred to as “desirable migrants” in con-
temporary debates of the time. 
 As shown by Roxana Barbulescu in Chap.  2 , progressive EU enlargements seem 
to have eroded the support of political elites for the principle of freedom of circula-
tion in different parts of Northern Europe. This means that new Southern European 
migrants are not necessarily able to capitalize on their predecessors’ “success” when 
moving North. This can be explained by the importance of East-West migration 
ﬂ ows following the enlargement to EU-10 countries and the progressive lifting of 
restrictions on the freedom of circulation of their citizens. In spite of the fact that 
overall migration within the EU has remained limited, the intensiﬁ cation of speciﬁ c 
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social dumping and access to housing and social services in certain localities. 
 In particular, the use of social protection entitlements by EU migrants and third 
country nationals has become increasingly controversial in the context of the crisis. 
In different Member States, such as Belgium and the United Kingdom, governments 
have not only reduced the ability of immigrants to claim beneﬁ ts in these countries, 
but they are also increasingly depicting EU and third-country migrants as “abusers” 
of their social protection systems (see Chaps.  7 and  10 ) and as “unreasonable bur-
dens” on their public ﬁ nances. In spite of their existence for several decades, the 
resurgence of the concepts of “welfare magnets” or “welfare shoppers” to delegiti-
mize immigrants’ access to social protection is, however, not surprising in a context 
of crisis when states are looking at ways to decrease public spending (Böhning 
 1972 ; Borjas  1998 ; Schierup et al.  2006 ; De Giorgi and Pellizzari  2009 ; Giulietti 
et al.  2013 ). 
 Few speciﬁ c academic reports have responded directly to the new wave of accu-
sations regarding the ﬁ scal cost of migration (Dustmann and Frattini  2013 ). 
Nevertheless, studies on the ﬁ scal impact of migration, developed by international 
organizations such as the European Commission (EC) and the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have pointed out that—in spite 
of the fact that measuring the impact of migration is rendered complicated by the 
diversity and large number of policies to which immigrants contribute—the impact 
of migration on public ﬁ nances is very frequently positive (European Commission 
 2013 ; OECD  2013 ). At the political level, the Commission has also repeated in dif-
ferent communications made by its Commissioner responsible for employment, 
social affairs and inclusion that freedom of circulation concerns only a small minor-
ity of EU workers. Moreover, the migration resulting from this freedom generates 
wealth inside the Union and, most importantly, it is a founding principle of the EU 
about which the Commission is not willing to make concessions (European 
Commission  2014c ). 
 Following the terms of Directive 2004/38/EC on the free movement of EU citi-
zens, Member States have, however, recently started to pay particular attention to 
the provision allowing the removal of residence permits from EU nationals in need 
of social assistance, i.e. those who represent a “burden” on the public ﬁ nances of the 
host state. As several states are now aiming to reduce the number of foreigners 
receiving beneﬁ ts in times of crisis, this practice is gaining traction. At the same 
time, a likely consequence of this practice is that numerous EU migrants will refrain 
from making use of their right to social protection, due to a lack of knowledge about 
these beneﬁ ts or for fear of losing their right to residence. This is particularly con-
cerning since, in 2013, 48.7 % of third-country migrants aged 18 and over residing 
in the EU-28 and 28.1 % of EU migrants were at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion. 
 Member States that are receiving this new wave of Southern European migrants 
are, however, not unanimously rejecting it. As shown by Klekowski and Höhne in 
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9Chap.  9 , Germany, for instance, has adopted speciﬁ c measures to encourage the 
migration and integration into the labour market of young European migrants. 
These programmes, which were advertised in Southern Europe, caught the attention 
of thousands of young Spaniards, who moved to Germany with a contract guaran-
teeing an apprenticeship and language classes. While this programme is limited in 
scale, it clearly illustrates the fact that the crisis has also represented an opportunity 
for certain industries facing shortages of skilled workers. While it represents a basic 
application of the principle of freedom of circulation within the EU, the attraction 
of Southern European talent to Northern European labour markets triggers its own 
set of controversies. First, as shown in Chap.  9 , the risk continues that, due to difﬁ -
culties involved in the recognition of qualiﬁ cations across Europe, some highly- 
skilled Southern European migrants might end up working in jobs that do not 
maximize their skills (i.e. leading to “brain waste”). Second, by recruiting explicitly 
qualiﬁ ed workers, will Northern European Member States not be undermining the 
ability of Southern European countries to recover from the crisis? 
 These questions have been raised in countries of both destination and origin. As 
shown in the four Southern European case studies in this edited volume, the authori-
ties in sending countries have reacted very differently to these new ﬂ ows. On the 
one hand, Portugal and Italy have debated the issue of emigration in Parliament and 
their emigration-related authorities (e.g. consultative councils on emigration) have 
brought the issue onto the national agenda. However, as shown by José-Carlos 
Marques and Pedro Góis in Chap.  5 , in the case of Portugal, the issue of emigration 
is being used in the domestic political arena to support or question the management 
of the economic crisis by the authorities. On the other hand, Spain and Greece 
appear to have been less reactive, in spite of the large emigration waves of recent 
years. In the case of Spain, in particular, Bermudez Torres and Brey’s chapter (Chap. 
 6 ) shows clearly that acknowledging the very existence of crisis-related emigration 
is a controversial topic. The Spanish government’s uneasy position on these ﬂ ows 
epitomizes the dilemma faced by sending states. On the one hand, recognizing the 
existence of crisis-related ﬂ ows is a necessary step towards addressing some of the 
difﬁ culties encountered by citizens abroad and preparing for their possible return 
when the socio-economic context improves. On the other hand, denying the exis-
tence of such ﬂ ows is a way to avoid politically damaging debates on the responsi-
bility by the governments of sending countries in creating those new migration 
waves. 
1.5  Structure of the Book 
 Following this introduction, which has conceptualized the issue of South-North 
migration of EU citizens in a time of crisis, Chap.  2 tracks down the evolution of 
freedom of movement within the EU and documents its retrenchment in the context 
of the crisis. In that chapter, Roxana Barbulescu argues that—even though it is the 
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mobility of Eastern European citizens that has triggered negative reactions and 
restrictive policies—this new mobility has very concrete and serious consequences 
on new Southern European migrants. 
 Chapters  3 ,  4 ,  5 ,  6 ,  7 ,  8 ,  9 , and  10 are country-speciﬁ c chapters containing case 
studies looking at the issue of South-North EU migration from the perspective of 
selected sending and receiving nations. This approach deserves two comments. 
First, while we agree that such a state-centred approach may give the wrong impres-
sion that these new ﬂ ows are unilateral and permanent, we also felt that it would 
provide us with the right angle to identify the speciﬁ c issues and varying reactions 
being triggered by this new mobility in different parts of Europe. Furthermore, 
given the aforementioned difﬁ culties in measuring ﬂ ows between EU countries, we 
consider that using sending and receiving country data provides the reader with a 
more complete and accurate description of this phenomenon. 
 Second, because this volume does not have a purely comparative ambition, the 
eight countries under study were selected along two lines. The four sending coun-
tries featured in this volume were selected from among the group of Member States 
most severely hit by the crisis. Because of the diverse socio-economic situations 
between countries like Greece and Italy, the relevance of the category of “Southern 
European Member States” could, however, be called into question. This is particu-
larly true when we think of Ireland or the Baltic states, which have experienced very 
similar difﬁ culties during the crisis. Yet, we maintain that the category of Southern 
European Member States is a valid unit of analysis because of the common history 
of twentieth century migration from those countries to Northern Europe. In several 
cases, these migration ﬂ ows has been associated in public discourses with success-
ful integration processes (see D’Amato  2005 ; Saﬁ   2006 ; Martiniello  2013 ). This 
contrasts strongly with the current distrust and sometimes opposition towards new 
European migrants in most Northern European Member States. 
 The capacity of Northern Europe to remain—in spite of variations from case to 
case—an attractive destination area for immigrants explains the geographical focus 
of this volume. Naturally, this part of Europe has also been affected by the crisis but 
with varying degrees of intensity and different timings. The four receiving countries 
studied in this volume—Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom—
have been selected not only because of their better economic performance during 
the crisis compared to Southern European EU countries but also because their gov-
ernments have reacted differently to the economic crisis and, most importantly, to 
the new inﬂ ux of Southern European migrants. Whereas Belgium and the United 
Kingdom have reacted mostly with hostility, France could be qualiﬁ ed as being 
indifferent and Germany very encouraging towards speciﬁ c types of new Southern 
EU migrants. 
 In Chap.  3 , Georgia Mavrodi and Michalis Moutselos show that the skills, migra-
tory paths and numbers of recent migrants are quantitatively and qualitatively dif-
ferent from those of post-war migration. Meanwhile, elite discourse around new 
migration has mostly been anchored to the debates for/against austerity and no tar-
geted policies have been developed to facilitate the trajectories or the return of the 
new migrants. This contrasts very strongly with the case of Italy, as discussed in 
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Chap.  4 by Guido Tintori and Valentina Romei. The authors question the idea of a 
brain drain from the country in favour of a more balanced approach, which takes 
into consideration the diversity of proﬁ les among new emigrants. With this approach, 
the authors examine how the sense of political alert about a possible brain drain 
intertwines with post-crisis labour market reforms. Chapter  5 by José Carlos 
Marques and Pedro Góis questions the concept of crisis-related migration by show-
ing that Portuguese emigration was already a signiﬁ cant phenomenon before the 
crisis but that this has been ignored because of the policy-makers’ focus on immi-
gration into Portugal. Their chapter also shows that, while Portugal has had a tradi-
tion of engaging with its citizens abroad, limited actions have been taken to assist 
new emigrants beyond alarmist discourses in Parliament. In this sense, the authors’ 
conclusions are very comparable to those made in Chap.  6 by Anastasia Bermudez 
Torres and Elisa Brey, who also note a lack of engagement with, if not a sense of 
antagonism towards, new emigrants. In Spain, the very acknowledgement of the 
existence of crisis-related migration is a topic of contention between governing and 
opposition parties. Yet, in spite of the difﬁ culty involved in measuring the exact 
number of emigrants and in differentiating them from return migrants, their account 
of the mobilization of new Spanish emigrants is very telling of the transformation of 
Spanish communities in Northern Europe. 
 The next four chapters reverse the perspective and look at how new Southern 
European migrants have been received and at the policies, controversies, or indiffer-
ence they have generated. In Chap.  7 , Jean-Michel Laﬂ eur and Mikolaj Stanek show 
how favourable Belgium could have been in principle to new Southern European 
migration because of the positive image associated with twentieth century Italian 
migration. However, a large inﬂ ux of Central and Eastern European migrants to 
Belgium, coupled with the economic crisis, have decisively transformed policy- 
makers’ rhetoric towards EU migrants. As the authors show, this hostility has 
recently developed into a policy—which has particularly hit Southern European 
migrants—of the systematic removal of residence permits from EU citizens who 
make use of social assistance for extended periods of time. 
 On a similar theme, Chap.  10 on the United Kingdom, by Alessio D’Angelo and 
Eleonore Kofman, describes how social policies are increasingly being used as a 
substitute for migration policies by Member States. The UK, however, is the ﬁ rst 
destination country for tertiary educated, Southern European migrants. The UK is 
also characterized by a political and policy context of anti-immigration sentiment in 
the mainstream political discourse, often conﬂ ated with a criticism of the EU sys-
tem of free movement. Chapters  8 and  9 offer very different accounts of Southern 
European migration. In Chap.  8 , Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels and Jutta 
Höhne discuss the top-down and bottom-up recruitment of skilled Southern 
Europeans by Federal Employment Agencies, regional ofﬁ ces, trade associations 
and employers themselves during the crisis. In spite of emerging xenophobic dis-
courses that exist in countries receiving Southern Europeans, the authors show that 
this new migration has mostly been framed as part of the response to a lack of 
skilled workers, as well as contributing to a resolution of the emerging demographic 
challenges. In Chap.  9 , Tatiana Eremenko, Elsa Steichen and Nora El Qadim con-
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ﬁ rm the diversity of proﬁ le in the new Southern European migration. They under-
line the fact that recent controversies and regulations concerning migration in 
France have spared Southern Europeans, but have focused instead on third country 
and EU citizens from Central and Eastern Europe. 
 To conclude this volume, two chapters draw the most important lessons from the 
case studies. In Chap.  11 , Jean-Michel Laﬂ eur, Mikolaj Stanek and Alberto Veira 
attempt to ﬁ nd an answer to the question of whether we are witnessing the reopen-
ing and repetition of previous South-North migration waves from the 1950s, 1960s 
and 1970s. In this process of cross analysis of data from the different chapters, the 
authors identify the main features of both the current and previous waves of migra-
tion. They also analyse the social and economic context in which the new South- 
North migration has been taking place. The authors argue that although the South to 
North migratory route has been re-established during the recent economic crisis, 
there are several features that make the previous and current migration waves barely 
comparable. Finally, in Chap.  12 , Jean-Michel Laﬂ eur and Mikolaj Stanek build on 
the different case studies, to identify ﬁ ve main lessons emerging from the renewed 
migration ﬂ ows of Southern European EU citizens. The authors argue that evidence 
from the multidimensional exploration of new South-North migration contained in 
this volume shows that while new Southern European migration has not been the 
most important migration phenomenon in Europe in the past decade, its study is key 
to understanding contemporary migration dynamics within the EU. 
 Overall, this book brings to light several issues that, to date, have not always 
been clearly and explicitly addressed or assessed within the context of intra-EU 
mobility. Among other issues, it reafﬁ rms that migration is not only a strategy for 
individuals and households but also for governments to deal with the deterioration 
of their country’s employment situation. It also demonstrates increasing segmenta-
tion in both access to freedom of circulation and access to certain welfare provi-
sions, which varies according to the nationality of EU migrants. Finally, it shows 
that the already fragile balance between labour supply and productive structure in 
Southern European EU countries might be affected by the outﬂ ow of highly skilled 
workers. 
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 Chapter 2 
 From International Migration to Freedom 
of Movement and Back? Southern Europeans 
Moving North in the Era of Retrenchment 
of Freedom of Movement Rights 
 Roxana  Barbulescu 
 Whatever the weather ,  we must move together . (Message on poster popularising the 
Marshall Plan, 1950) 
2.1  Introduction 
 Europeans have always moved to European neighbouring countries to battle wars, 
study, work or start a family. Over time, mobility on the European continent has 
changed remarkably: if in the postwar period, Southern Europeans were recruited as 
guest workers via bilateral agreements established between states, the creation of 
freedom of movement allowed people to migrate freely and on their own choice. 
The consolidation and extension of freedom of movement rights continued as the 
European Union has grown “ever closer”, it gradually extended from workers and 
their families to include students, retirees, job seekers and every European Union 
citizen with suffi cient fi nancial resources to support her/his stay. Over time freedom 
of movement has gradually evolved in a form of international migration unique in 
the world which, encompasses a population of half a billion people and 32 countries 
(EU28, EEA and Switzerland). In the context of the economic crisis that has started 
in 2007, citizens and political elites in several member states are challenging in 
systematic manner the principle of freedom of movement for the fi rst time. At the 
EU level too, the hitherto progressive expansion of rights for freemovers which 
culminated with the introduction of Directive 38/2004 was stopped after in mid 
2000s. 
 R.  Barbulescu (*) 
 ESRC Centre for Population Change and Department of Sociology, Social Policy and 
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 This chapter examines the transformation of freedom of movement as a particu-
lar policy area at the supranational, European level and then moves on to document 
and discuss the political and policy responses to the intensifi cation Southern 
Europeans’ migration to Northern Europe in times of economic crisis. It starts by 
process-tracing the evolution of the freedom of movement regime from the guest 
worker schemes, the hallmark of European labour mobility in postwar period. It 
then moves to its period of intense consolidation and Europeanisation at the policy 
and political level. Finally, it zooms-in how and to what extend this past trends have 
changed after the last two enlargements and the new South-North migration trig-
gered by the economic crisis. The chapter argues that the new South-North migra-
tion is taking place in an era of retrenchment of freedom of movement rights. The 
recent Eastward enlargements drive the political contestation of freedom of move-
ment rights and together with the worsening of economic conditions in North- 
Western EU countries have led to policy changes that effectively contract the rights 
of freemovers. Such retrenchment of rights announce the end of a “golden era” of 
freedom of movement as it becomes increasingly similar with international migra-
tion from third countries. The ongoing changes negatively affect all European citi-
zens including Southern Europeans moving in the EU since the start of the economic 
crisis. In particular, the young Southern Europeans who have been socialised and 
experienced Europe as a continent of free mobility because the contraction of rights 
comes at the time when they most need mobility rights to escape the fi nancial and 
economic crisis in their countries. 
2.2  South-North Mobility in the Postwar Europe: Guest 
Workers on Old Migratory Routes 
 In the postwar period, many Southern Europeans went to work in the more industri-
alised countries in the North of Europe as guest workers (Castles and Kosack  1973 ; 
Piore  1979 ; Hammar  1985 ; Messina  2007 ). War-ridden economies North-Western 
European countries recruited workers from a variety of countries but focused pri-
marily on the Mediterranean basin – Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, as well as 
Yugoslavia, Turkey and Northern African countries – and their former colonies. 
Southern Europeans were amongst the most numerous migrant community in the 
countries. For example, in 1980, in Western Germany, Southern Europeans repre-
sented over a quarter of all foreign workers (Italians made up 14 % of all foreign 
workers, Greeks 6.6 %, Spaniards 4 % and Portuguese 2.5 % (Schmitter Heisler 
 1992 : 39 and Chap.  9 in this volume). Belgium and France received similar high 
numbers of Southern Europeans in the same period (see Chaps.  7 and  8 in this vol-
ume). Elsewhere in North-Western Europe, Southern Europeans were also numer-
ous. In the Netherlands, Southern Europeans who were categorised as 
‘Mediterranean’ made up 1.1 % of the total population of the country, with Spaniards 
rather than Italians being the most dominant, 0.8 % or 123,000 (Rath and Sagar 
R. Barbulescu
17
 1992 : 206). Compared with these countries, Britain was a deviant case in Northern 
Europe as it primarily recruited workers either from its colonies outside Europe or 
from and the Baltic states via the European Voluntary Workers Scheme (Kay and 
Miles  1988 ) There were, however, some exceptions. Italians workers concentrated 
in London and the large cities or in Bedford where they worked for the London 
Brick Company (see Chap.  10 in this volume). 
 As a rule, guest worker agreements were state-to-state deals that Southern 
European countries signed with France, Switzerland, and Belgium in the 1940s, and 
with Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria in 1950s and 1960s. The repeated 
recruitment in Southern Europe as well as the family members who soon joined the 
workers in Northern Europe carved a marked migratory route from the South to the 
North of Europe. In the Fordist-Keynesian regulation model, the guest worker 
scheme played an essential role. Imported foreign workers provided a secondary 
labour force. They offered Northern European countries a reliable and fast solution 
to shortages, an on demand ‘army of reserve workers’ as Marx called it ready to 
power heavy industries and presumably ready to return at the end of their contracts. 
More importantly and paradoxically, guest workers were also contributors to 
Northern European economies via fl exible pay-as-you go schemes which offered 
few social entitlements during what has been called the golden era of the welfare 
state. The majority of guest workers in postwar Europe were male, blue-collar 
workers who found employment in high-unionised industries. They were the ideal 
protected workers especially in conservative-corporatist varieties in Northern 
Europe. Yet as native workers in similar positions benefi ted of extended protections, 
foreign workers found themselves on fl exible welfare trajectories. 
 In 1973 and because of the Oil crisis, Germany suddenly stopped new recruit-
ments and most Western European governments followed suit by 1974. By the 
1980s, everywhere in Europe the old guest worker programmes came to a full stop: 
the foreign workers have gained either permanent permits, became citizens in the 
country where they lived or returned. 
 Envisaged as temporary programmes, guest worker schemes led instead to the 
permanent settlement of the postwar migrants. Rather than triggering a large-scale 
return migration of the postwar workers, worsening economic conditions made 
migrants remain in the country and bring their families. The Oil Crisis together with 
the major transition from industrial to service based economy caused high unem-
ployment, and deregulated the labour market with the logic that it would create new 
jobs. In particular, unemployment hit hard precisely the sectors in which foreign 
workers originally were recruited: the heavy industry, manufacture and mining. 
Also, native workers were now competing shoulder-to-shoulder with foreign work-
ers for fl exible work contracts and with women who were increasingly gaining 
access to paid work. In practice, these macro-economic changes prevented new 
recruitments from abroad. It also meant that many of the guest workers themselves 
entered unemployment and were in need of social protection just as native 
workers. 
 From the perspective of post-1973 crisis, the guest worker scheme seem as 
exceptional as the economic conditions in which it was born. The shortages of 
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labour force in key sectors of economy that characterised the early postwar years 
was the opposite of high unemployment that swept across North-Western Europe in 
1970s and 1980s just as much as generous state investment for reconstruction funds 
including the multibillion dollar Marshall Plan was the opposite of the debt states 
accumulated in the Oil Crisis. In fact, they seemed so unlikely that in 1986, the 
migration scholar Stephen Castles ( 1986 ) wrote ‘an obituary’ of the guest worker 
scheme in  International Migration Review . 
 The crisis had different impact for different communities of guest workers. 
Amersfoort et al. ( 1984 ) fi nd that that unlike the Turks, Tunisians and Moroccans, 
the migrants from Spain, Italy, Portugal and former Yugoslavia had high return 
rates. Moreover, emigration statistics of these countries report that departures 
declined signifi cantly since 1973. Studying the effect of the Oil Crisis on migration 
within European Union and the Nordic Community, Rinus Penninx ( 1986 ) notes 
that the only generalizable trend is that new infl ows “seem to diminish, if the free 
circulation zone as a whole is going through a period of stagnation or recession, 
ultimately, this leads to a less rapidly growing foreign population of member states” 
( 1986 : 957). On return migration, however, Penninx fi nds no general trend. For 
instance, the Portuguese community decreased in Western Germany and in France 
but it stabilized in Norway and the Netherlands and it increased in Luxembourg. 
 However, for Spain, Greece and to some extent Italy return migration was some-
where more signifi cant. Return was driven primarily by the accession of Spain and 
Greece to the EU and Italy’s  miracolo economico of the 1960s. The Southern 
enlargement marked by the accession of Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal together 
in 1986 had similar temporary restrictions introduced in the accession treaties as 
those applied for the Central and Eastern European states. In fact, the Southern 
enlargement was the fi rst time the European Community enforced temporary restric-
tions on freedom of movement of people. The restrictions were imposed for a period 
of 6 years after each enlargement although Straubhaar ( 1984 ) noted they were 
scheduled initially to run for 7 years in the case of Spain and Portugal. The period 
was reduced because of the unexpected  extremely low mobility of workers from 
these states. During the transition period, the number of Portuguese living in the EU 
increased by only 30,000 (3 %) while the number of Spanish citizens actually 
decreased by 25,000 (−5 %) (Dustmann et al.  2003 : 44; Entzinger  1978 ). 
 Noteworthy is that there was no real end of Southern Europeans’ migration story, 
no declaration or obituary was written for the South-North migratory route. The 
route did not disappear, it was transformed. While migration from the South to the 
North slowed down signifi cantly, the same routes were used by the returning 
Southern Europeans as well as Northern Europeans moving South. Soon after the 
accession of the Southern European states to the EU (with the exception of Italy 
who was one of the six founding members), mobility patterns on this migratory 
route changed their character and parts of these fl ows became increasingly similar 
to North-North intra-European mobility. While certain migration patterns remained 
stable (see for instance low-skilled Portuguese migration in Chap.  5 ), new Southern 
European fl ows that had little in common with the postwar migration also emerged. 
Similarly to what had been observed in other parts of the EU, young and educated 
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Southern European citizens headed to European cities in search for jobs but also to 
pursue cosmopolitan lifestyles and projects of self-realisation (Favell  2008 ; Recchi 
and Favell  2009 ). Finally, the emergence of a new migratory route in the reverse 
direction, running from the North to the South of Europe and the intensifi cation of 
migrations from Central and Eastern Europe to both Southern and Northern Europe 
clearly indicated the decline of the South-North route. 
 Comparing the Southern Europeans’ ‘old’ and ‘new’ migrations, one matter 
stands out. In the postwar Europe, they were able to work abroad because of the 
guest workers schemes while the more recent Southern Europeans have been able to 
move within the EU as Union citizens who enjoy freedom of movement rights. In 
the following section, I discuss the evolution of freedom of movement and its asso-
ciated rights. 
2.3  The Archaeology of European Freedom of Movement: 
From International Migrants to Freemovers 
 Some sort of freedom of movement exists for all people regardless of their national-
ity by virtue of holding a passport. However, not all passports are the same some 
passports carry different mobility rights across the world. Possessors of Afghan 
passports, for example, can travel freely to 28 countries at the same time that pos-
sessors of British, Finish and Swedish passports have near global mobility rights 
because they are able to enter freely to 173 of the 193 countries in the world (Henley 
and Partners Visa Restrictions Index  2013 ). The wide disparity in mobility rights 
has given rise what Stephen Castles ( 2005 ) calls “hierarchy of passports”. However, 
the kind of mobility regimes passports establish is rather limited as it only secures 
free entry but guarantees no right to residence in the country, no rights for family 
members or other post-entry rights. Before the establishment of the European 
Community and freedom of movement, Europeans travelled under the same condi-
tions as other international migrants using their passports and enjoyed limited rights 
once in the country. The emergence of a regional space for unrestricted mobility a 
profound change in the way the Europeans moved across the continent. Compared 
with similar regional projects such as NAFTA in North America, MERCOSUR in 
South America or the Euroasian Economic community, European freedom of move-
ment of people stands alone because in the European case, mobility lies at the heart 
of the EU and together with the freedom of movement of services, goods and capital 
forms the four core freedoms of the Union. To recall the centrality of freedom of 
movement of people within the EU and the progressiveness of the regional integra-
tion project in Europe, Adrian Favell ( 2014 ) calls it “the fourth freedom” of the 
EU. Others, on the other hand, see it as an anachronism for the contemporary narra-
tive on immigration. The editors of a leading EU law journal (Editorial Comments 
 2014 ) describe freedom of movement as a dream that turned into nightmare “legally 
over-complicated, politically abused allegedly costly and popularly 
2 From International Migration to Freedom of Movement and Back?
20
misunderstood?”. Indeed, monitoring reports on the implementation of freemovers 
rights have revealed repeatedly irregularities with the transposition of the Directive 
in practice (Shuibhne and Shaw  2014 ). In April 2014, the European Commission 
acknowledged the problem and adopted the Directive 54/2014 that sets new rules to 
ensure better implementation of the rights of workers and jobseekers. 
 Freedom of movement is not only a generous mobility regime but it also gener-
ates additional rights including social rights in the member states of destination 
(Bauböck  2007 ; Kostakoloupou  2007 ; Maas  2007 ; Olsen  2008 ). Nonetheless, a 
notable absence is the lack of political rights for mobile Europeans in national elec-
tions although recent mobilisation in favour of these rights have found new momen-
tum in the European public sphere (Shaw  2007 ; Barbulescu  2012 ; Baubock et al. 
 2012 ). The European freedom of movement therefore provides for ample entry  and 
post-entry rights linked with residence which, create to a fairly unrestricted space 
human mobility within Europe. I underline  fairly because it is not an absolute right. 
From the beginning, the treaties included safeguards that protect the interests of the 
member states from ‘unreasonable burden’ on the social assistance system (Article 
14 of the Directive 38/2004) (see Chap.  7 on Belgium) and allow them to restrict 
freedom of movement on grounds of public policy, public security and public health 
(Article 27.1). 
 The freedom of movement of people was established at early stages of European 
integration. In its original defi nition in the Treaty of Rome (1957) it established 
under Article 3 ‘the abolition, as between the member states, of obstacles to free-
dom of movement of persons, services and capital’ and took more than 10 years 
until it was implemented in 1968 with the Regulation 1612/1968. The policy was 
the result of convergence of interests between the Italy and the North-Western 
European countries, notes Moravcsik ( 1998 : 149): “Italy sought to export labour 
and the other [Northern European], especially Germany, sought to import it, so it 
was easy to agree in principle on freedom of movement”. Italy in particular argues 
Romero ( 1993 : 52), was keen in signing off the policy because of the emerging 
European employment market provided with a solution to the chronic unemploy-
ment and poverty that led to Italians’ mass emigration the turn of twentieth century 
(see Chap.  4 , this volume). Paradoxically, the promise of freedom of movement  for 
people announced in the Treaty of Rome that implied it would apply to all nationals 
was materialised into a labour mobility  for workers in 1968. Peo Hansen and Stefan 
Jonsson ( 2014 : 227–30) show that the change of wording from freedom of move-
ment for nationals to workers was determined in the negotiation leading to what we 
now know as the Treaty of Rome. France requested to integrate Algeria, who at the 
time was part of Metropolitan France, to the European Community. In this case, 
Italy was amongst the opponents. Algeria’s integration to the common market 
would have meant that its agriculture and especially Algerian workers who had 
French citizenship would now have competed with the Italian products and Italian 
workers. Algeria became an independent state before the implementation of free-
dom of movement but the early negotiations surrounding the Algerian case helped 
the member states understand that by replacing nationality with workers, they 
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gained some leeway in deciding who qualifi es for the worker status and under which 
conditions could they enjoy free mobility. 
 The initial introduction of freedom of movement of workers served both instru-
mental objectives of the European integration (Olsen  2008 ). At its early phase, inte-
gration focused on developing the economic advantages of the Union and on 
building the common market. Freedom of movement of workers complemented the 
freedoms of services, goods, capital and added substance to the common market. It 
also served the political objectives of the EU by creating a sense of unity, amongst 
the people of Europe, or a quasi-European demos and, therefore, legitimising the 
newly established Union. 
 Until the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), freedom of movement evolved consis-
tently and progressively expanding the groups of EU citizens who could enjoy these 
rights from workers and their families to economically non-active people with suf-
fi cient economic means to support themselves. These changes were implemented 
through a series of European Community regulations 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 
72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Generally, the regulations sought to 
amplify the scope of the freedom of movement to include students, pensioners and 
economically autonomous people. The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) marked a mile-
stone in the evolution of freedom of movement: it elevated the status of freemovers 
to citizens of the European Union and introduced new political rights for the mobile 
Europeans. Bellamy and Warleigh ( 2005 ) note that provisions made by the Treaty 
of Maastricht sought to substantiate the single market and tackle the democratic 
defi cit between the citizens and the European elites. The freedom of movement 
expanded progressively until the mid 2000s when it culminated with the Directive 
38/2004, also known as the ‘Citizenship Directive’. 
 The Directive also established a right of permanent residence for Union citizens 
and did away with the exclusive relationship between freedom of movement rights 
and EU citizens by expanding them to third country nationals. Nevertheless, the 
latter were to benefi t of these rights freely as did the EU citizens but only under 
extraordinary circumstances: if and only if third country nationals complied with 
certain conditions requested by the member states. This last addition corrected what 
William Maas ( 2008 ) has called the ‘unfulfi lled promised’ of EU’s citizenship: its 
inability to extend the rights that Union citizens enjoyed since 1950s to long-term 
legal residents from third countries. In other words, what the Citizenship Directive 
achieves was to take further the legacy of Maastricht by consolidating the scope of 
freedom of movement and by expanded its associated rights; but, crucially and most 
importantly the Directive marked a fi rm move from the economic logic of market- 
minded freedom of movement that dominated the European agenda until Maastricht 
to the nation-building project of ‘making’ citizens and setting the basis for a 
European political community. 
 In addition to the large number of regulations, guidelines, statements and com-
munications from the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU henceforth) played an important role in interpreting the scope and 
limitations of both freedom of movement rights and Union citizenship through a 
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vast jurisprudence on these matters. CJEU interpreted Union citizenship as destined 
to become the  fundamental status rather than a  complementary status to the national 
citizenship. A series of the Court’s rulings 1 have consolidated this interpretation 
over time. The most remarkable example of the “court-driven empowerment” 
(Joppke  2010 : 171) of the Union citizenship is the CJEU’s decision in the  Grzelczyk 2 
case. The court reaffi rmed the right of a French-national student, Rudy Grzelczyk, 
who after 3 years of studying in Belgium and working to support himself through-
out his studies, to minimum subsistence allowance offered by the Belgian authori-
ties. The CJEU held as follows:
 [ U ] nion citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the member 
states, enabling those who fi nd themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment 
in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided 
for. 3 
 In November 2014, the CJEU made a major decision on the rights to social pro-
tection for freemovers. In the landmark  Dano case, 4 CJEU has ruled that Union citi-
zens lose the right to access to certain social protection packages if after the fi rst 3 
months they do not fall under the categories protected by the Citizenship Directive: 
workers (be them dependent or self-employed), former workers or jobseekers. 
Elisabeta Dano, a Romanian Roma and lone mother in charge of a 5-year-old with 
whom she resided in Germany since 2011. Ms Dano was living with her sister who 
also providing for her fi nancially. At the time she made the new claim, Ms. Dano 
was already receiving two types welfare benefi ts in Germany – child benefi t and 
lone parent benefi t – and had applied for a third one, a special non-contributory cash 
benefi t known as basic provision under the SGB II. It is for this third type of benefi t 
that the Court decided that she was not entitled to claim it. The Court argued that Ms 
Dano was not eligible for this benefi t because, at the time of claiming the benefi ts 
she was neither a worker, a former worker or jobseeker. The Court noted that “it is 
apparent from the documents before the Court that Ms Dano has been residing in 
Germany for more than three months [at the time of making the claim] that she is 
not seeking employment and that she did not enter Germany in order to work” 
(Paragraph 66). 
 In September 2015, the Court ruled a restrictive decision in another case on EU 
citizens’ access to welfare rights. In Alimanovic, 5 the decision confi rmed that the 
1  Most notable from an extensive jurisprudence,  Ritter -  Coulais v Finanzamt Germersheim 
C-152/03, Case  Sala v Freistaat Bayern C-85/96, Case  Bindar v London Borough of Ealing 
C-209/03, Case  Trojani v CPAS C-465/02, Case  Ioannidis C-258/04. 
2  Case  Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d ’ aide sociale d ’ Ottingnies - Louvain - la Neuve , C-184/99. 
3  Emphasis added. Case C-184  Grzelczyk ibid, Para 31. 
4  Case Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano  v Sozialgeright Leipzig (Germany), C-333/13  http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30d5753e894d7fd2478683bfe
79fccce5f4b.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxuObNf0?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&
mode=DOC&docid=159442&occ=fi rst&dir=&cid=312950 
5  Case Alimanovic et al.  v Jobcenter Berlin Neukoeln (Germany) C-67/14  http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text&docid=167661&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir
&occ=fi rst&part=1&cid=602229 
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member states can refuse social assistance to EU citizens who lose the status of 
Union workers. The Alimonovic family are Swedish citizens who resided in Berlin 
Germany. The family is composed by Nazifa the mother, Sonita elderly daughter 
and two minors still in the care of the mother: Valentina and Valentino. The family 
settled in Germany in early 1990s where the three children were born, but moved to 
Sweden in 1999. They returned to Germany in 2010. The mother and the older 
daughter worked on temporary contracts for nearly a year from June 2011 to May 
2012 after which they applied for unemployment benefi ts. When these were 
exhausted, they applied for social assistance for people in long-term unemployment 
(known as Arbeitslosengeld II). The Court ruled that Germany can stop these pay-
ments because neither the mother nor the daughter have managed to retain their 
status of Union workers. The directive specifi es that in order to retain the worker 
status, the EU citizens had to have worked for more than 1 year, laid off and regis-
tered with the relevant employment offi ce. Even in this case, the Union worker can 
retain the status for only 6 months. Both the mother and the daughter exhauseted the 
6 month period and therefore lost the status of Union worker. 
 Dano and  Alimanovic cases are transformational for European freedom of move-
ment beyond their legal consequences. Both rulings turn the light on the two ele-
ments of the freedom of movement that have been contested by the public and the 
far-right anti-immigration parties but which have slowly found their way on the 
agenda of mainstream political parties. The fi rst is the fact that free movement might 
mean unconditioned freedom to settle and the fact that freedom of movement would 
be used by some Europeans to “shop” for more generous welfare benefi ts than those 
of their countries of origin.  Dano and  Alimanovic spoke directly to growing angst 
with free movement and addressed heads-on both concerns. The decision stated 
black over white that host member states can indeed deny non-contributory benefi ts 
to freemovers and that they enjoy relative generous rights that come with freedom 
of movement for a period of 3 months. After this period, freemovers can retain these 
rights  if and only if they are workers, former workers, jobseekers or have enough 
fi nancial resources to be economically self-suffi cient. When freemovers do not hold 
such statuses, then they lose the rights established by the Directive. The Directive 
(Article 7.1) is clear on the right to reside after the fi rst 3 months is conditioned by 
freemovers’ fi nancial self-suffi ciency and “comprehensive sickness insurance” so 
that they or their family members do not become “a burden on the social assistance 
system in the host state”. While the European freedom of movement creates ample 
mobility rights (Article 5 in the Directive) and a wide set of rights for the fi rst 3 
months of residence (Article 6), freemovers’ need to meet the self-suffi ciency crite-
ria to retain these rights after the fi rst 3 months (Article 7). 
 The asymmetry in rights between before and after the 3 months period had cre-
ated public concern and confusion about freedom of movement and the  Dano and 
 Alimanovic doctrines have helped dispel them. In effect, these cases do nothing 
more than to switch the light and lay bare what seemed to be the best-kept secret 
on freedom of movement: its limits. While these limits have been part of the deal 
from the beginning, they have rarely entered the public debate on freedom of 
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movement and they were consistently omitted from the promotion campaigns of 
the European Commission that pushed for more intra-European mobility and 
focused on the special rights of the freemovers. Perhaps more importantly is that 
before  Dano and  Alimanovic , the limits of freedom of movement seldom have 
been enforced. However, these recent decisions of the CJEU have received much 
media attention and announce a period of retrenchment of freedom of movement 
rights. 
 In the following section, I explore the policy and political responses to freedom 
of movement in times of crisis and zoom-in on their consequences for the migration 
of Southern Europeans. 
2.4  Freedom of Movement, No More? Political Contestation 
of Freedom of Movement in Times of Crisis and How It 
Affects Southern European  en route to Northern Europe 
 Since the start of the economic crisis of 2007/2008, political and public discourse 
increasingly challenge the freedom of movement of people within EU as an abso-
lute right. Alarmed by the prospect of large infl ows from the Central and Eastern 
European member states upon the end of the transition restrictions, numerous politi-
cal leaders have spoken publicly on taking measures to ‘control’ migration from the 
other EU member states. The anticipation of the end of restrictions for Romanian 
and Bulgarian workers in January 2014 —while most European countries were fac-
ing their own internal economic crisis— triggered a wave of anti-immigration reac-
tions in the EU as well as outside of it (see Barbulescu  2014 ). 
 In the spring of 2013, ministers of four member states – UK, Germany, Austria 
and the Netherlands-wrote a joint letter to the European Commission and Council 
[at that time under Irish Presidency] warning it of the fact that some cities in their 
countries were being put “under a considerable strain by certain immigrants from 
other member states” (Ministers of Interior of Austria, the Netherlands, UK and 
Germany  2013 ). The letter called for tougher controls for freemovers including effi -
cient repatriations and re-entry bans: “[a]ll necessary measures need to be taken to 
deal with the consequences of this type of immigration and to fi ght its causes. This 
includes legal as well as fi nancial measures.” Interestingly, the member states refer 
to freedom of movement as “this type of immigration” and pleads for new “legal” 
measures to tackle it. The letter is important because it makes visible an emergent 
coalition of freedom of movement hardliners amongst the North-Western EU mem-
ber states who, not accidently, have also been the main receivers of migration from 
the other member states. In response, a parallel coalition supporting freedom of 
movement emerged and brought the Scandinavian countries and the Central and 
Eastern European states together. The ministers of Sweden, Finland and Norway 
jumped in defence of freedom of movement in a joint letter set to the  Financial 
Times (January 2014). The elections for the European Parliament in May 2014 
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exported the heated debate on possible restrictions to freedom of movement rights 
to all member states. 
 What seemed a pro-mobility coalition between the new member states and the 
Scandinavian states collapsed with the arrival of the so-called “refugee crisis” in the 
summer of 2015. Central and Eastern European countries have shown antagonistic 
attitudes towards the freedom of circulation of refugees and asylum seekers. Some 
of the new member states refuted EU quotas for refugees and sought to seal off their 
borders as a way of preventing asylum seekers to enter. In reply, European Council 
President Tusk rang the alarm: “Let there be no doubt, the future of Schengen is at 
stake and time is running out. The clock is ticking, we are under pressure, we need 
to act fast” (Tusk  2015 ). Ironically, by threatening to quit the principle of freedom 
of movement for refugees and asylum seekers, the new member states put under risk 
the mobility of EU citizens including that of Central and European citizens who 
have been the main protagonists of intra-European mobility over the last decade. 
 Nonetheless, the strongest contestation of freedom of movement for EU citizens 
comes from the Northern European countries. For instance in the UK, in anticipa-
tion of the elections for the European Parliament as well as general elections, David 
Cameron declared that ‘free movement in EU needs to be less free’ (EUActive 
 2013 ) (for a full discussion on the UK, see Chap.  10 , this volume). The Dutch 
Socialist Deputy Prime Minister, Lodewijck Asscher, used the colour codes used to 
announce weather calamities and called for ‘orange alert’ in anticipation of 
EU labour migration (EUObserver  2013 ). The Commission replied arguing that the 
member states raised concerns about welfare tourism including abuses but have not 
submitted evidence to support its existence. Instead, the Commission replied by tak-
ing a technical fact-checking approach and commissioned an independent study 
(ICF GHK  2013 ) which suggested a set of actions seeking to help the member states 
combat welfare tourism and make the most of freedom of movement (EC  2013 ). 
The GHK report (2013) found minuscule numbers of EU citizens who do not work, 
who are not economically active but who receive benefi ts from another EU member 
state. They represented less than 1 % of all such benefi ciaries (of EU nationals) in 
six countries studied (Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Malta and Portugal) and 
between 1 % and 5 % in fi ve other countries (Germany, Finland, France, The 
Netherlands and Sweden). Data obtained by  The Guardian on unemployment ben-
efi ts found that a similar number of EU citizens receive them as Brits in other EU 
countries (19 January 2015). 
 Calls for more control on freedom of movement is not new. Previous episodes in 
which freedom of movement has been contested were of lower intensity and, more 
importantly, they came from individual member states rather than a consolidated 
block of hardliners. Yet, I argue that they paved the way for the fi rst serious chal-
lenge that freedom of movement faced since its introduction. For instance, the evic-
tion of Roma effectively limited the rights of Roma EU citizens and led to their 
repatriation from Italy in 2008 and France in 2010 – a practice that continues to the 
present day. Freedom of movement was challenged also from the left for it 
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 depreciated workers’ rights and conditions by excluding posted workers from other 
European states to have the same protections local workers had. A series of rulings 
from the CJEU confi rmed the right of companies to contract posted workers under 
the same conditions as workers in their countries of origin rather than workers in the 
countries were they are employed. 6 
 The fact that member states’ initiatives and statements challenging freedom of 
movement remained largely unsanctioned from the Commission but were rewarded 
by the public had the unexpected effect of “normalising” the contestation. From this 
point onwards, it was only a matter of time before a coalition of member states 
would write to the Commission asking for new measures to better control the mobil-
ity from the other member states. 
 In the context of the economic crisis and enlargement  fatigue in the Northern 
Europe, individual member states have introduced new policy measures that de 
facto contract freedom of movement rights. UK and Germany have made changes 
that restrict access to social rights while Belgium has intensifi ed the number of 
expulsions for EU citizens (see Chaps.  7 ,  9 , and  10 in this book). The UK initially 
entertained the idea of quotas for migration from the other member states as it 
would help the Conservative Party meet its campaign pledge: to cap net migration 
including migration from EU to less than 100,000. However, the German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel convinced David Cameron to retreat from setting a cap on EU 
migration (The Guardian  2014 ). Cameron also consulted with European Commission 
chief Jean-Claude Juncker before delivering the Staffordshire speech in which he 
announced the new measures. In Brussels, a European Commission spokesman 
reacted to the plan set by Cameron by saying that it was up to “national lawmakers 
to fi ght against abuses of the system and EU law allows for this.” 
 The recent talks about restrictions on freedom of movement also made their way 
in the European Parliament. A Spanish MEP, representing the newly established left 
wing party  Podemos inquired the Commission about the effects the recent policies 
announced by the Northern European states on the rights of Spaniards. Pablo 
Iglesias fi lled a written question for the Commission asking about the particular 
situation of Spanish citizens in Germany who according to a draft law provides for 
penalties of up to 3 years imprisonment for people in breach of the country’s resi-
dence conditions. The Commission responded reaffi rming that it would check 
whether the draft is compatible with EU law (EP Written Answers  2014 ). In addi-
tion, Switzerland who is an associated state has voted in February 2014 in a public 
referendum to limit freedom of movement by submitting the new arrivals to quotas. 
The European Commission has already declined Switzerland’s proposal to imple-
ment the quotas for migration from the other member states and presented the broad 
association agreement as one package that cannot be renegotiated separately. 
6  Case  Laval Un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2008] IRLR 160  C-341/05 
and Case  International Transport Workers Federation v Viking Line ABP [2008] IRLR 143 
C-438/05. 
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 It is important to mention here that the politicisation of freedom of movement is 
not restricted to Northern Europe, but a similar process occurs in Southern Europe 
especially in Italy and Spain where Romanians and Bulgarians have tended to 
migrate. However, in Southern Europe politicisation intensifi ed before and after the 
Eastward enlargements rather than at the time the transitional restrictions were 
lifted (Barbulescu  2013 ). 
 The once isolated challenges are slowing building into a consensus amongst the 
North-Western European states. The fact that the freedom of movement and not 
European citizenship is the target of contention shows that people have not appro-
priated the later in the same way as the former. Nonetheless, the emerging consen-
sus focuses on a freedom of movement with more safeguards for the receiving 
states. Ultimately, this new focus translates into the following dilemma: how can 
member states organise the migration of wanted migrants while keeping out the 
unwanted migrants. This dilemma is precisely the one that states, including those 
who lead the contestation on freedom of movement, face when seeking to control 
migration from outside the EU. Because policies on freedom of movement and 
international migration seek to achieve what is increasingly the same result, they are 
becoming more alike at the policy level. 
 The concern of political elites about migration were not new as they followed the 
Eastward EU enlargement in 2004, 2007 and 2013. The economic crisis that started 
in 2007 has only aggravated this concern. It is important to mention here that public 
opinion and political leaders do not systematically target Southern Europeans in 
particular. Often, the raising numbers of Southern Europeans arriving in the North 
European countries since the start of the crisis have had little or no impact on the 
public opinion in the countries of destination and seldom featured in the media. An 
exception to this has economic liberal outlet,  The Economist that has published 
from a series of columns profi ling it: “They are coming: Hope for a better life is 
pushing young Europeans abroad” (13 September 2013) and “PIGS can fl y: Some 
European economic migrants are more welcome than others” (16 November 2013). 
From the point of view of migration scholarship, one of the puzzle is the invisibility 
of the new Southern European migration. In sharp contrast, in the countries of ori-
gin in Southern Europe, the new emigration has moved to the top of the public 
agenda inciting talks about a veritable “brain drain” and “exile” migration of the 
young professionals. 
 While Eastern Europeans and Roma in particular are the poster child for limiting 
freedom of movement, changes in this policy area such as the ones announced by 
the  Dano decision equally affect the Southern Europeans who are moving in times 
of crisis. More dramatic is that the rights as freemovers are called into question at a 
moment when Southern Europeans most need them to deal with the effects of the 
crisis. The impact on the ongoing contraction of freedom of movement rights is set 
to be higher for Southern Europeans. Unlike Central and Eastern Europeans, the 
young Spaniards, Italians, Portuguese or Greeks moving now to North-Western 
Europe have have grown up in a Europe in which mobility is free and is a defi ning 
feature of being in the EU. 
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2.5  Conclusions 
 Southern Europeans have been the pioneers of European freedom of movement 
establishing migratory routes connecting the South with the North of Europe in the 
postwar period. However, when these routes were initiated, Southern Europeans 
were mere international migrants recruited by the Northern European countries 
largely through guest worker schemes. The exception to this rule was Italy, which 
was a founding member of the EU. With time, European Union has expanded and 
together with it, European freedom of movement has strengthened and expanded to 
incorporate new rights. With the accession of Spain, Greece and Portugal to the EU, 
the migratory route lost its signifi cance only to re-emerge in the context of the eco-
nomic crisis. 
 However, this new migration of Southern Europeans comes at a time when free-
dom of movement is challenged in a number of member states. A coalition of mem-
ber states bringing together the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and, Austria —who 
share a hard line agenda on freedom of movement— have already taken action by 
introducing restrictive policies seeking to reduce access to social benefi ts, to effec-
tively expel homeless EU citizens and to extend the re-entry bans for offenders. We, 
therefore, observe a hollowing out of freedom of movement rights, as political con-
sensus builds up to limit rights associated with freedom of movement and in doing 
so, making it increasingly similar to international migration. While the contraction 
of freedom of movement rights and their systematic challenge have been triggered 
by the 2004, 2007 and, 2013 Eastward enlargements, Southern Europeans who 
chose to move to another member state since the start of the crisis will be equally 
affected by the ongoing changes. Brought up in the Europe in which freedom of 
movement was beyond doubt and even promoted by the member states and EU 
institutions, Southern Europeans see their rights endangered when they need them 
the most: to escape the fi nancial and austerity crisis in their countries. Freedom of 
movement or the euro, once emblematic achievements of European integration are 
being tested under the shock conditions of the most severe crisis in living history. 
The EU institutions still seem determined to paint freedom of movement in terms of 
win-win situation benefi ting sending and receiving member states alike. At the 
national level, however, the narratives on international migration and freedom of 
movement are becoming increasingly similar. 
R. Barbulescu
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 Chapter 3 
 Immobility in Times of Crisis? The Case 
of Greece 
 Georgia  Mavrodi and  Michalis  Moutselos 
 Greece, like other countries of Southern Europe, had in the beginning of the twenty- 
ﬁ rst century completed a spectacular reversal of its migration history. Starting out as 
the European country with the most extensive emigration ﬂ ows relative to its popu-
lation in the early 1970s, Greece ended up, by the late 2000s, as the EU country with 
the highest percentage of (legal and estimated illegal) immigrant to national popula-
tion (Kasimis  2013 ). Yet the severe economic crisis that started in 2008 challenges 
this remarkable development. Could the swing of the historical pendulum once 
again have more people migrating out of the country? Indeed the country’s eco-
nomic woes have reversed the balance of migratory ﬂ ows. Repatriation of immi-
grants who resided in Greece has been much more dramatic than new emigration, 
the latter consisting mostly of high-skilled workers. Greek policymakers have so far 
not developed a coherent policy vis-à-vis these developments, while existing net-
works and institutional frameworks, many of which are a legacy of the post-war 
migration, have not adapted to the recent waves. 
3.1  Socio-economic Situation in Greece 
 Greece is, without doubt, the Eurozone member-state hit most severely by the eco-
nomic crisis. The country’s economy was in recession between 2008 and late 2014. 
Its real GDP growth rate fell dramatically during four consecutive years (2008–
2011) peaking at a spectacular if devastating 7.1 % drop in 2011. In the year 2013 
real GDP growth continued to fall by 3.9 % (Eurostat  2014 ). Overall, almost 25 % 
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losses of its GDP between and relative per capita income occurred between 2009 
and 2013 (Table  3.1 ).
 At the same time there is a decline in the population residing in the country. After 
years of a continuous population rise, owing much to international immigration, on 
1 January 2009 the country had reached a peak at 11,190,654 inhabitants. Two years 
later they were reduced to 11,123,392. It is estimated that the total population had 
fallen below eleven million as of 1 January 2014 (10,926,807 inhabitants), at about 
the same level as in the late 1990s, with another 100,000 estimated to have left the 
country by January 2015 (Eurostat  2015c ). 
 Heavy recession has gone hand-in-hand with steady, uninterrupted increase in 
unemployment rates that began in early 2009. At that time, the number of long-term 
unemployed (deﬁ ned as those actively seeking employment for 12 consecutive 
months or longer) surpassed 300,000 people, reaching 381,642 in December 2009, 
474,745 in September 2010, and 611,785 in March 2011. Short-term unemploy-
ment also increased considerably, from 138,284 people in March 2010 to 180,817 
people a year later albeit recording lower numbers during the summer months. 
During the ﬁ rst trimester of 2014, over 1,355,000 people were ofﬁ cially recorded as 
unemployed among a total population of approximately 11 million, with a slight 
decrease noted in the ﬁ rst trimester of 2015 (ELSTAT  2014 ,  2015 ). 
 How unemployment relates to the economic crisis can be traced by taking into 
account the ofﬁ cial unemployment data recorded during the ﬁ rst trimester of each 
year since 1998. We choose to look at the ﬁ rst trimester (January–March) of each 
year to account for seasonal unemployment in important economic sectors such as 
tourism, agriculture, and constructions. 
 According to Greek ofﬁ cial statistics, unemployment rose from 9.3 % in 2009 to 
27.8 % in 2014 (ELSTAT  2009 ,  2010 ,  2011 ,  2012 ,  2014 ,  2015 ). It would be mis-
leading to simply attribute high unemployment rates in 2009 to the outbreak of the 
economic crisis. During the previous decade, with the exception of 2007 and 2008, 
unemployment had been relatively high and, despite economic growth, unemploy-
ment rates had peaked in the ﬁ rst trimesters of 1999 and 2000 at 12.2 % and 12.3 %, 
respectively. However, the ﬁ rst 2 years of crisis put a halt to the gradual but signiﬁ -
cant reduction of unemployment achieved between 2004 and 2008 (from 11.3 % to 
8.2 % during the ﬁ rst trimester of those years, respectively) and introduce a period 
of unprecedented and precipitous rise ever since (ELSTAT  2009 ,  2010 ) (Table  3.2 ).
 Apart from the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs, the crisis has altered the 
geographical distribution of unemployment and strategies of job-seekers. For 
instance, those without a job today are much less selective than their counterparts 
 Table 3.1  Real GDP growth rate and GDP per capita in PPS, 2007–2014 
 2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 
 Real GDP growth rate  3.5 %  −0.2 %  −3.1 %  −4.9 %  −7.1 %  −7.0 %  −3.9 %  0.8 % 
 GDP/capita in PPS (EU28 
= 100) 
 91  93  94  87  77  74  73  72 
 Source: Eurostat ( 2015a ,  b ) 
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5 years ago: whereas 11.1 % of the unemployed in early 2009 had refused at least 
one job offer for various reasons, those in early 2014 who did the same were only 
4 % (Ibid.). The share of part-time work in overall employment has also increased 
gradually, from 6.1 % in early 2009 to 9.5 % in early 2015. More signiﬁ cant are the 
changes in qualitative characteristics of employment. In early 2015, 68 % of part- 
time employees had this type of employment because they could not ﬁ nd a full-time 
job, as opposed to 45.9 % 6 years before. Moreover, in addition to geographical 
areas known for high unemployment rates prior to the crisis (such as western 
Macedonia in Northern Greece), regions that previously attracted internal and inter-
national migrants for employment purposes (such as Attica and Crete) are now hit 
particularly hard (Table  3.3 ).
 Within this wider framework of change some structural characteristics of unem-
ployment in Greece have remained constant. Unemployment continues to affect 
predominantly the young, women and the low-skilled. Women aged 24 and below 
have most difﬁ culties to ﬁ nd a job (in the last 3 years, over 55 % of this category 
have been unemployed) while men with a degree of tertiary education have been the 
most likely to be employed. Paradoxically, those with primary education had and 
still have better chances in the Greek labour market than those with secondary edu-
cation or the holders of a degree of tertiary technical education (ELSTAT  2009 , 
 2010 ,  2012 ,  2013a ,  b ,  2014 ,  2015 ). Last but not least, as Table  3.2 suggests, the 
crisis disproportionately affected foreign workers, a group that had exhibited lower 
unemployment rates than the national average, but whose unemployment level 
increased more than ﬁ vefold between 2008 and 2013. 
 The recession also resulted in the signiﬁ cant reduction of disposable income for 
individuals and households, increasing poverty, and social exclusion. According to 
Eurostat, the median net income declined from 11,963 euros in 2010 to 7714 euros 
in 2014 while the mean net income decreased from 13,974 euros to 8879 euros dur-
ing the same period (−35.5 % and −36,4 %, respectively) (Eurostat  2015d ). 
According to more precise estimates covering part of this period, relative poverty 
(deﬁ ned as the percentage of the general population with an income that lies below 
60 % of the median disposable income) showed a modest increase, from 19.4 % in 
2009 to 22.3 % in 2013 (Matsaganis and Leventi  2013 : 3). However, there is great 
variation among different population categories. 
 Table 3.3  Unemployment in selected Greek regions, 2009–2014 (ﬁ rst trimester) 
 Region 
 Year 
 2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015 
 Attica  7.6 %  10.7 %  14.7 %  22.9 %  28.6 %  28 %  26.7 % 
 Crete  10.9 %  12.9 %  15.7 %  23.4 %  26.9 %  26.9 %  27.2 % 
 Western Macedonia  14.4 %  15.1 %  22.3 %  28.5 %  32.0 %  28.4 %  29 % 
 Ionian islands  14.1 %  20.4 %  20.3 %  15.9 %  22.8 %  27.4 %  28.9 % 
 Southern Aegean  16.9 %  18.9 %  24.3 %  13.9 %  24.9 %  30.3 %  25.4 % 
 Source: ELSTAT ( 2009 ,  2011 ,  2012 ,  2014 ,  2015 ) 
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 Between 2009 and 2013, relative poverty increased most sharply for the unem-
ployed (from 34.2 to 46.7 %), for households residing in rented property or paying 
home mortgage (from 19.3 to 27.2 %), for the self-employed (from 17.3 to 24.0 %), 
and for those residing in Athens, as opposed to other urban or rural areas (from 16.1 
to 24.7 %) (Matsaganis and Leventi  2013 : 3). Moreover, over 60 % of the unem-
ployed adults were in danger of social exclusion in 2010, 2011 and 2012 (Karakitsios 
 2014 : 10). In contrast, relative poverty has been negligible for civil servants and 
bank employees; it has been low and declining for some professional groups (pri-
vate doctors, lawyers, engineers and mass media employees); it has slightly 
increased for paid employees in the private sector and students (1.5 and 3.2 % 
increase, respectively); and, albeit high, it showed a sharp decrease for those 
employed in agriculture (from 34.1 % in 2009 to 24 % in 2013). Finally, among 
generational categories, young adults up to 29 years have been subject to the sharp-
est increase in relative poverty (from 19.5 % in 2009 to 26.9 % in 2013), the reverse 
of pensioners and the elderly (Matsaganis and Leventi  2013 : Ibid.). 
 These estimates reveal a mixed picture. While the Greek recession has been con-
tinuous and severe, parts of the population have remained more protected (civil 
servants who have retained their positions albeit with reduced salaries, free profes-
sionals and, to a signiﬁ cant degree, pensioners) while others (such as the unem-
ployed, the young and the self-employed) have experienced growing relative 
deprivation and/or poverty. Even when income in 2013 is compared with a stable 
poverty limit, namely the adjusted poverty level of the year 2009, the unemployed, 
the self-employed and the young appear as the main victims of the crisis (Matsaganis 
and Leventi  2013 : 4–5). These developments relate to long-established structural 
characteristics and redistributive consequences of the Greek system of social pro-
tection, along with the effects of austerity on public ﬁ nances and programs of social 
security (Matsaganis  2013 : 2). 
 The latter continued to protect the rights and income of parts of the population 
directly or indirectly supported by the state (civil servants, employees in public util-
ity companies and pensioners) much more than the unemployed, the paid employ-
ees in the private sector, and the self-employed. For decades, this social welfare 
model – at the same time discriminatory, selective and weak – was coupled by the 
protective and supportive role of traditional social networks (most importantly the 
family) towards the young, the elderly and those in need, characterised by the provi-
sion of both material and non-material support to the most vulnerable (Htouris 
 2012 ; see also Eurostat  2013a for data on income pooling and sharing within the 
household). Increasing unemployment and cuts in earnings and wages have put 
strains on the ability of households and families to fully perform this function. 
 The recession has most severely hit parts of the population with low levels of 
human capital (Zografakis and Mitrakos  2012 ). The latter include single-parent 
families, the long-term unemployed, and the country’s immigrant population, espe-
cially third-country nationals (largely employed in the private sector and in low- 
paid seasonal economic activities) who have largely remained outside the coverage 
of the basic social security net (Matsaganis  2013 ; Zografakis and Mitrakos  2012 ; 
Balourdos  2012 ). It has been estimated that Albanian immigrant households have 
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faced the greatest danger of falling to low-income-earner status, compared to both 
Greek households and immigrant households of other nationalities (Zografakis and 
Mitrakos  2012 ). The less favourable employment situation for third-country nation-
als is not a Greek phenomenon and has been noted in labour markets across the 
EU. In particular, along with the existence of looser ties with the host country, the 
employment of third-country nationals in jobs with ﬁ xed-term contracts and in eco-
nomic sectors with high sensitivity to the business cycle (such as tourism and con-
struction) is connected with higher labour mobility and employment volatility. 
3.2  Migratory Dynamics and Volume of Emigration Flows 
 The period between 1955 and 1977 marked the most extensive wave of outward 
migration, with about 1.2 million people moving out of Greece, roughly half to 
Germany, 30,000 to Belgium and about 370,000 overseas, mostly in the United 
States, Canada and Australia. The reasons for emigration were primarily economic 
and the rural areas of Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace in the North were particularly 
overrepresented during the post-war wave. In addition, about 65,000 political refu-
gees had ﬂ ed the country after the Greek Civil War after 1949, but the majority of 
them relocated to countries of the former Eastern Bloc. After 1970 there was a 
counter-wave of repatriation, particularly from European countries, towards Greek 
urban centers (Glytsos and Katseli  2005 ). 
 It is notable that data for post-war emigration are more informative than cur-
rently available data collected by the Greek authorities. The scarcity of detailed 
information poses a major challenge to the description, analysis and understanding 
of the phenomenon – a problem not limited to the Greek case, as the difﬁ culty in 
collecting systematic data partly relates to the free movement of people among EU 
member-states (Deutsche Bank Research  2011 : 5). 
 The Greek national statistical agency (ELSTAT) focuses on recording the num-
ber of foreign nationals entering or residing in the country. Additional estimates of 
emigration ﬂ ows and their publication, a practice that began in 2010, do not include 
Greek citizens. Moreover, the issue of current migration movements from Southern 
EU member-states to the rest of the EU is under-researched, fuelled by non- 
registration of recent emigrants with the authorities of their countries of origin 
(Triandafyllidou and Gropas  2014 ). As a result, best available data are those released 
by national statistical agencies in the countries of destination, as well as larger data-
bases and publications by international organisations. 
 According to Eurostat ( 2013b ), outﬂ ows from Greece began outnumbering 
inﬂ ows in 2008, when Greece recorded negative net migration for the ﬁ rst time 
since 1998 (the ﬁ rst year of publication of such data). Between 2009 and 2012, 
emigration increased rapidly. Outﬂ ows peaked in 2010 followed by a drop in 2011, 
only to resume strength in 2012. The timing of the increase in net migration out-
ﬂ ows corresponds to the outbreak of the economic crisis. The ﬁ gures also include 
foreign citizens, including non-EU citizens, who had settled in Greece in the 1990s 
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and 2000s. Indeed, most recent work on emigration from Italy highlights the exodus 
of EU citizens and third-country nationals (Triandafyllidou and Gropas  2014 : 2). 
 According to the OECD, the number of registered foreign (non-EU) citizens in 
Greece fell from 610,800 in 2009 to 507,000 in 2012 (OECD  2015 ). This develop-
ment may reﬂ ect a large-scale departure of Albanian nationals, who had been the 
dominant immigrant group in Greece since the early 1990s. In fact, according to the 
estimates of the Albanian Institute of Statistics about 95,000 Albanians of 18 years 
old and above returned from Greece to Albania between 2009 and 2013 (INSTAT 
and IOM  2014 ). In contrast, emigration of Greek nationals appears to be limited 
(OECD  2013 : 258). This is not to say that Greeks are not part of the wider phenom-
enon of new migrations from the European South to Northern Europe and beyond. 
According to the OECD, signiﬁ cant percentage increases in new arrivals of Greek 
citizens have been recorded in Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Sweden. Over 30,000 people left Greece for these countries in 2011 while in 2012 
there were over 40,000 Greek nationals arriving in Germany and Sweden alone 
(OECD  2013 : 256, 258). 
 National statistics, when available in the countries of destination, offer a more 
detailed picture. A direct comparison among them is often difﬁ cult, given the differ-
ent time frames and categories used (citizenship, country of birth, point of depar-
ture) The most recent provisional immigration data from Germany indicates that 
31,861 persons arrived from Greece in 2014, 30,602 of whom were non-German 
citizens. These ﬁ gures made Greece the 11th most important country of origin of 
new immigrants, despite a slight decrease when compared to previous years (a total 
of 35,811 persons in 2012 and 34,728 persons in 2013). At the same time, a total of 
17,225 persons emigrated from Germany to Greece (Statistisches Bundesamt  2014 ). 
 A clearer picture is provided by data reﬂ ecting the immigration trend of non- 
German citizens from Greece in the last decade. After 5 years of stability (between 
8000 and 9000 persons each year in the period 2005–2009, greatly outnumbered by 
an average of 15,000 non-German citizens emigrating from Germany to Greece per 
year, new arrivals increased dramatically in 2011 (12,523 persons) and 2012 (23,779 
persons), before peaking at 33,739 persons in 2013 and falling slightly to 30,602 
persons in 2014. At the same time, it seems that the outbreak of the severe economic 
crisis discouraged Greeks already residing in Germany from returning back: com-
pared to 14,841 non-German citizens who emigrated to Greece in 2009, 11,482 
chose to do so in 2010, followed by 10,306 in 2011 (Statistisches Bundesamt  2014 : 
19–20). Yet, a modest increase in the number of those leaving to Greece since 2012 
may indicate a reversal of this trend, possibly related to the stabilisation of the eco-
nomic situation in Greece or the limited return of retired past economic migrants. 
 The upward trend of arrivals from Greece can also be detected in the United 
Kingdom, at a faster pace, albeit at a smaller scale. According to annual estimates 
of the Ofﬁ ce of National Statistics – reporting foreign-born and foreigners -, esti-
mated arrivals of those born in Greece for the period 2006–2014 peaked in 2011 and 
2012 (about 8000 new arrivals), slightly upwards from 6000 arrivals in 2007 and 
went back to 6000 in 2013 and 2014. These inﬂ ows are typical of the entire period 
since the early 2000s reﬂ ecting a strong preference among Greek youth for the UK 
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as a place of study and employment. The most remarkable development is the slow-
down of return migration from the UK to Greece that has caused the number of UK 
residents born in Greece to swell from about 25,000 in 2007 to about 52,000 in 
2014. Similar trends can be found in the estimated numbers of Greek nationals 
residing in the UK with 54,000 residents in 2012 compared to 26,000 in 2007 (see 
also UK chapter) (Ofﬁ ce of National Statistics  2015 ). 
 In the Netherlands, the total number of residents of Greek origin shows a steady 
and signiﬁ cant increase in the last 6 years (from 13,888 persons in 2009 to 15,052 in 
2011, to 18,253 in 2013 and 19,217 in 2014). Only 599 persons among them belong 
to the second generation whereas 4724 are newcomers (CBS  2014 ). Increases in 
arrivals of Greek citizens are also recorded in other member-states but they start 
from a very low base and the total number is rather insigniﬁ cant. In Austria, for 
instance, the number of Greek citizens arriving in the country between 2010 and 
2012 increased twofold: 519 persons in 2010, followed by 813 in 2011 and 1201 in 
2012 (Statistik Austria  2013 : 28). In Belgium, 14,922 Greek residents were recorded 
on January 1st, 2009 and 14,798 a year later, while the number increased to 16,275 
by January 1st 2015 (Statistics Belgium  2009 ,  2010 ,  2015 ; see also Chap.  8 in this 
volume). New arrivals reached 715 people in 2010 and 1025 people in 2012 
(Eurostat  2014 ). In Sweden, 517 immigrants born in Greece arrived in 2009, fol-
lowed by 602 in 2010, 1018 in 2011, 1546 in 2012, 1519 in 2013 and 1243 in 2014). 
The number of Greek citizens arriving in Sweden during the same period was some-
what lower but displayed the same trends (483 in 2009, 520 in 2010, 929 in 2011, 
1348 in 2012, 1378 in 2013, 1088 in 2014) (Statistiska Centralbyran  2015 ). Similar 
trends were also observed in France, where the number of foreigners of Greek citi-
zenship resident in France ( étrangers ) increased from 5884 people in 2006 to 
5962 in 2008 to 6596 in 2011 (INSEE  2006 , 2008, 2011 – later data do not include 
Greeks as a separate category). 
 Finally, when it comes to western European destinations outside of the European 
Union, Switzerland also documents increases in the number of foreign-born Greek 
citizens present in the country in recent years. The inward migration of Greek citi-
zens increased from 713 persons in 2009 to peak at 1685 incomers in 2013 with a 
decrease to 1464 persons in 2014 (Statistik Schweiz  2015 ). 
 On the basis of the data presented above, it becomes clear that Greek emigration 
to central and northern Europe is, generally, on the increase since 2008. However, 
the size and pace of the movement may differ greatly from one country of destina-
tion to another. When one compares the current ﬂ ows to the post-war emigration 
from Greece to Western Europe, one is struck by aspects of continuity (Germany, 
Belgium and Sweden having been traditional destinations), and change (the UK and 
the Netherlands). In terms of size, the average gross annual emigration from Greece 
to Germany for the period is roughly equal to the numbers of current outﬂ ows 
(about 30,000 persons a year; see Fakiolas and King  1996 ). However, a direct com-
parison between the two periods is not easily warranted. For instance, it is reason-
able to assume that the free movement of people inside the EU and the absence of 
state-sponsored, heavily monitored, intra-European migration – typical of the post-
war period – underestimates the number of Greeks currently moving or residing 
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abroad or engaging in seasonal and repeated migration. Free movement of capital 
and the common currency might also render difﬁ cult the measurement of remit-
tances towards Greece from these recent migrants. 
 A second tentative conclusion is that the overall number of Greek emigrants does 
not correspond to a wave of mass emigration, despite the heavy recession and the 
favorable institutional framework of freedom of movement within the EU. In this 
regard, Greece does not differ from the other EU member-states that have been 
severely hit by the crisis. As noted recently, “if we consider the extent, the duration 
and the harshness of the crisis it seems that a surprisingly lower number of Greeks, 
Italians, Irish, Spaniards and Portuguese have emigrated than would have been 
expected” (Gropas and Triandafyllidou  2014a : 5). 
 There exist many explanations behind the discrepancy between predicted eco-
nomic migration and observed reality. First, there are well-known impediments to 
labour mobility within the EU: inter alia, linguistic barriers, cultural differences, 
inadequate information on labour supply and demand in other EU member-states 
and incomplete recognition of qualiﬁ cations (Deutsche Bank Research  2011 ). 
Mobility is also, generally, very costly for unskilled workers, who would have the 
greatest incentive to migrate, while skilled workers are able to cover such costs 
more easily but do not face as high unemployment levels (for a similar analysis, see 
SER 2001: 7–8). Htouris ( 2012 ) has also underlined the protective role of the Greek 
family for those hit by the economic crisis in the absence of other welfare provi-
sions. We may assume that this family-based safety net, bolstered by the relative 
protection of pensions during the crisis, constrains the geographic mobility of 
young, unemployed Greeks. 
 An underdeveloped area of research relates to the qualitative characteristics of 
recent emigrants, such as their skills, professional aspirations, geographic origin, 
family history and networks etc. Empirical research on emigration is limited in the 
Greek scholarly community, since most academics and research institutions still 
focus on issues of immigration (including irregular immigration), settlement, and 
integration of third-country nationals. Two surveys have dealt exclusively with doc-
umenting the characteristics of emigration ﬂ ows (Lambrianidis  2011 ; Gropas and 
Triandafyllidou  2014a ,  b ). However, both concentrated on the movement of the 
high-skilled, while the older survey is based on data collected prior to the economic 
crisis. 
 There is practically no systematic data available on emigration ﬂ ows of the 
lower-skilled or unskilled Greek emigration. Due to its seasonal and undocumented 
nature this type of emigration is also underestimated in ofﬁ cial registries (unlike 
Portugal, there is no recording of posted workers, see Chap.  5 in this volume). This 
remains an empirical challenge for the full appreciation of the recent migration 
movement from the South. Indeed, a private communication of the authors with a 
representative of the Association of Immigrants and Coethnics from Germany, con-
ﬁ rmed that many low-skilled workers migrate for a brief period and work in restau-
rants, construction and transportation (often in businesses owned by relatives or 
other co-ethnics) without registering residence or employment (telephone interview 
10/08/2014). 
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 In reality, the only piece of empirical research that conveys parts of the bigger 
picture is the recent online survey by Gropas and Triandafyllidou ( 2014b ). The 
survey collected responses from 919 Greek citizens who emigrated abroad between 
2007 and 2013, the vast majority among them having left since 2009. Biases associ-
ated with snowball sampling and self-selection limit the generalizability of the 
study, but certain conclusions merit discussion. Of all respondents, 88 % hold a 
higher education degree and 97 % were up to 45 years of age (48 % were under 30 
years old). Their ﬁ ve most popular destinations in the EU were the UK, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden, with Switzerland and Norway among the 
top-ﬁ ve destinations outside the EU (other countries included the United States, 
United Arab Emirates and Canada). 
 In the country of destination, most respondents found employment in the IT sec-
tor, education and research, medical and paramedical professions, hotel services 
and catering, and engineering. The wish to improve their academic and professional 
training, their sense of lacking a future in Greece, and the ability to ﬁ nd better pro-
fessional opportunities were by far the three most important motivations for leaving 
abroad. Finally, the majority of their respondents (58 %) declared their wish to 
remain in their country of destination for more than 5 years or even migrate further 
to another country rather than return to Greece in the near future (Gropas and 
Triandafyllidou  2014b ). 
 The survey dovetails Lambrianidis’ ﬁ ndings ( 2011 ) based on data collected prior 
to the outbreak of the crisis, which shows that the phenomenon of Greek emigration 
of the high-skilled pre-dated the recession. The crisis has only intensiﬁ ed the phe-
nomenon but not to the point of creating a “mass wave” of Greek emigration of 
professionals and scientists. 
3.3  Public Discourses and Policy Responses on New 
Migration 
 As noted in the previous section, the historical experience of mass postwar emigra-
tion into Northern Europe was dominated by the image of the low-skilled male 
manual worker, typically from rural areas, who sent remittances to the family home, 
relied on state-led programs of employment and integration and was willing to repa-
triate once economic conditions were no longer propitious. This image was not 
entirely accurate, as later migrants in the postwar boom included families and older 
people, their duration of stay increased and they exploited migrant networks 
(Glytsos and Katseli  2005 ). However, the differences with current outﬂ ows cannot 
be overstated: the Greek state has not developed any systematic policy on sending 
migrants or attracting them back to Greece – the high-skilled exploit professional 
networks, while the low-skilled rely on family acquaintances. Elite discourse on 
migration has largely focused on the prospects of “brain drain” but has mostly been 
framed in terms of individual decision-making. 
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3.3.1  Discourse on New Migration 
 The recent movement towards the European North has featured in Greek public 
discourse mainly in association with the prolonged economic crisis. Since the latter 
has resulted in acute political polarization, references to the migratory waves are 
often tinged with partisan interpretations. For instance, when reporting on the so 
called “neo-immigrants” ( neometastates ), the Left-leaning press emphasizes themes 
of appropriation of added value by Northern European employers and exploitation 
by fraudulent employment ofﬁ ces set up in countries of destination (Avgi 
12/05/2013; Eleftherotipia 05/01/2014). On the other side of the political spectrum, 
the popular right-wing press has evoked romantic, organic images of “national 
bleeding” and lamented the forceful recruiting of young Greeks by Germany, remi-
niscent of the forceful recruitment of Jenissaries ( paidomazoma ) in Ottoman times 
(Dimokratia 06/09/2012, 04/07/2013). In both cases, the interpretative frames 
implicitly or explicitly assign responsibility to the choices of pro-austerity govern-
ments (often explicitly using terms such as “sell-outs”, “traitors”); the same narra-
tives often suggest a conscious and coordinated attempt of Northern European 
governments to draw the best talent from the South that goes unchallenged. 
Interestingly, the same reports draw abundantly from historical analogies (a typical 
one is “Gastarbeiter with a university degree”). 
 Other newspapers, typically less critical of the bailout agreements with EU part-
ners, are concerned with high-skilled migration and the prospect of “brain drain”. 
They emphasize the beneﬁ ts of migration for educated Greeks who cannot ﬁ nd 
adequate employment at home, but underline the paradox of aiming to rebuild an 
economy without its best-skilled workers. Reporting is otherwise full of informal 
interviews of Greek doctors, nurses and engineers who have moved abroad (To 
Vima 01/03/2013, Kathimerini 12/01/2013). Journalists often include data from the 
above-cited studies by Triandafyllidou, Groppa and Lambrianidis (and sometimes 
brieﬂ y interview the authors) to underline the high skills of migrants, as well as the 
continuities from pre-crisis migration. However, they underreport examples of sea-
sonal, low-skilled migration, with scattered accounts of exploitative working condi-
tions (Kathimerini 28/12/2014). Another notable underreported story in the Greek 
press is the remarkable outﬂ ow of third-country nationals, especially Albanians. An 
exception was the investigative hourly broadcast by journalist Stavros Theodorakis 
on Greek-born and raised teenagers who left Greece with their families. 
 Beyond the press, the new migratory waves are the object of discussions and 
debates among academics, journalists and political elites. This discussion has at 
times taken the form of academic roundtables -notably in collaboration with the 
Greek-German Cultural Society “Dialogos” in Thessaloniki or under the auspices 
of the Onassis Foundation in Athens- and has at times assumed a debate-style form 
of “Should I stay or should I go?”. One of these debates, organized by Intelligence 
Squared Greece, featured famous Greek academics, writers and entrepreneurs. 
Generally, framing migration as a moral dilemma in times of national emergency is 
of limited consequence in the Greek public discourse, as most arguments are actu-
ally about the costs and beneﬁ ts of the decision to migrate. 
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 Public discourse regarding outward migration is also notable for its silences. 
First, it is entirely disconnected from the very heated discussion on third-country 
nationals residing in Greece, notably immigrants/refugees and asylum seekers 
whose applications are processed by Greek authorities and who remain in quasi- 
legal or illegal status. The most direct reference to the dangers of anti-immigrant 
sentiment in Greece backﬁ ring against the Greek new immigrants abroad was made 
inside the Greek parliament by the Communist Party’s MP, Georgios Marinos 
(Parliamentary Proceedings 15/03/2014). Second, the absence from the public 
debate of acting Greek associations and representatives of the Greek Orthodox 
Church in Northern Europe is notable. Time will show if these older organizations 
have not made public contributions, because arrivals have been very recent or 
because these particular ethnic associations, created in the 1960s and serving Greek 
guest workers and their families, represent an outdated form of community 
organization. 
3.3.2  Policy Initiatives for the New Migrants 
 Historically, Greek policymakers have had an ambivalent attitude towards migra-
tion into Northern Europe, on the one hand regarding it as a safety valve and a 
source of income through remittances, and on the other hand bemoaning the skills 
and talent lost in the process. This was reﬂ ected in somewhat contradictory policies: 
Greek governments initially encouraged remittances and signed bilateral agree-
ments for enhancing workers’ assimilation through skills and language training; 
since the early 1970s, however, they actively sought repatriation by providing incen-
tives for asset purchases in Greece and reductions in duties and taxes for imported 
consumer durables (for instance, cars bought abroad). In another example of inco-
herent policy, the children of Greek migrants were offered the option to attend 
exclusively Greek schools, but were later encouraged to attend German schools or 
bilingual programs (Glytsos and Katseli  2005 ). 
 If the previous Northward migration wave was anchored to formalized interstate 
agreements, current movement takes place within a free-movement framework. 
Migratory trajectories of those leaving Greece are individually decided and exe-
cuted and inter-state initiatives are of limited importance. For instance, the “Job of 
My Life” (Mobi-proEU) program, sponsored by the German Federal Ministry of 
Labor and aimed at training young workers from other EU countries, received very 
little attention in Greece, mostly because of limited cooperation between the pro-
gram organizers and the Greek Manpower Employment Organizations- OAED 
(Greek Reporter 30/01/2014). Certain initiatives promoting partnerships at the 
municipal level under the auspices of the Greek-German Assembly have also had 
very limited success on employment and training. On the other hand, sector-speciﬁ c 
information sessions and cooperative initiatives among academic institutions in 
Greece, businesses and professional associations, especially for doctors and 
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 engineers, were more successful and facilitated the resettlement of thousands of 
Greek professionals (Kathimerini 13/05/2012, APE-MPE 28/05/2014). 
 Inversely, there have been no speciﬁ c laws passed by the Greek parliament or 
decisions by Greek governments since 2008 targeting recent migrants beyond the 
provisions of existing EU Treaties. Much like the Greek press, parliamentary 
debates around the “brain drain” have been subsumed under the pro- and anti- mem-
orandum narratives. New migration is thus used as an off-handed reference in dis-
cussions about funding a new technology hub in Thessaloniki or passing the annual 
budget law (Parliamentary Proceedings 21/08/2013, 05/07/2012). Developments in 
two policy areas related to the new migrants reveal, if anything, a disengagement of 
the authorities. First, Parliament passed a law in late 2011 to gradually close or 
convert Greek-language schools abroad, stressing the need to integrate with host- 
country curriculum. In addition, there has been no progress on the issue of voting 
rights of Greek citizens residing abroad. Greece is indeed one of the very few 
European states not to have provisions for expatriates exercising their right to vote 
(Laﬂ eur  2013 ) and that despite Constitutional provisions to that effect (Sitaropoulos 
and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece 2012). 
 The absence of an ofﬁ cial policy towards recent migrants also reﬂ ects the absence 
of an institutionalized framework towards the Greek diaspora, in contrast with other 
Southern European countries, such as Italy or Portugal. The Council of Expatriate 
Greeks ( Simvoulio Apodimou Ellinismou ), founded in 1995 to consult the Greek 
government on issues pertaining to citizens abroad, had entered a period of decline 
long before the crisis had started and was virtually inactive by 2010. In fact, the only 
systematic policy initiative affecting new migrants was the obligation to register at 
a newfound tax division for Greek citizens living abroad, intended to avoid tax 
evasion. 
3.4  Conclusion 
 Unsurprisingly, the serious economic problems Greece has faced in the last few 
years have increased migratory outﬂ ows and transformed it into a country of emi-
gration – a position it had not assumed in decades. Although the bulk of outﬂ ows 
consist of third-country nationals returning to their home countries or moving to 
more promising destinations within the European Union, Greeks, especially the 
high-skilled, have also emigrated or postponed repatriation. They have chosen his-
torically preferred destinations (with Germany assuming the lion’s share), as well as 
more novel ones, such as the UK. However, this movement has not assumed the 
massive proportions of post-war migration, as the severity of the crisis might have 
suggested and the heavy –if rather superﬁ cial- politicization of the “brain drain” 
implied. On the other hand, existing migrant networks and institutionalized support 
by the Greek authorities have proven ill-suited, under-developed and under-utilized 
to face the needs of the new migrants, again in contrast with the more structured 
post-war migration. In fact, policy and opinion makers in Greece have mostly 
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subsumed the importance and challenges of recent movements under domestic 
political divisions. It remains to be seen if concrete policy changes vis-à-vis recent 
migrants materialize, as Greece enters a post-crisis era. 
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 Chapter 4 
 Emigration from Italy After the Crisis: 
The Shortcomings of the Brain Drain 
Narrative 
 Guido  Tintori and  Valentina  Romei 
 In this chapter, we try to assess whether the international economic crisis, which 
stemmed from the credit crunch of 2007–2008 originated in the United States and 
the United Kingdom, has had a signifi cant impact on Italy’s migratory patterns. 
According to offi cial statistics, Italy has steadily had a positive net migration since 
1974, thus turning into a ‘country of immigration’, after a long-standing status of a 
‘country of emigration’. This turn in Italy’s migratory balance should not convey 
the idea, though, that there have not been relatively signifi cant numbers of people 
leaving the country even after the 1970s (Tintori  2013 : 127–133). In our analysis, 
we focus our attention primarily on outfl ows from Italy towards Northern Europe, 
testing the conventional assumption that the country, in a sort of path dependent 
response, recurred to emigration as a viable remedy to economic strain and as a 
safety valve to release the social pressure of high level of unemployment. In the fi rst 
part of the chapter, we initially consider the evolution of the fi nancial, economic and 
social conditions of the country from the 1990s to 2015. We then provide a brief 
historical review of the migratory fl ows from and to Italy for the same period. This 
basic overview of the interaction of the economic crisis and Italy’s migratory pat-
terns works as a background to discuss more specifi c questions concerning current 
emigration: its scale, compared to past experiences; its composition, with special 
attention paid to the level of professional skills, sex and age; the reliability of avail-
able data. To describe in detail the socio-demographic profi le of the Italian emi-
grants since the 2000s and their destinations we rely on Italian data collected by the 
ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, as well as by the National statistical 
offi ce (ISTAT). We critically assess the accuracy of such data against the available 
statistical sources from the top destination countries. In the second part of the 
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chapter, we analyse both the public discourse on and the policy response to the most 
recent outfl ows. In particular, we look at how the political elites discursively framed 
the relationship between the crisis and the outfl ows and to what extent the most 
recent outfl ows intertwine with the latest labour market reforms. In conclusion, we 
fact-check whether the hegemonic narrative focusing on the ‘brain drain’ is consis-
tent with the data on the human capital of those who have left and might leave. 
4.1  A Quantitative Approach to Crisis-Induced Emigration 
from Italy 
4.1.1  Current Economic and Social Situation 
 Since the 1990s, the Italian economy has been suffering from a long period of slug-
gish or no growth. After 2007, Italy faced a series of dip recessions, which resulted 
in a rapid deterioration of the quality of life of her population. 
 The reasons behind the country’s poor economic performance since the 1990s 
are numerous and controversial ranging from its public debt, a sclerotic bureau-
cracy, low productivity rates and falling competitiveness – mainly linked to rela-
tively high unit labour costs, excessive regulation, lack of R&D spending, an excess 
of small sized businesses -, political instability, ineffi ciency, corruption and uncom-
petitive marketable services (Ciocca  2007 : Ch. 12 & 13). The 2008 international 
crisis, therefore, hit Italy in a peculiar way, compared to other Eurozone countries, 
making recovery less a question of cutting expenses and bailing out the fi nancial 
and bank system, than a demand for far-reaching structural reforms of the public 
sector and the business environment (Ciocca  2010 ). The international crisis of 2008 
aggravated, if anything, the political and economic instability Italy has been strug-
gling with since the early 1990s. 
 While all the Eurozone had a double digit growth in the last 15 years, the Italian 
economy did not grow at all. It grew very slowly even in the fi rst half of 2000 when 
the Spanish economy, for example, rose by 17 %. After the crisis, even though Italy 
avoided any bank bailouts and the direct intervention of the European Commission 
(EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) – the so-called ‘Troika’— the country’s recovery has been very weak. 
Compared to the same period in 2008, Italy’s economy still shrank the most among 
both core countries – France, the UK and Germany – and some peripheral countries, 
including Spain, in the second quarter of 2015. Italy’s was the only one to contract 
in 2014 among major European economies, and in the fi rst half of 2015 it grew at 
half the speed of the average of the Eurozone. In the 2 years to the second quarter 
of 2015 the Italian GDP rose by a meagre 0.4 %, while the UK gained 5.7 %. 
Whatever the main reasons of “steady and prolonged decline in growth” (Tiffi n 
 2013 : 3) the consequences included lost of employment, productivity, output, sav-
ings, impoverishment of its population and lack of confi dence. 
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 Unemployment levels started to slowly decline in 2015 but, at just below 12 % of 
the population, they still are close to the all-time high since the 1960s. Both the EC 
and the IMF forecast the level to remain above the country long-term average until 
2020. In Italy the level of unemployment is still much lower than in other Southern 
European countries – in Spain and Greece it varies between 22 % and 25 % – but it 
also hides a more general deterioration of the labour market (Ballestrero  2012 ; 
Carinci  2012 ). As in Italy it is relatively diffi cult to dismiss employees, especially 
in the public sector, there has been an increase of poor quality employment and 
unemployment among the most vulnerable groups, like the youth. According to 
Eurostat ( 2015 ) Italy’s youth unemployment reached 41 % in August 2015, the third 
largest in the Eurozone after Greece (48 %) and Spain (49 %). Both youth and total 
unemployment rates are higher among the female population. The crisis resulted in 
a narrowing of the gender gap in employment rates among all advanced countries. 
In Italy, this kind of convergence takes place at a slower pace, in that a higher pro-
portion of women in working age were inactive, mainly because of a lack of job 
opportunities and rewarding careers. This is particularly worrying, as according to 
OECD nearly half of the Italian female population (45 %) is inactive, the third larg-
est proportion after Turkey and Mexico. The same source shows that Italy has the 
second largest proportion among advanced countries after Chile for marginally 
attached workers, i.e. people not in the labour force because they were too discour-
aged to look for jobs, but willing and available to work. It also ranks third among 
advanced economies after Spain and the Slovak Republic for proportion of people 
that are working part-time because they could not fi nd a full time job. 
 Over 25 % of total employees in Italy are self-employed, the second highest pro-
portion in Western Europe after Greece. The fi gure is, to some extent, infl ated by the 
fact that many self-employed are de facto working full time for a different employer, 
since there is a lower tax wedge for independent contractors. Still, self-employment 
can also be seen as a survival strategy for those who cannot fi nd any other means of 
earning an income. Those who do fi nd jobs are employed with largely precarious 
contracts. According to the OECD more than half of the youth (15–24 years old) 
were in temporary contracts in 2014. Despite the current government’s claims on 
the positive impact of the recently approved “jobs act”, only one third of the new 
contracts registered between January and July 2015 were permanent. 1 On the other 
side, those that are unemployed tend to be so for a long period with the risk of hav-
ing rising diffi culties in re-entering the labour market. Nearly 60 % of the unem-
ployed in Italy have been so for more than 1 year, the fi fth largest among OECD 
countries and a rapid rise from 49 % before the crisis. 
 The result is that real disposable income has been rapidly deteriorating and it is 
now at lower levels than in the early 1990s, while it is over 60 % higher in the 
Eurozone. The deterioration of the labour market, in fact, is much more evident 
from data on poverty rather than from unemployment rates. According to Eurostat, 
1  Source:  http://www.inps.it/bussola/VisualizzaDOC.aspx?sVirtualURL=/docallegati/DatiEBilanci
/osservatori/Documents/Osservatorio_Precariato_Gen-Lug2015.pdf&iIDDalPortale=10156 . 
Accessed 1 October 2015. 
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the percentage of the population that is severely deprived is much higher in Italy 
than in other Western European countries (11.5 % in 2014 vs. 7.1 % in Spain and 
5 % in France and Germany). The percentage declined from its peak at 14 % in 
2012, but it’s still double than the pre-crisis period (Eurostat  2013 ). 
4.1.2  Migratory Dynamics Before and During the Economic 
Crisis 
 Since the 2000s, Italy, together with Greece, Spain and the United Kingdom, has 
been one of the main immigrant-receiving countries in Europe (OECD  2011 : 403–
404). The international economic crisis has, of course, impacted on Italy’s migra-
tory dynamics. The country still attracts signifi cant numbers of immigrants, mainly 
because the backbone of its productive system, made of small and medium enter-
prises, is in labour-intensive sectors, like fashion, agriculture and food. Italy thus 
continues to present a positive net migration, even though the gap between those 
who enter and those who leave the country every year has been shrinking, especially 
since 2011. Total immigration into the country, i.e. including Italian returnees, went 
from roughly 527,000 individuals at its peak in 2007 to almost 307,000 in 2013. 
Despite this decrease, yet offi cial data show that the net international migration 
amounted to considerable +142,000 units in 2014, +182,000 in 2013 and +245,000 in 
2012. On the other hand, total emigration, i.e. including foreigners leaving the 
country, for the same period has doubled, passing from nearly 51,000 in 2007 to 
over 139,000 in 2014 (ISTAT  2015 ,  2014 ). 
 Focussing on Italian citizens only, there is a clear growing trend of Italian nation-
als moving their residency abroad. The 2014 and 2013 fi gures – respectively, 89,000 
and 82,000 – are the highest in the last 10 years (ISTAT  2014 ,  2015 ). The net migra-
tion of Italian citizens has been negative already for most of the 1990s and 2000s but 
since 2009 the gap is widening. Nonetheless, according to ISTAT, the number of 
Italian emigrants has not reached yet the levels of the 1970s. 
 High rates of returns, a typical trait of historical emigration from Italy, are a fea-
ture of more recent emigration patterns too. 2 The numbers of Italians returning to 
their home country, though, are lower than they used to. For example, the non- 
foreign population that moved to Italy from abroad in 2012 was 20 % lower than in 
2007. In the 5 years to 2012, 28,000 Italian nationals moved to Italy from Germany, 
the same number in the previous 5 years was over 51,000. Over the same period, 
Italians returning from Switzerland dropped from 24,000 to 13,000. According to 
Eurostat, in 2012 Italy had the smallest share of returning migrants among all 
European countries (excluding Cyprus and Luxemburg). 
 The foreign population residing in Italy is increasingly leaving the country. Over 
11,000 Romanians – the largest foreign-born national group in Italy – left the 
2  For a thorough discussion of past Italian emigrations – destinations, volumes, patterns (return or 
settlement) and political contexts – see (Tintori  2013 ). 
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 country in 2013 together with nearly 2400 Moroccans and a similar number of 
Albanians. At the same time, the annual infl ow of the same groups is declining. It 
needs also to be considered that documented immigrants leaving the country have 
no incentives – just as natives – to de-register as residents in Italy, since it would 
involve loosing some benefi ts there, such as access to welfare service and public 
health care. For example, while ISTAT counted about 1500 Albanians leaving Italy 
in 2011, the Albanian statistics registered nearly 7000 Albanian returnees from Italy 
for the same year. The explanation in the mismatch of the two data, apart from pos-
sible differences in collecting them, lies also in the above-mentioned reason. 
4.1.3  Main Trends in the Current Emigration 
 As everyone who has familiarity with the collection of data on international mobil-
ity knows, it is diffi cult to say exactly how many people are leaving or entering Italy 
every year. Undocumented immigration is a known problem, but undetected emi-
gration is also an issue. Italians living abroad have a legal obligation to register in 
the AIRE (Registry of the Italian citizens residing abroad) at consulates, provided 
they have the intention of staying in that country for at least 12 month. There are no 
real incentives to register, since failure to comply with the law is not sanctioned and, 
once registered into the AIRE, the citizens lose a series of benefi ts in the home 
country, such as their access to the health service of their region of last residence, to 
name one. In addition, most people might not know for how long they are going to 
stay abroad, especially when they move to another EU member state with temporary 
contracts or as jobseekers. Therefore, Italians abroad register only when they are in 
need of a service from the consulate, typically, after quite some time. Therefore, 
AIRE fi gures are, on the one hand, very likely to underestimate the presence of 
Italian workers abroad, especially when their stay is temporary. Despite that, the 
most recent data of the AIRE show that the stock of citizens offi cially residing 
abroad has increased impressively in the last decade and totalled more than 4.5 mil-
lion nationals at the end of 2014 (see Fig.  4.1 ). Yet, according to AIRE data less than 
one in four Italian residents abroad is aged between 18 and 34; a proportion that has 
remained unchanged from before the crisis. Once again, AIRE fi gures prove they 
are not a useful source to understand current outfl ows from Italy, since they include 
not only people who emigrated a long time ago, people born to Italian parents 
abroad, but most of all sizeable amounts of people who were born outside Italy and 
obtained citizenship by descent. According to the latest available data, in fact, 
between 1998 and 2010 at least 1,003,403 individuals got Italian citizenship by 
descent at Italian consulates abroad and were automatically added to the AIRE reg-
istry. 73.3 % of the total new Italian/EU passports were released in Latin American 
countries (Tintori  2009 ,  2012 ).
 At the same time, the ISTAT data too, based on the changes of residence admin-
istrative source, under-estimate the real-time emigration fl ows, since they detect 
only the individuals that offi cially move their abode overseas. However, they still 
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seem to be the best Italian source available to grasp the trends in current emigration. 
According to ISTAT, over 320,000 people left Italy between 2009 and 2012, 40 % 
more than the previous 4 years. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that holds that 
almost exclusively southerners contributed to Italian emigration, the majority of the 
recent emigrants came from the northern regions of Italy. In absolute terms, the larg-
est fl ow of nationals emigrating from Italy in 2012 was to Germany, Switzerland, 
the UK and France. In 2013, for the fi rst time the UK took over as the most favoured 
destination, followed by Germany, Switzerland and France. The data on the 2014 
fl ows confi rm the UK as a booming destination (see also Chap.  10 ). The average age 
was around 34 years old and there was a prevalence of males (57.6 %) over females 
(ISTAT  2014 ). The percentage of graduates on the emigrant population above 25 
years of age has increased from 11.9 % in 2002 to 30.6 % in 2013. The increase of 
graduates among the emigrants is somehow expected, given the high competition 
for jobs in the international labour market, especially in the destination countries 
privileged by Italian graduates. The top fi ve countries that attracted the highest per-
centage of highly educated Italians were, in 2013, the US (35 %), UK (33.9 %), 
Brazil (32.2 %), Switzerland (30.7 %), Spain (30.3 %). There is therefore a growing 
trend of graduates leaving the country, but the share is still by far a minority of the 
emigrant population. In the second part of the chapter, we will analyse better 
whether Italy is currently affected by a “brain drain” or not (Table  4.1 ).
4.1.3.1  Main Destination Countries 
 As showed, according to ISTAT, the largest fl ow of nationals emigrating from Italy 
in 2013 was to the UK (almost 14,000) followed by Germany (11,400), Switzerland 
and France (around 8000–9000 to each country). In all those countries, between 
2010 and 2013, the rise of emigration fl ow from Italy was the fastest since the mid- 
1990s. Once again, data should be taken as a source to grasp the magnitude or trends 
of current emigration, not as a source of precise information. Looking at destination 
countries’ data, therefore, might help, but even in this case we should put the data in 
perspective. 
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 For example, if we look at the UK (see Chap.  10 ), according to the AIRE about 
16,000 Italians registered through the local consulates in 2013, but if we consider 
how many Italians obtained a national insurance number (NIN) in the same year, a 
mandatory document that allows to work in the UK, then the fi gure rises to about 
44,000. In 2013 the numbers of NIN allocated to Italians was 66 % higher than in 
the previous year, the largest increase since data is available. The annual infl ow of 
registration is four times higher than its pre-crisis levels. Over 80 % of the Italian 
that were allocated a NIN in 2013 were below 34 years old. Forty-two percent were 
aged between 18 and 24, The NIN data, though, incorporate also Italians only by 
passport, that never actually lived in Italy, mostly Latin Americans of Italian descent 
that use the Italian nationality to enter the EU labour market freely (Tintori  2011 ). 
According to the UK census of 2011, in fact, nearly 10 % of the UK residents hold-
ing an Italian passport were born in Latin America. Moreover, the NIN registration 
is mandatory for temporary and seasonal work too and it is valid for life. Therefore 
the numbers cannot be used to assume the actual stock of Italians living in the UK 
and do not tell us much about the length of their stay. On the other side, the NIN 
registrations do not include Italian people that are not working in the country and 
yet live there. 
 In Germany the stock of Italians increased in 2013 at its fastest rate since the 
1970s. Over 80 % of Italians (excluding students) living in Germany in 2012 had a 
degree in secondary/higher education. According to Swiss national statistics the 
infl ow of Italian immigrants was at its peak in 1983, when it reached 12,000 people, 
it was below 7000 people per year in the decade to 2006, but then it jumped again 
and reached a record high in 2013 with over 13,000 Italian immigrants. This means 
that nearly 80,000 Italians offi cially entered Switzerland with a status of permanent 
 Table 4.1  % of Italian resident population (15–64) and emigrants (25–64) by educational 
attainment, 2002–2013 
 Resident population 
(15–64)  Italian emigrants (25–64) 
 Tertiary (%) 
 Primary/lower 
secondary (%) 
 Secondary/higher 
(%)  Tertiary (%) 
 2002  8.6  51  37.1  11.9 
 2003  9.1  51.4  36.8  11.8 
 2004  10  56.4  31.4  12.2 
 2005  10.7  51.5  31.1  17.4 
 2006  11.4  50.4  29  20.6 
 2007  12  41.7  33.2  25.1 
 2008  12.7  40.6  33.5  25.9 
 2009  12.8  42.6  33.6  23.8 
 2010  13  38.3  34.8  26.9 
 2011  13.1  37.9  34.5  27.6 
 2012  13.8  36  36.4  27.6 
 2013  14.4  34.6  34.8  30.6 
 Source: ISTAT and Eurostat 
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resident in the 7 years to 2013 compared to half that size in the previous 7 years. To 
these fi gures, we should also add at least 60,000 so-called ‘ frontalieri ’ – Italian 
cross-border workers – who every weekday commute for work between the two 
countries. Even if we look at less favoured destination countries, Italian emigration 
appears to be on the rise. In Austria, immigration from Italy grew a 35 % in 2012 
over the previous year, the fastest rate since consistent data were made available in 
2002. The share of Italian immigrants aged 15–29 years old increased by 6 % points 
to 49 % between 2008 and 2013. In the Netherlands there is a similar rise of Italian 
immigration during the years of the crisis, especially of young people. Immigration 
data from other countries confi rm the described trend too (Table  4.2 ).
 An interesting exception is Belgium. Belgium recorded a long-term decline in 
Italian immigration that has not stopped during the years of the crisis, even if it is 
slightly milder. This is the result of two factors: a reduction in the infl ux of Italians 
since the 1980s – the net Italian migration fl ow is currently about even; and rising 
numbers of acquisition of Belgian nationality, which is automatic to third genera-
tion children. Despite the decline, though, Italians – together with the French – are 
still the largest foreign population in Belgium with over 150,000 individuals (Vause 
 2013 ; see Chap.  7 ). 
 Table 4.2  Stock and % annual change of Italian residents in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, 
Belgium, 2001–2013 
 Stock of 
Italians in 
Germany 
 Annual 
% 
change 
 Stock of 
permanent 
Italian 
resident in 
Switzerland 
 Annual 
% 
change 
 Stock of 
Italians 
in 
Austria 
 Annual 
% 
change 
 Stock of 
Italians in 
Belgium 
 Annual 
% 
change 
 2001  616,282  313,976  −1.8  195,586 
 2002  609,784  −1.1  308,255  −1.8  1364  190,792  −2.5 
 2003  601,258  −1.4  303,770  −1.5  1461  7.1  187,021  −2.0 
 2004  548,194  −8.8  300,214  −1.2  1402  −4.0  183,021  −2.1 
 2005  540,810  −1.3  296,392  −1.3  1380  −1.6  179,015  −2.2 
 2006  534,657  −1.1  291,684  −1.6  1467  6.3  175,498  −2.0 
 2007  528,318  −1.2  289,589  −0.7  1713  16.8  171,918  −2.0 
 2008  523,162  −1.0  290,020  0.1  1842  7.5  169,027  −1.7 
 2009  517,474  −1.1  289,111  −0.3  1955  6.1  166,956  −1.2 
 2010  517,546  0.0  289,125  0.0  2167  10.8  165,052  −1.1 
 2011  520,159  0.5  290,546  0.5  2297  6.0  162,826  −1.3 
 2012  529,417  1.8  294,359  1.3  3095  34.7  159,727  −1.9 
 2013  552,943  4.4  301,254  2.3  157,426  −1.4 
 Source: Statistical offi ce of Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Belgium 
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4.2  Policies and Debates 
 The Italian State has traditionally looked at the emigrants and their descendants as 
commercial and economic outlets and a key instrument for promoting its political 
role in the international arena (Tintori  2013 : 143–146). Even during the period of 
the so-called ‘Great Emigration’ at the turn of the twentieth century and again dur-
ing the second wave of mass emigration after World War II, when Italians were 
leaving by the millions per decade, the concern about the ‘haemorrhage’ of eco-
nomically active population was short-lived. It was quickly replaced by the argu-
ment that saw emigration as a safety valve to deal with unemployment and a prospect 
to establish ‘colonies’ of consumers of Italian products abroad. More ambitiously, 
the presence of an Italian diaspora was exploited to project the nation’s prestige, 
economy and labour market internationally (Manzotti  1962 ; Choate  2008 ; Tintori 
and Colucci  2015 ). 
 In terms of policy response, the Italian State has historically displayed a high 
degree of activism in promoting tailor made measures for the citizens abroad and 
their descendants. Since the 1970s – to consider the post-war period only – the insti-
tutions involved ranged from local level administrations – e.g.  Regioni and  Comuni – 
to governmental departments – e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of Labour, of the 
Interior, of the Economy – and ad hoc created public agencies. Provisions varied 
between economic incentives to return, welfare and pension schemes provided 
directly abroad, training and educational programs, Italian language schools abroad, 
and climaxed in 2000–2001 with the adoption of the legislation on external voting 
that allocated 18 dedicated seats for the external citizens in representation of 4 
global electoral macro-districts (Tintori  2013 : 140–143; Lafl eur  2013 : 78–87). In a 
context of continuity, it is therefore noteworthy to assess whether there has been a 
shift in the contents and intensity of the Italian State’s activities dedicated to the citi-
zens abroad since 2008, as a response to the increase in the outfl ows of the recent 
years. 
4.2.1  Public Discourse After the Crisis 
 As the fi rst section showed, between 1990 and 2014, with the exception of the 
2002–2004 period, the net migration rate of Italian citizens has been negative. This 
means that, even though its dimension waxed and waned, emigration, already main-
streamed into the narrative of the nation, has not ceased to be a permanent trait of 
the Italian society, economy and culture. Three main interwoven public discourses 
dominated the debate regarding recent emigration. 
 The fi rst, up to the crisis, was mainly proposed by some experts and academics 
and was quickly adopted in media representations and descriptive, mostly autobio-
graphical essays (Altreitalie  2011 ; Cucchiarato  2010 ; Soffi ci  2014 ). It described the 
recent migratory waves as the so-called  nuove mobilità (“new mobility”), in order 
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to mark the distance from the mass emigration of the past, in that the latter featured 
humble, unskilled, poorly educated individuals and families forced to leave the 
country out of sheer misery, with nothing but cardboard suitcases, relying on the 
chain migration system to fi nd a job at destination; while the former resonates much 
more with the population of the so-called “Eurostars” (Favell  2008 ), a generation of 
highly skilled and intensely mobile people who are equipped to roam between 
“Eurocities” and global capitals to make the best out of the “human face” of global-
ization (Favell et al.  2006 ). 
 The second, prominent especially after the crisis and the growth in emigration 
rates, was a further development of the fi rst with a note of pessimism added to it. It 
is still pivoted on the young and talented, the highly skilled, the graduates, the “best 
of Italy” (Tirabassi and Del Prà  2014 ), who would be forced – rather than choose – 
to leave the country in growing numbers, since Italy is ruled by the elderly and they 
are not offered anything but fi xed-term contracts, unrewarding career-prospects, and 
peanuts-paid jobs. Members of the political elites contributed to this narrative 
through public statements that prompted nationwide discussions on the ‘brain 
drain’. For example, in November 2009, Pier Luigi Celli, the dean of the Rome- 
based private University LUISS, funded by the association of Italian entrepreneurs, 
published an open letter to his son on one of the leading newspapers,  La Repubblica , 
in which he advised him to leave the country as soon as he graduated. 3 By the same 
token, Fabrizio Barca, then minister of Mario Monti’s government, declared in 2012 
that leaving the country was the right choice for young graduates, citing the exam-
ple of two out of three of his sons that had started a career in Latin America and in 
the UK. 4 As a result, this explicit, almost exclusive focus on talent and emigration 
of graduates through the media, popular blogs 5 and the political elites, has popular-
ized the phrase ‘ fuga dei cervelli ’ – the Italian equal for brain drain –, which is 
applied indiscriminately to every (relatively) young Italian who goes overseas, 
regardless of their qualifi cation and occupation. 
 This only partially true and extremely over-simplistic rendition of Italy’s current 
mobility patterns, even in the academic realm, relies essentially on qualitative and 
human-centred empirical research that samples on the dependent variable. It does 
not delve into the actual data on the human capital of those who leave, their occupa-
tion, wage levels, type of job contracts, and length of stay abroad. As we have only 
started to demonstrate in the fi rst part of the chapter, though, if there is enough 
evidence to state that the recent rise of emigration – especially that undetected by 
Italian offi cial data – was signifi cantly composed of young people, there are no solid 
3  Pier Luigi Celli, “Figlio mio, lascia questo Paese”,  La Repubblica , 30 November 2009.  http://
www.repubblica.it/2009/11/sezioni/scuola_e_universita/servizi/celli-lettera/celli-lettera/celli-let-
tera.html ; last accessed 13 August 2014. 
4  “Barca: ‘Fuga di cervelli? Se Italia non migliora è giusta’”,  La Repubblica , 16 April 2012,  http://
www.repubblica.it/scienze/2012/04/16/…/barca_fuga_di_cervelli_se_italia_non_migliora_
giusta‐33394354/ ; last accessed 17 April 2014. 
5 Among the most popular blogs are  Italians by Beppe Severgnini, journalist of one of the most 
important Italian newspapers,  Il Corriere della Sera , and  Giovani Talenti (Young talents) hosted by 
Sergio Nava, journalist of the main economic Italian newspaper  Il Sole 24Ore . 
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proofs that they bring the ‘brain’ too with them, as they are not necessarily skilled 
or they don’t necessarily end up working in highly-skilled sectors. In the next and 
fi nal section, we will add a few more words on the issue, by looking at the data on 
the human capital of those who have left or might leave. 
 Third discourse: the principal Italian daily newspapers, the liberal  La Repubblica 
and the moderate  Il Corriere della Sera , have joined the ‘brain drain frenzy’ and 
feature regular contributions, in their online versions especially, that spotlight the 
‘haemorrhage’ of the best part of the population. 6 This kind of reportages has often 
been associated to the diffi culties that Italy faces in integrating her immigrants. 
Probably an unintended outcome, the alarmed tones characterizing these discourses 
have led to a political climate where an ‘Italians fi rst’ argument and an anti- 
immigrant backlash have become politically legitimate, even more so in the context 
of growing competition for jobs. Thus, not only the traditionally anti-immigrant 
campaigns of the Northern League are now recrudescing, but also the minister of 
the Interior, Angelino Alfano, member of the broad coalition government led by 
Matteo Renzi, recently declared that the government will not allow that even “a 
single immigrant take the job of an Italian citizen”. 7 
4.2.2  Political Initiatives 
 The long-standing dynamism of the Italian state towards the ‘Italians abroad’, a 
phrase that indistinctly confl ates both the emigrants and the descendants of former 
emigrants, makes it diffi cult to single out which policies and/or agencies have been 
developed as a reaction to the growth of outfl ows after the crisis. In addition, in the 
course of – even recent – history, a plethora of institutions have been in charge to 
deal with the ‘Italians abroad’. In this section, we provide a fi rst review of the mea-
sures undertaken since 2008. We examine whether there has been a shift in the 
contents and intensity of the governmental activities towards the emigrants, if these 
measures are dependable on the described public discourses that accompanied the 
recent outfl ows, and whether they are consistent with the available data on ‘those 
who leave’, Italy’s economic situation and labour market. 
 Since the 1990s, and even more intensely between 2000 and 2007, virtually all 
of the 20 Italian regional administrations passed legislative acts that reached out for 
their reference communities of ‘Italians abroad’. Provisions encompassed a wide 
range of policies: social subsidies, vocational training and co-development projects, 
programmes aimed at facilitating ‘co-ethnic’ returns, cultural exchange trips, tour-
ism, and so forth. After the crisis, a minority of experts and politicians, especially 
6  See, for example, the ad hoc created video-reportage format  Domicilio Londra (Domicile: 
London) by  La Repubblica :  http://video.repubblica.it/rubriche/domicilio-londra 
7  “Alfano: ‘Non accetteremo che un immigrato prenda il posto di un italiano’,  La Repubblica , 1 
August 2014,  http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2014/08/01/news/alfano_-92937945/ ; last access 2 
August 2014. 
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those with an academic background, assuming a high degree of return or circularity 
of the current outfl ows have tried to frame the ‘Italians abroad’ question mainly as 
an opportunity and not necessarily as a problem, a potential occasion to further 
develop the labour force’s human capital, improve the balance of trade and of pay-
ments, and a chance to transform the ‘brain drain’ into a ‘brain return’ (ISPI  2012 ). 
A more systematic study is still needed, but it seems that more recently the main 
efforts of both state-level agencies and local administrations have been directed, on 
the one hand, towards the establishment of ethnic business communities and, on the 
other, towards the return of individuals with improved human and social capital. 
 As recently as 30 December 2010, the then Berlusconi’s government approved a 
measure (Law 238) formally aimed at attracting EU skilled citizens to move and 
work in Italy. The law grants tax incentives to EU citizens born after 1969, who have 
been working or have graduated abroad but have resided for at least 2 years in Italy 
in the past. The incentives are accorded if they start new business activities in Italy 
or are hired permanently by an Italian employer. As a matter of fact, the law is pri-
marily targeting Italian nationals, as an attempt to pave the way for the return of the 
skilled and young emigrants. In fact, the measure, which is advertised in Italian 
only, includes a series of ancillary privileges for Italian citizens alone, in terms of 
access to public housing and pension benefi ts. It also creates a privileged bureau-
cratic channel for the Italian applicants in order to speed up their procedures, 
through a collaboration between the Italian consulates and the agency  Italia Lavoro 
SpA , created in 1997 and controlled by the Ministry of the Economy. Incidentally, 
these actions were undertaken concurrently with the adoption of policies that 
retrenched the social and economic rights of third country nationals regularly resid-
ing in Italy and made more demanding the procedures to get their residence permits 
renewed. 
 The 2010 Law and the hegemonic narrative on the ‘brain drain’ became the foun-
dation of ensuing actions taken both at the local and state level. The Umbria region 
has launched the programme ‘Brain Back Umbria’, which further develops its 
Regional Law 37 of 1997. The programme, fi nanced mainly through the European 
Social Fund, focuses exclusively on former residents of the region living abroad. It 
grants tax incentives for new businesses and start-ups set up in the region, as well as 
seed money – 5000 Euros – for researchers. 8 Similarly, the municipality of Milan 
has launched the portal “Welcome Talent”, in cooperation with the blog  Italents and 
few local scholars. The programme, through the action called “Welcome Business”, 
allocated 510,000 Euros to ‘talented returnees’ in order to start a new business in 
Milan. In 2012, under Monti’s government, the Ministry of the Interior and the 
Ministry of Education activated the platform “Innovitalia” whose goal is to “maxi-
mise the impact of human capital” of the Italian “brains” abroad and “promote 
research and business opportunities” in partnership with the motherland. 9 
 These actions are certainly consistent with the hegemonic narratives concerning 
the current emigration, where both the governmental rhetoric and media reports 
8  http://www.brainbackumbria.eu/index.php last access 12 August 2014. 
9  http://www.innovitalia.net/crowdforce/product/index.html last access 12 August 2014. 
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insist on the presence of graduates. Yet, the available data show that the percentage 
of graduates, though on the increase, is by far a minority not only in the stock but 
also in the yearly emigrant population. 
 In some respects, Italy presents all the prerequisites for suffering from a ‘brain 
drain’ issue. Education did not help much to avoid economic distress. Unemployment 
rates among those with a tertiary education were about 11.5 % of the young popula-
tion (25–34 years old) in 2011, an even larger proportion than among those with 
secondary education (10.5 %) and not so smaller than the unemployment rate of 
those without education (14.8 %). In other countries, university degrees are much 
more rewarding in terms of employability. For example, in Germany youth unem-
ployment rates drop from 20 % among those with no qualifi cation to 2.7 % among 
those with a tertiary degree. France shows a similar gap (23 % vs. 6 %) and even in 
Spain where unemployment rates are higher, earning a degree makes a decisive dif-
ference in the labour market (33 % with no qualifi cation vs. 16 % among graduates) 
(OECD  2013a ). 
 On the other hand, comparative studies show that Italy does not export more 
graduates than other developed countries – in the EU, for example, Germany, France 
and the UK have higher percentages of graduates leaving the country – but has 
instead a problem of ‘brain circulation’, in that it is not able to attract signifi cant 
numbers of educated foreigners (Franzoni et al.  2012 ; Beltrame  2007 ). The asym-
metric treatment reserved to the ‘Italians abroad’ and third country nationals in the 
allocation of rights and access to incentives might play a decisive role here. In addi-
tion, Italy might not export many graduates as expected simply because, fi rst, there 
are not so many and, second, they may not be necessarily fi t to participate in the 
global labour market. Italy ranked second to last for tertiary educational attainment 
among all OECD countries – only Turkey had worse rates – regardless of whether 
the whole population was considered or only the youth cohort (25–34 years old) 
(OECD  2013b ). By the same token, in 2013 Italy scored poorly, last place among 20 
OECD countries, for percentage of adults (aged 16–65) who worked in skilled 
occupations during the previous 5 years (OECD  2013c : 442). Enrico Giovannini, 
then minister of Labour in Letta’s government, commenting on these data, bitterly 
observed that the average poor human capital of most of the Italian young people 
made them simply unemployable, when it came to the demands of the international 
labour market. 10 
 Italian consulates have probably a better pulse of the kind of emigration that is 
taking place from Italy. Massimiliano Mazzanti, the Italian consul in London, con-
fi rmed that the UK is a booming destination for Italians looking for a job. Their 
profi les and qualifi cations vary extensively, but only a minority ends up working in 
the City or in highly skilled occupations. As a matter of fact, a growing number of 
scams have been reported, in which Italian newcomers are requested payment for 
10  “Giovannini su dati Ocse: ‘Dimostrano che italiani poco occupabili’”,  La Repubblica , 9 October 
2013,  http://www.repubblica.it/scuola/2013/10/09/news/giovannini_su_dati_ocse_dimostrano_
che_italiani_poco_occupabili-68246867/ last access 12 August 2014. 
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accommodation and access to work by fellow citizens and locals 11 – a sort of his-
toric recurrence of the ethnic-broker or  padrone system that accompanied Italy’s 
great emigration of the past. That is why the consulate, in January 2014, launched 
the “Primo Approdo” (First Landing) project, which offers a downloadable hand-
book as well as in person meetings with experts to provide young Italians with 
information on how the labour market, the educational, social, health and legal sys-
tems function in the UK. Even more recently, the Italian consulate in Melbourne has 
hosted a photographic exhibition at the local  Museo Italiano , signifi cantly titled 
 What I have to do / What I would like to do , by Cristian Iotti. The exhibit witnesses 
the stories of many young Italians who have recently arrived in Australia and have 
adapted to all kind of occupations in order to make a living, while still pursuing their 
individual dream-job. 
4.3  Conclusion 
 There is a clear and growing trend of Italians emigrating from the country after the 
economic crisis. The fi gure on emigration of 2014, the highest since the mid-1970s, 
counts for 1.4 emigrants for every 1000 of the Italian population. As described in 
the fi rst section of the chapter, numbers, composition, profi le and duration of the 
most recent and current outfl ows from the country are still somehow uncertain. Yet, 
they are undoubtedly not comparable in size – both in absolute and relative num-
bers – with mass departures of the two waves of the historical great emigration. 
There are enough data to affi rm that it is mostly the young to emigrate, as it is usu-
ally the case, but there is no solid evidence yet to assert that the majority are also 
highly-skilled or – educated. Partially, emigration of the young is due to the 
increased movements of people in a globally interconnected labour market. But the 
most likely explanations to account for the increase in the emigration rate after the 
crisis should be sought in the combined effect of two factors: the long period of 
sluggish or no growth of the economy since the 1990s, which has progressively 
impoverished the country’s household incomes, and the latest labour market 
reforms, that between 2003, with the law n. 276 of 20 September, and 2012, with the 
law n. 92 of 8 June, – the so-called Biagi and Fornero Laws, respectively – have 
heavily deregulated the labour market and introduced fl exibility. The reforms, in 
particular, have a direct responsibility in pushing young people out of the country, 
since they have aggravated the labour system’s segmentation, in which a relevant 
part of Italy’s workforce, with a majority of males and members of the older genera-
tions, holds hyper-protected life-long contracts, while a sizeable minority, virtually 
all of the new employed, has access almost exclusively to insecure, highly-fl exible, 
low-paid jobs (Berton et al.  2012 ; Simoni  2009 ). There where more detailed data on 
11  “Interview with Italian Consul in London, Massimiliano Mazzanti”,  L ’ ItaloEuropeo , 21 February 
2014,  http://www.italoeuropeo.com/interviews/1539-interview-with-italian-consul-in-london-massim-
iliano-mazzanti last access 12 August 2014. 
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the occupation of current Italian emigrants are available and as testifi ed by recent 
initiatives undertaken by the Italian consular authorities, the hegemonic narratives 
focussed on the ‘brain drain’ issue and the export of talents appear to be misleading. 
They should, at best, speak of ‘brain waste’. In fact, on the national labour market 
front, Italy is not able to participate in the brain circulation system and attract a 
number of skilled immigrants suffi cient to match the relatively average percentage 
of her graduates and PhDs that are leaving. It does not reward adequately the young 
and educated either, who are very often confi ned to unattractive careers, underpaid 
and underemployed. On the international labour market front, Italian adults lack the 
key skills to compete with their peers, constantly ranking in the last place in Europe 
in terms of foreign languages, numeracy and ICT profi ciency (OECD  2013c ). 
Despite these evidences, the public discourse on emigration has adopted quite 
alarmed tones, since it has focused primarily on the ‘brain drain’ issue. More wor-
ryingly, it has become a fi eld where to display ethno-nationalist arguments and anti- 
immigrant backlash. 
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 Chapter 5 
 Structural Emigration: The Revival 
of Portuguese Outfl ows 
 José  Carlos  Marques and  Pedro  Góis 
5.1  Introduction 
 Over the last 20 years the social, political and academic importance attached to 
Portuguese emigration, and in particular to emigration fl ows, has contrasted with 
the size and social signifi cance of the migratory outfl ows during these years. 
Considered a feature of the past, and associated with a reality marked by low levels 
of development, emigration did not readily fi t into the narrative of economic and 
social development promulgated during this period. Statistical data provided by 
host countries, however, shows that since the mid-1980s, and especially in the early 
years of the new millennium, the outfl ows of Portuguese citizens intensifi ed, new 
emigration destinations such as Angola, Brazil, and the UK emerged, traditional 
destinations of emigration (e.g. France and Switzerland) became more developed, 
and forms of migration became more diverse. This diversifi cation is one of the most 
distinct characteristics of current Portuguese emigration movements, noticeable 
through the development and combination of different forms of mobility (short- 
term, temporary and more permanent) and the modifi cation of emigrants’ socio- 
demographic characteristics. Although emigration of citizens with few qualifi cations 
continues to be dominant, it is noticeable that there is an increase in highly qualifi ed 
migrants. On the following pages we will, fi rstly, analyse current Portuguese emi-
gration, showing that it is infl uenced by an interaction of economic factors and pre- 
existing migration networks that structurally support on-going emigration fl ows, 
which have become geographically more diverse due to the development of mobil-
ity opportunities within and beyond Europe. In the European case these 
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opportunities have led to the expansion of mobility patterns based on multiple inter-
connections between Portugal and the destination countries, and by a continued 
intense participation in a labour market delimited by the borders of the European 
Union and by the borders of countries with which it has special agreements. 
 In the second section, we will refl ect on both the relations of the Portuguese State 
with its emigrant communities abroad, and the current political debates on the 
recent increase in emigration fl ows. We emphasize that these debates have not been 
followed up by policies directed towards new Portuguese emigration structures, and 
that they continue to be based on the image of emigration from the past century. 
5.2  Portuguese Migratory Dynamics and Volumes in the Last 
Decades 
 Emigration had, for the last couple of centuries, been a “structural constant” 
(Godinho  1978 ) of the Portuguese society. The outfl ows were directed to different 
geographical regions according to the demands of the international labour market. 
Like several other European countries, Portugal participated in the two great migra-
tory waves of the nineteenth and twentieth century (the transoceanic, and the intra- 
European migratory fl ows). 1 During the fi rst wave more than two million people left 
Portugal for the new world (mainly for Brazil), and throughout the second wave, 
which lasted roughly from the 1950s to 1974, almost as many individuals left, pre-
dominantly for other countries in Europe (particularly France and Germany) 
(Baganha et al.  2005 ). 
 Between 1974 and 1985 permanent emigration decreased signifi cantly and return 
migration registered a strong increase. During the 1980s, 1990s, and the fi rst decade 
of the new millennium, Portugal recorded, like other Southern European countries, 
a remarkable increase in the foreign resident population – from 58,091 in 1980 to 
451,742 in 2009. This deep transformation of the Portuguese migratory landscape 
nurtured the development of a social and political (and also scientifi c 2 ) discourse on 
the absence of continuing outfl ows, that contrasted with the size and social signifi -
cance of the actual emigratory fl ows recorded during these years. Considered to be 
a characteristic of the past and associated with a reality marked by low levels of 
development, emigration did not readily fi t into the dominant narrative of economic 
and social development during this period. 
 However, as frequently happens, data contradicts this dominant defi nition of 
reality. After the mid-1980s there is evidence of a revival in the outfl ow of Portuguese 
nationals, which is characterized by three main elements: a transformation of the 
institutional context in which it occurred, the development of new destination coun-
tries (see below), and the emergence of new forms of migration (see Sect.  5.4 ). At 
1  On these two waves see, among others, Arroteia ( 1983 ), and Serrão ( 1982 ), and for a synthesis 
Baganha et al. ( 2005 ), and Marques and Góis ( 2013 ). 
2  See, for example, the book on the ‘end of the migratory cycle’ to Europe (Paiva  1985 ). 
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the institutional level, when Portugal became a member of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1986, new conditions were created for the movement of 
Portuguese workers (and, incidentally, for a lack of visibility of emigration move-
ments, because offi cial statistics on exits to other European countries ceased in 
1988). In 1992 Portuguese nationals gained access to a European area in which the 
free movement of people was possible. This seemed to create adequate conditions 
for a recovery in the outfl ow of Portuguese citizens, mainly directed towards the 
northern European countries that, until the abrupt halt of the early 1970s, were the 
main destinations of Portuguese emigrants. The data on the arrival of Portuguese 
citizens in some destination countries provided by Baganha ( 1993 ), Peixoto ( 1993 ), 
and Baganha and Peixoto ( 1997 ), show that between 1985 and 1990, Portugal expe-
rienced an increased frequency of exits (on average 33,000 individuals per year left 
the country during this period, mainly to non-EU countries) which, nevertheless, 
was substantially lower than that recorded during the preceding decades. 
 Another indicator of this increase in the external mobility of Portuguese citizens 
can be revealed through an analysis of the changing numbers of Portuguese nation-
als residing in other European countries. Table  5.1 shows a continuous increase in 
Portuguese citizens living in selected European countries after 1985. This increase 
is explained, not only by the natural increase in the number of Portuguese citizens 
already living abroad, but also by new migratory movements.
 It is particularly signifi cant that in several of the selected countries, the total 
number of Portuguese citizens more than doubled between 1985 and 2000, thus 
clearly showing that the notion of an end to the Portuguese migratory movements, 
repeatedly asserted at the beginning of the new millennium, was a de facto 
illusion. 
 The marked increases (in both absolute and percentage terms) recorded in coun-
tries in which the presence of Portuguese nationals was, until the 1980s, nearly 
insignifi cant, indicate that from that time onwards Portuguese emigrants found 
 Table 5.1  Portuguese citizens living in selected European countries, 1985–2013 
 1985  1990/1  2000/1  2005  2010 b  2013 b 
 Belgium a  9,500  16,538  25,600  27,373  33,084  38,813 
 France b  –  599,000  571,000  492,000  495,454  509,254 g 
 Germany a,c  77,000  92,991  133,700  115,606  113,208  127,368 
 Luxembourg d  –  39,100  58,450  67,800  79,800  88,200 
 Spain a,e  23,300  33,268  42,000  66,236  142,520  129,079 
 Switzerland f  30,851  85,649  134,675  180,765  238,432 f  253,769 f 
 United Kingdom a  –  –  58,000  73,000  102,000  143,000 
 Sources:  a SOPEMI, several years 
 b Observatório da Emigração ( http://www.observatorioemigracao.secomunidades.pt ) 
 c Statistische Bundesamt Deutschland, Statistische Jahrbuch, several years 
 d Service central de la statistique et des études économiques (STATEC) 
 e Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Series Anuales Padrón Municipal de Habitantes (several years) 
 f Bundesamt für Migration, Ausländer- und Asylstatistik 
 g 2012 data 
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alternative destinations to the traditional receiving countries of migrant labour 
forces. The cases of Switzerland and the United Kingdom are particularly illustra-
tive of the creation and consolidation of new migratory destinations; in these two 
countries the Portuguese became a signifi cant foreign community in a relatively 
short period of time. 
 Data on Portuguese-born people living in another European country (Table  5.2 ) 
confi rms that the increase described was particularly evident after 2005, and that a 
substantial part was due to new migratory movements.
 The upsurge in Portuguese emigration during the 2000s and particularly since 
2005 is also observable in the data on the infl ow of Portuguese citizens to some 
other European countries. This data shows that emigration resumed its growing 
trend, after a temporary interruption between 2007 and 2010 due to the economic 
crisis experienced by some of the potential destination countries of Portuguese emi-
grants (e.g. Spain) (Table  5.3 ).
 Taken together, the data presented in the preceding tables illustrate simultane-
ously the signifi cance of Portuguese integration in the Western European migration 
system, and the variety of migratory destinations that emerge and develop in differ-
ent national frameworks. The maintenance of these migratory destinations is contin-
gent on the evolution of the opportunity structures and/or the emergence of 
alternative migration structures (Marques  2008 ,  2009 ). So, for example, the reduc-
tion of the emigration fl ow to Spain (due to a decrease in job opportunities in this 
country) was compensated, from 2010 onwards, by an increase of the infl ow of 
Portuguese citizens to Germany and especially to the UK. 
 Though striking, the data presented above does not capture entirely the dimen-
sion of the Portuguese outfl ows after 2005. Available data (see below) show that, in 
addition to the European destination countries, the current emigration fl ow is head-
ing toward destinations that until now only marginally functioned as host countries 
for Portuguese migrants. Thus, Portuguese emigration destinations have become 
geographically more diversifi ed, complementing the integration into the Western 
European migration system with an increased participation, as a country of origin, 
 Table 5.2  Portuguese-born living in selected European countries, 2000–2013 
 2000/1  2005  2010  2013 
 Belgium  21,189  23,300  28,310  31,564 
 France  571,874 a  567,000  588,276  599,333 b 
 Germany  108,397  92,251  90,148  104,084 
 Spain  58,364  80,846  148,154  134,248 
 Switzerland  100,975  132,872  172,274  211,451 
 United Kingdom  34,000  57,000  83,000  110,000 
 Total Europe  1,292,536  1,529,237 
 Sources: Pires et al. ( 2014 ), Branco ( 2013 ), and Observatório da Emigração ( http://www.observa-
torioemigracao.secomunidades.pt ) 
 Notes:  a 1999 data 
 b 2012 data; data for Luxembourg is not available 
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in the Lusophone migration system. In this last migration system the cases of Brazil 
and Angola are paradigmatic of the development of new destinations for Portuguese 
emigration due to the marked economic growth experienced by these countries in 
the last few years. In Angola the number of Portuguese emigrants entering the coun-
try increased from 156 in 2006 to 23,787 in 2009. In 2013 there were around 
115,000 Portuguese citizens living in Angola. 3 
 Although available offi cial data is insuffi cient to describe the evolution of 
Portuguese migratory fl ows to Brazil, there is evidence that it has increased in the 
last few years. Thus, for example, work visas issued to Portuguese citizens in Brazil 
rose from 477 in 2006 to 2,913 in 2013, and the number of Portuguese residents in 
Brazil registered at a Portuguese Consulate increased from 493,227 in 2008, to 
558,737 in 2012. 4 Although incomplete, these fi gures show a clear growth in 
Portuguese emigration to Brazil and Angola that reversed the migratory movements 
which took place during the 1990s and early years of the twenty-fi rst century. 
 We should state that an element of these fl ows to Brazil and Angola (and also to 
other Lusophone countries) could include an unknown number of citizens from 
these countries who previously migrated to Portugal, and during their stay in the 
country acquired Portuguese citizenship. 
 In sum, in the new millennium, and particularly with the beginning of the 2008 
economic crisis, Portuguese emigration went both to traditional destinations and to 
new destinations. The participation in various migration systems, each at different 
phases, is able to compensate for any reduction in employment opportunities in a 
particular destination, or to react to an increase in the national emigration pressure. 
Portuguese emigration becomes therefore geographically more diverse, adding to 
its ability to include new European countries as effective host countries, the capacity 
to include destinations that overstep the borders of the European continent. 
 Annual estimations of Portuguese outfl ows made by the Portuguese Statistical 
Offi ce confi rm, for 2011 and 2012, the return to substantial emigration fl ows. 
According to these data 222,396 emigrants left the country, 43.1 % of them perma-
nently. If we compare these data with the average outfl ow during the most intense 
period of Portuguese emigration in the twentieth century (on average 97,695 emi-
grants left the country each year between 1960 and 1974) it is possible to suggest 
that the idea of a return to the past is an adequate description for the current migra-
tory situation. 
 An accurate description of the social and demographic characteristics of contem-
porary Portuguese emigration is, due to data limitations, unfortunately not possible. 
We believe, however, that in these respects the current emigrants reproduce, with 
some alterations, the features already present in previous emigration fl ows. The 
changes observed in contemporary movements result either from changes in the 
international labour market (and, in particular, in the demand for migrant workers in 
the major destination countries of Portuguese migrants), and from transformations 
in Portuguese society itself. Together these changes contribute to certain distinctive 
3  Data from  http://www.observatorioemigracao.secomunidades.pt/np4/paises.html?id=9 
4  Data from  http://www.observatorioemigracao.secomunidades.pt/np4/paises.html?id=31 
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characteristics of the Portuguese emigrants of the twenty-fi rst century. The skill 
level of those currently involved in the outfl ow appears, in public and academically 
informed discourse, to be one of the most signifi cant characteristics. If one of the 
distinguishing differences between the transatlantic movements of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century, and the intra-European migration of the 1960s 
and early 1970s was the “generalization to the entire country of the ‘emigration 
zone’” (Almeida and Barreto  1970 : 233), we believe that it is possible to hypothe-
size that, in addition to the features of the new migratory forms mentioned above, 
one of the distinctive elements of the current emigration movement is the general-
ization of the emigration experience to virtually all professional categories. In fact, 
while the emigration fl ow of the 1960s and 1970s was composed of predominantly 
poorly qualifi ed people from the agricultural, industrial and domestic work sectors, 
with negligible emigration of skilled professionals, 5 contemporary emigration, 
despite continuing to be mostly unskilled, seems, according to some mainly anec-
dotal information, to record an increase in the proportion of people with higher 
levels of qualifi cation. Thus, for example, in 2014, 29.3 % of Portuguese-born work-
ing in the UK had a tertiary degree (see chapter on the United Kingdom). In France, 
data on emigrants arrived between 2006 and 2011 show also a higher proportion of 
highly skilled when compared to emigrants arrived in previous periods (see chapter 
on France). 
 Docquier and Rapoport ( 2012 ) state in their study on the evolution of the “brain 
drain” in the past four decades, that Portugal was, in 2000, one of the European 
countries most affected by skilled emigration, with a skilled emigration rate of 
19.5 % of the skilled workforce in the country, or 13.1 % if we limit the analysis to 
those who arrived in the country of destination aged 22 or over. 6 Several media 
reports show that during the 2000s and early 2010s the emigration of higher- 
education graduates continued and intensifi ed, increasingly including more profes-
sional groups (e.g. professions related to the health sector). Some of these 
professionals are recruited directly in Portugal and, while abroad, work in activity 
sectors directly related to their academic training. Others encounter some diffi cul-
ties in transferring their qualifi cations to other labour markets and experience a 
labour market integration that is dissonant with their area of qualifi cation, and as a 
result suffer downward mobility. 
 In terms of demographic characteristics, available information does not allow for 
a rigorous description of the age and sex structure of those who currently leave the 
country. Estimates of annual emigration published by the Portuguese Statistical 
Offi ce show that most of those who temporarily or permanently left the country 
5 According to Baganha ( 1994 ) these professional groups had no rational motivation for migration 
since the existing labour market segmentation assured them a higher level of income. 
6  The fi rst fi gure includes skilled immigrants regardless of whether they obtained their qualifi cation 
in the country of origin or destination. The second fi gure uses information on the age at entry into 
the country of destination as a proxy for the country in which their qualifi cation was acquired 
(assuming that those who entered aged 22 or more acquired their qualifi cation in the country of 
origin) (Beine et al.  2006 ). 
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were male (72 % in 2012) and in the active age group (in 2012, 57 % of migrants 
were between 20 and 39 years of age). Although differences between permanent 
and temporary migrants seem to be insignifi cant, it should be noted that the former 
have a younger age structure (with 55 % between 20 and 34 as opposed to 40 % for 
temporary migrants) and a higher proportion of women (29 % of permanent and 
23 % of temporary migrants). 
5.3  Economic Crisis, Unemployment and Changes 
in Migration Flows 
 The majority of these outfl ows are a result of the negative growth in the Portuguese 
economy and the profound transformations of the Portuguese labour market brought 
about by the economic crisis. From 2009 to 2013 (with the exception of 2010) the 
Portuguese economy was marked by an unfavourable evolution. The average annual 
GDP growth rate in these 5 years was −1.7 % (or 2.6 % if the year 2010 is not 
included in the calculus) (INE, database, various years). The annual decrease in the 
GDP, and the austerity measures had a profound impact on the Portuguese labour 
market. One of its biggest impacts is the massive increase in unemployment, and 
changing forms of employment, which affect some groups (e.g. youths, immigrants) 
in a more intense way. Workers aged 45 and over also form a disproportionate share 
of the hard-luck recession category, the long-term unemployed. In the aftermath of 
the 2008 fi nancial and economic crisis, unemployment reached its highest level and 
socio-economic inequalities increased. Since the second half of 2008, the unem-
ployment level started to rise sharply and is now well above 10 % (16.3 % in 2013, 
whereas in 2008 it was 7.6 %). The young were particularly affected by unemploy-
ment, registering a 128 % increase in their unemployment rate from 2008 to 2013 
(Table  5.4 ).
 Immigrants from non-EU member countries are also a social group particularly 
hit by unemployment in the aftermath of the 2008 fi nancial and economic crisis. 
Their unemployment level is well above the national average and registered a more 
 Table 5.4  Unemployment rate by age group and gender 2008–2013, (%) 
 2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013 
 15–24  16.7  16.7  20.3  22.8  30.3  37.9  38.1 
 25–34  9.8  8.7  11.0  12.8  14.1  18.1  19.0 
 35–44  6.7  6.7  8.4  9.8  11.0  13.3  14.4 
 45 and more  5.6  5.4  6.9  8.0  9.6  11.4  12.2 
 Total  8.0  7.6  9.4  10.8  12.7  15.5  16.2 
 Males  6.6  6.5  8.9  9.8  12.3  15.6  16.0 
 Females  9.5  8.8  10.2  11.9  13.0  15.5  16.4 
 Source: INE, Employment Survey, various years 
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marked increase within the last years than the national average, rising from 13.0 % 
in 2007 to 30.4 % in 2013 (INE, Employment Survey, 2007 and 2013). 
 Due to these increases in the levels of unemployment, it is possible to state that 
the economic crisis was not only responsible for the recent increase in the outfl ow 
of Portuguese nationals (either by birth or by naturalization), it also impacted on the 
number of immigrants living in Portugal. Data on the evolution of the foreigners 
living in the country with a valid residence permit shows a continuous increase 
between 2001 and 2010 (marked by successive legalization opportunities for immi-
grants) and a noticeable decrease thereafter. This declining tendency became even 
more evident in 2013 when the total foreign population reached a number that was 
below the one they had just before the 2008 economic and fi nancial crisis. This 
decrease is shared by the six major national groups present in the Portuguese terri-
tory (as we can see in Table  5.5 ). The data shows that, after an intense increase 
between 2001 and 2008, all nationalities experienced, albeit at a different pace, a 
clear decrease. We must emphasize the existence of a new citizenship law that 
allowed the naturalization of a very high number of legal foreign residents, which is 
part of the cause of this decrease.
5.4  Migratory Patterns 
 To the outfl ows of a more permanent character it is necessary to add a signifi cant 
fl ow of temporary exits, sometimes of a circular character, which have intensifi ed in 
recent decades as a result of the deepening of globalization, the EU’s freedom of 
 Table 5.5  Foreign population living legally in Portugal by selected nationality, 2001–2013 
 Year  Total  Romania  Ukraine  Angola 
 Cape 
Verde 
 Guinea 
Bissau  Brazil 
 2001  129,473  508  203  22,751  49,845  17,791  23,422 
 2002  238,929  615  299  24,782  52,223  19,227  24,762 
 2003  249,995  764  525  25,616  53,434  20,041  26,508 
 2004  263,322  1,219  1,551  26,517  54,788  20,511  28,730 
 2005  274,631  1,564  2,120  27,533  55,608  20,935  31,500 
 2006  332,137  5,446  22,846  28,856  57,369  21,170  42,319 
 2007  401,612  17,200  34,240  30,431  61,110  22,174  55,665 
 2008  436,020  26,425  52,472  27,307  50,887  23,842  106,704 
 2009  451,742  32,457  52,253  26,292  48,417  22,404  115,882 
 2010  443,055  36,830  49,487  23,233  43,510  19,304  119,195 
 2011  434,708  39,312  48,010  21,329  43,475  18,131  111,295 
 2012  417,142  35,216  44,074  20,366  42,857  17,759  105,622 
 2013  401,320  34,204  41,091  20,177  42,401  17,846  92,120 
 Source: 2001–2008: INE. Base de Dados [ www.ine.pt ] 
 2009–2013: SEF, Estatísticas [ http://sefstat.sef.pt/relatorios.aspx ] 
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movement, the development of information and communication technologies, the 
emergence of low cost aviation companies in Europe, and the widespread growth of 
atypical forms of employment contract (visible, for example, through the extension 
of subcontracting processes to ever more areas of activity). Since the mid-1980s, 
these forms of temporary migration are a central characteristic of Portuguese out-
fl ows to different European countries. For example, in Switzerland the number of 
temporary entries of Portuguese citizens during the 1980s and 1990s was approxi-
mately 33,000, and 16,000 during the fi rst 8 years of the twenty-fi rst century 
(Marques  2008 ,  2009 ). After the end of the transition period fi xed in the agreement 
on the free movement of labour signed between Switzerland and the European 
Union (2001–2007), the temporary entry of Portuguese citizens to Switzerland 
remained high (roughly 17,000 per year). Given that these are not permanent move-
ments, it would be inaccurate to state that the overall number of temporary exits 
during the period under study corresponded to an equal number of migrants. Many 
of these outfl ows are carried out in successive years by the same migrants. They are, 
in fact, repeated movements of a single migrant and not new emigration movements 
performed by different migrants. 
 An undetermined number of these movements correspond to a circular migration 
movement that combines periods abroad (in one or several countries) with periods 
in Portugal. Some anecdotal information on the fl ow of Portuguese citizens to 
Angola or Mozambique (but also to other destinations of Portuguese multinational 
corporations), published in the national press, testify that this temporary migration 
also takes place in non-European contexts, although in these cases migration peri-
ods tend naturally to be of longer duration. 
5.4.1  The Case of Posted Workers 
 A specifi c case of these temporary exits of Portuguese citizens is formed by posted 
workers, which developed as a result of Portugal’s membership of the European 
Union (Ramos and Diogo  2003 ). This type of migratory outfl ow is substantially 
different from traditional forms of Portuguese emigration due to the fact that 
Portuguese companies acted as subcontractors of big European construction com-
panies that used free movement within the European area to their advantage by 
promoting the mobility of Portuguese workers. This allowed Portuguese construc-
tion companies to benefi t from the differential in labour costs that existed between 
Portuguese and other European construction workers (Baganha and Cavalheiro 
 2001 ). 
 In Germany, the number of posted Portuguese workers in 1997 was 21,919, rep-
resenting 12.1 % of all posted workers and 40.1 % of posted workers from a 
European Union country (Worthmann  2003 ). Portuguese migrants were thus the 
largest group of posted workers from an EU member country working in Germany. 
According to some sources these fi gures did not account for the real number of 
Portuguese citizens involved in this type of migration fl ow, since they only refer to 
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posted workers in a regular situation and therefore did not include around 35,000 
Portuguese working as irregular posted workers (Gago and Vicente  2002 : 212). 
 More recent data shows that in 2007 and 2009, Portuguese posted workers were, 
respectively, 66,048 and 65,499, and that in 2009, the main destination countries 
were Spain, France and Germany (European Commission  2011 ). 7 From 1 May 2010 
the Portable Document A1 8 has replaced the E101 certifi cate. Data on the issuing of 
these documents for 2010 and 2011 shows a continuous declining trend of the num-
ber of documents issued (Table  5.6 ) that, in 2011, recorded the lowest value of the 
last 5 years (54,183). This downward trend is clearly a result of the economic crisis 
in some of the former destination countries as we can see from a detailed analysis 
of the evolution of numbers of posted workers by main countries of destination.
 This shows that the decline in posted workers to Spain accounts for the main 
reduction in the overall number of Portuguese posted workers between 2009 and 
2011. A portion of this reduction was compensated by an increase in detachments to 
the Netherlands, and especially to France which, taken together, show an increase 
of detachments during the same time interval. Since the majority of the detachments 
head for the construction industry and public works (67.5 % in 2011) (European 
Commission  2012 ), it is conceivable that the crisis in this sector in Spain defl ected 
the movement of posted workers to those national contexts in which the construc-
tion industry and public works were less affected by the economic crisis, or are in a 
process of recovery from the effects of this crisis. 
 Despite the mentioned limitations, data from detachments are indicative of 
mobility patterns and trends that have developed in recent years. They complement 
previously presented fi gures showing that opportunities for mobility within Europe 
have contributed (and continue to contribute) to the diversifi cation of migratory 
opportunities for Portuguese citizens. These opportunities seem particularly rele-
vant for workers in sectors that have been most affected by the current economic 
crisis (e.g. construction and public works). 
7  Data concerning posted workers does not necessarily correspond to a same number of migrants, 
as the same worker may have been assigned more than one E101 certifi cate (or, after 2010, a 
Portable Document A1). 
8  Council Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 regarding the coordination of social security systems 
(European Commission  2012 ). 
 Table 5.6  Certifi cates and Portable Documents A1 issued in Portugal, by main destination 
countries (2007–2011) 
 2007  2009  2010  2011  Change 2009–2011 (%) 
 Germany  –  4,858  5,175  4,770  −1.8 % 
 Spain  –  23,854  18,968  12,762  −46.5 % 
 France  –  12,694  17,191  18,502  45.8 % 
 Netherlands  –  4,087  7,423  7,020  71.8 % 
 Total  66,000  65,499  58,948  54,183  −17.3 
 Source: European Commission,  2011 and  2014 
5 Structural Emigration: The Revival of Portuguese Outfl ows
76
 Taken together, the different types of temporary outfl ows to other member states 
of the European Union or to countries with which it has special relations (e.g. 
Switzerland), as well as more permanent emigration movements, have benefi ted 
from the possibilities of free movement within the European Union or the European 
Economic Area. The structuring of different destinations within this European 
migration system (and, from the mid-2000s onwards, within the Lusophone migra-
tory system (Marques and Góis  2012 ; Baganha et al.  2005 ; Marques  2008 )) allows 
for the diversifi cation of migration opportunities, and consequently increases 
migrants’ opportunities to react to short-term instabilities that arise in countries 
which are part of this migratory system (driven, for example, by economic, and /or 
political constraints). It can thus be said that one of the peculiarities of contempo-
rary Portuguese emigration is a result of the multiplicity of migratory destinations, 
which are activated according to the set of opportunities that emerge and develop in 
different destination countries (Marques  2008 ,  2009 ). 
 Like the Portuguese outfl ows of the twentieth century (Baganha  1994 ), the pur-
suit of economic opportunities that are lacking in Portugal is one of the main rea-
sons for current emigration fl ows. The rise in unemployment, the stagnation or even 
reduction in salaries, a lack of positive expectations regarding economic growth, 
etc., are powerful drivers of emigration fl ows. Although important, these conditions 
do not by themselves fully account for the intensity of the emigration fl ow. As in 
past emigration movements, the development and maintenance of present emigra-
tion is based, in different degrees and in variable confi gurations, on social structures 
that support migration. It is the positive evolution of these structures, consisting of 
family members, friends and acquaintances, which contribute to the self- 
sustainability of the migration process. 
 Two types of social network allow potential migrants to connect to existing 
opportunity structures in the country of origin and to access, after they arrival in the 
country of destination, resources that are important for their initial permanence in 
that country. It is thus possible to differentiate between ‘internal migration net-
works’ 9 and ‘external migration networks’. The fi rst type of network helps to create, 
mainly in the country of origin, the necessary conditions to achieve emigration. It 
allows, for example, access to recruitment opportunities abroad, or knowledge of 
entities with potential relevance in accomplishing the migration process. 
 The second type of migratory network develops after leaving the country, and 
connects, in the destination country, recently arrived migrants with already estab-
lished migrants (Marques  2008 ). These latter networks assume a different role in 
accordance with the national context in which they operate. They seem to be more 
relevant in more traditional emigration contexts (e.g. France and Switzerland) and 
play a less central role in recent emigration destinations (e.g. UK or Angola). So the 
recent emigration fl ow to France still maintains an initial connection with older and 
9  The notion of ‘internal migration networks’ is used to mean the relationship, in the country of 
origin, between migration candidates, migrants and non-migrants (at the individual or institutional 
level, like for example the notices of job opportunities in other countries made available by the 
Portuguese Employment Service offi ces). 
J.C. Marques and P. Góis
77
established emigration communities that contribute to the integration of newcomers 
in the labour market (often in companies owned by Portuguese or through replacing 
retiring Portuguese), and in the French housing market. Emigration to the UK has, 
at least partially, a lesser connection to previous emigration fl ows, and thus a greater 
propensity to integrate, either in new labour market sectors, or new geographical 
areas. 10 
5.5  Policies and Political Debates on Emigration 
 During most of Portugal’s emigration history, political debates where framed by the 
contrasting objectives of controlling the migration fl ow, and to allow for the con-
tinuing emigration regarded both as an answer to overpopulation (from the perspec-
tive of the available employment opportunities), and as a source of remittances 
necessary for the industrialization and development of the country (among others, 
Baganha  2003 ; Pereira  2002 ,  2004 ,  2014 ). Until the national Constitution of 1976 
the freedom to emigrate was constrained by the national interest (commonly defi ned 
as the interest of Portuguese elites). The inscription of the right to emigrate in the 
national Constitution (art. 44) occurred at a time when Portuguese emigration fl ows 
witnessed a deep transformation due to the end of the labour recruitment pro-
grammes of France and Germany. 
 The country’s accession to the European Community in 1986 brought about a 
certain invisibility of migratory outfl ows and concurrently a change in the political 
elites’ attitudes towards emigration. The exit of Portuguese citizens became an 
“embarrassing fact” (Baganha et al.  2005 ) that was in contradiction with the coun-
try’s position among the most developed countries of Europe. The denial or, at least, 
the underestimation of on-going outfl ows went along, as said previously, with 
increasing immigration fl ows that were much more acceptable to the development 
discourse of the political elite of that time. Thus, in the last decades, emigration was 
subjected to a continuous process of defl ation whereby existing outfl ows were not 
incorporated in the political discourses and in scientifi c practices. 
 Political debates and initiatives on emigration during this period were mainly on 
policies aimed at promoting the emigrant’s engagement with their country of origin 
(Marques and Góis  2013 ). Only after the recent upsurge in the outfl ow of Portuguese 
citizens has it been possible to observe an increase in the discourses (political, sci-
entifi c, and by the media) on emigration fl ows. 
 Due to the incipient expansion of current emigration, these discourses are how-
ever of a fragmentary nature and frequently not integrated in an overall strategy on 
emigration fl ows and emigration communities abroad. In order to analyse the 
10  In 2001, 61.5 % of all Portuguese-born in England lived in the London region. Ten years later this 
percentage decreased to 47.8 %, while all other regions in England reported an increase of 
Portuguese-born (most signifi cant in the East and South East regions of England). (Data from UK 
Census 2001 and 2011, available at  http://infuse.mimas.ac.uk/ ). 
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 quantitative evolution and the changes in the formal political debates on emigration, 
an analysis of parliamentary debates of the last 8 years (from 2006 to 2013) 11 was 
conducted. 12 The objective was to discover if, as a result of the economic crisis, 
emigration became a salient theme in parliamentary debates and if there was a sub-
stantial change in the categories that usually frame the political debate on 
emigration. 13 
 The quantitative analysis shows, notwithstanding some important fl uctuations, 
an overall increase in references to emigration/emigrants over the last 8 years, from 
37 references in 2006 to 85 in 2013. This increase is evident both in references to 
emigrants and to emigration, and is particularly noticeable since 2011 (the year that 
marked the beginning of the EU/IMF fi nancial assistance program). This increase in 
references to emigration/emigrants does not however evidence a clear and unques-
tionable renewed interest in emigration: from the 503 analysed texts in which a 
reference to emigration/emigrants was made, 42.9 % refer to issues that are not 
directly linked to emigration, such as proposals on the creation of municipalities, 
laws on immigration, or in reports on the participation of deputies in external activi-
ties. And 21.3 % of the references are mainly related to past emigration fl ows and to 
the Portuguese community abroad (questions on associations, on the Portuguese 
media abroad, on the teaching of Portuguese language abroad, on descendants of 
Portuguese citizens, on the Council of Portuguese Communities, 14 on fi scal aspects, 
and on citizenship and political participation of emigrants). 15 Debates on current 
emigration cover thus ‘only’ 18.4 % of the analysed documents and even these are 
11  Two reasons justifi ed the selection of the year 2006 to start our study. First, the year 2006 cor-
responded to a legislative period which was not infl uenced by a parliamentary electoral campaign. 
Second, and more important, during this year the economic crisis was not yet present in the politi-
cal and media discourse, so allowing for a comparison with the following years which were 
strongly affected by the crisis. 
12  For this study 503 texts with references to emigration and/or emigrants were analysed. The total 
number of documents with references to these two themes was 553, but since 50 documents could 
not be retrieved from the database of the National Parliament they were excluded from our 
analysis. 
13  It is important to note that this study of parliamentary debates was not guided by the intention of 
conducting a discourse analysis, but by the aim to identify prominent emigrant related themes that 
fi gured in the daily-transcribed parliamentary debates. Therefore an inductive content analysis was 
conducted and the relevant passages of the diaries where coded according to a coding scheme that 
emerged from the analysed texts. We have used 30 categories and 59 sub-categories to map the 
relevance of Portuguese emigration related subjects for the period 2006–2013 in the interventions 
of the Portuguese MPs and government members. This research technique allowed for the identi-
fi cation of the most relevant categories and the measurement of the frequency of references in each 
category. 
14  This Council was created in 1980. It has a consultative role in advising the government in matters 
related to emigration and Portuguese communities abroad (Marques and Góis  2013 ). 
15  This does not mean that some of these issues could not also refer to new emigrants and recent 
emigration fl ows. But the context in which they were discussed refers exclusively to Portuguese 
communities that resulted from past emigration fl ows. 
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not exclusively on present emigration fl ows. 16 As could be expected the main themes 
discussed in regard to present emigration refer to the growth of the emigration fl ow, 
the measures adopted by the State to assist these new emigrants (mainly through the 
development of the network of consular posts), questions of integration, and visa 
policies of non-EU receiving countries (e.g. Angola). The debated issues frequently 
did not lead to concrete measures or policies towards present day migrants. An 
exception are measures that intend to facilitate circulation between Portugal and 
non-EU countries 17 and measures that albeit not directed to current emigrants impact 
on their engagement with the country of origin (measures on the reduction of con-
sular workers or on the availability of Portuguese Language and Culture courses 
abroad). Most of existent engagement policies were created in the aftermath of 
Portuguese emigration of the 1960s and early 1970s. They are, therefore, marked 
both by the characteristics of these emigrants and by the objective to expand post- 
1974 democratic participation to Portuguese citizens living abroad. Thus extra- 
territorial political participation was introduced in 1976, the Council of Portuguese 
Communities Abroad was created in 1980, and Portuguese Language and Culture 
courses where introduced in 1973/1974 (Marques and Góis  2013 ; Aguiar  2009 , 
 1987 ). 
 A closer look at the debates on current emigration fl ows reveals that most of 
them are made either in a discussion on the economic crisis (and used as an ‘instru-
ment’ to question the austerity policies adopted by the government), or on questions 
related to the integration of these emigrants (or their children) in the destination 
country. 
 The instrumental use of emigration is particularly evident in the discourses of the 
opposition parties that blame the government for the increasing outfl ows, as can be 
seen in the following excerpts:
 Given this dramatic reality, the government cannot deny (…) that the emigration of 
Portuguese citizens has increased with the growth of economic diffi culties in our country 
(Communist Party, Diary of the National Parliament, 25/05/2013). 
 Many thousands of young people, including the most qualifi ed, are pushed to the inevitabil-
ity of emigration by a government with no vision for the future, which is unable to open the 
horizon of hope for them (Socialist Party, Diary of the National Parliament, 23/03/2013). 
 The issue of the brain drain to which the last citation refers is a salient theme 
both in the parliamentary debates and in the media. In both cases different groups 
(politicians and journalists) use anecdotal evidence of the outfl ow of highly skilled 
Portuguese citizens either to illustrate the negative impact of this emigration fl ow on 
the future of Portuguese economy, or to illustrate the most important differences 
between current Portuguese emigration vis-à-vis past emigration fl ows. Although 
the most salient issue (together with the general increase in outfl ows) in public 
16  The remaining 17.6 % of the analysed documents make references to emigration/emigrants not 
related to this theme (for example during the discussion of the annual State budget, or during 
debates on the European Union.) 
17  For example, the bilateral agreement between Portugal and Angola on visa facilitation. 
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debates on current emigration is the issue of highly skilled migration (and on the 
brain drain usually associated with it), this has not lead to signifi cant policy 
responses aimed at this component of the current migration fl ows, or at current 
migration in general. Most of the policies adopted by the Portuguese State (e.g. the 
Council of Portuguese Communities) continue to be based on an image of emigra-
tion from the 1960s and early 1970s. Support and network structures directed at 
highly skilled migrants are a result of the efforts of this type of migrant in the desti-
nation countries, and receive after their creation a variable amount of support from 
the Portuguese State (mainly through the Portuguese Embassies). 18 
5.6  Final Remarks 
 Emigration is an integral part of Portuguese society that in the last couple of years 
has gained a new momentum. Like previous outfl ows the current wave has been 
shaped by the existing institutional and political framework, by the development of 
the conditions for mobility and by the functioning of migratory networks. Distinct 
features of present day migration fl ows are the diversifi cation of destination coun-
tries, the participation of a signifi cant proportion of highly-skilled in the emigratory 
fl ow, and the coexistence between old and new forms of migration. These new 
forms of migration are mainly the result of the legal and institutional framework 
created by the accession of Portugal to the European Union in the mid 1980s, and 
thus take advantage of the opportunities for circulation that exist within the European 
area. During the early years of this century, the Portuguese migratory destinations 
have become more diversifi ed, complementing European destinations with the 
intensifi cation of outfl ows to other countries, especially to Portuguese-speaking 
countries (above all to Brazil and Angola). 
 A substantial part of the current migratory movement is motivated by the coun-
try’s economic constraints, and in particular by the continued rise in unemployment, 
and by the existence of economic benefi ts in other countries. The links between job 
opportunities abroad and potential migrants are, like in past migration fl ows, pro-
moted by the activation or, as is the case of the most recent destination countries, by 
the construction and consolidation of migratory networks. 
 The revival of Portuguese emigration after the 2008 fi nancial and economic cri-
sis did not lead to concrete and strategic policies directed towards the new reality of 
emigration, as is evident from the analysis of the parliamentary debates described in 
the second part of the chapter. Policies continue to privilege the engagement of 
emigrants with their country of origin and most of them are based on the image of 
earlier emigration fl ows (Marques and Góis  2013 ). As described in the fi rst part of 
this text, contemporary Portuguese emigration exhibits important differences from 
previous emigration fl ows, making it necessary to study the appropriateness of these 
18  Examples of these networks are the PARSUK – Portuguese Association of Researchers and 
Students in the United Kingdom and the Association Agrafer, France. 
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policies for the current outfl ow (a study that it is not possible to pursue in this place). 
Although present day emigration continues to be mainly composed of less qualifi ed 
workers, it remains to be seen if existing policies also appeal to more qualifi ed 
migrants and to migrants who have a more temporary or even a circular migration 
trajectory. 
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 Chapter 6 
 Is Spain Becoming a Country of Emigration 
Again? Data Evidence and Public Responses 
 Anastasia  Bermudez and  Elisa  Brey 
6.1  Introduction 
 The global fi nancial and economic crisis that erupted at the end of 2007 has had a 
dramatic impact in the Southern EU member states, including Spain. Some of these 
countries despite having a history of emigration had lately become major attraction 
poles for immigrants as their economies expanded and demanded new workers. 
However, as the crisis deepened, labour markets contracted severely with two con-
sequences: growing unemployment and increased emigration (as well as reduced 
immigration). Being such a recent phenomenon, there is still a lack of detailed 
knowledge about these outfl ows, something that has contributed to polarize opin-
ions on the causes and consequences. 
 In the case of Spain, some public discourses portray this new emigration as lim-
ited and the result mainly of immigrants returning to their countries of origin (or 
re-emigrating) as labour opportunities decrease. Since one of the main focuses of 
migration policy post-crisis has been return migration, this could be perceived as 
positive. Equally, the emigration of young, qualifi ed natives is seen as mostly the 
choice of individuals in search of new experiences or as part of a globalising labour 
force, rather than as a negative result of the crisis. By contrast, others point out that 
offi cial data underrepresents the true extent of current emigration and its main char-
acteristics. As well as arguing that the outfl ows are larger than assumed and the 
outcome of poor job opportunities and reduced social expenditure, critics point out 
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that emigration is especially affecting the young and highly educated, which could 
have serious economic and demographic effects. 
 The following sections delve further into these questions, with the aims of clari-
fying what the available statistics say about recent emigration from Spain and of 
analysing the policy and public responses. To contextualize the current situation, we 
start with a description of key economic and migration data and then look into main 
destinations and the sociodemographics of recent outfl ows, to fi nish with a critical 
appraisal of policies and public debates. 
6.2  The Relationship Between Economics and Migration: 
The Impact of the Crisis 
 From the mid-1990s, Spain enjoyed a period of strong and sustained economic 
growth refl ected in the expansion of its labour market. Employment rates climbed 
gradually to reach a peak of 69.5 % in 2007, just below the EU-28 average. At the 
same time, and despite the enlargement of the workforce (Alonso Pérez and Furio 
Blasco  2010 ), unemployment declined to an all-time low of 8.2 %, slightly above 
the EU value (Labour Force Survey, LFS, Eurostat). However, the present crisis put 
an end to this bonanza in a much more dramatic way than the recessions of the mid- 
1970s and early 1990s, both in terms of economic deceleration and job losses 
(Ortega and Peñalosa  2012 ). 
 Although the crisis has affected labour markets globally, the impact in Spain has 
proven how unstable the previous period of prosperity was. After GDP growth rates 
of around 4 % the previous 3 years, since the crisis started the economy has con-
tracted (by −3.6 % in 2009) or barely grown (by 1.4 % in 2014). As a result, annual 
employment rates have fallen to the levels registered at the beginning of the twenty- 
fi rst century, while unemployment reached 24.5 % in 2014 (more than 14 percent-
age points above the EU average). In addition, over 29 % of the population in Spain 
is considered to be at risk of poverty or social exclusion (up from 23 % in 2007), 
while income inequality has augmented. The impact of all this has been uneven. 
Male unemployment rates more than tripled from 2007 to 2014, although women 
continue to record a slightly higher fi gure (Eurostat data). But it seems to be young 
people who have seen their chances of entering or remaining in the job market most 
affected (OPAM  2012 ). By 2014, among the group 16–19 years old, over two-thirds 
of the economically active were unemployed, while more than half of those aged 
20–24 were in the same situation (see Table  6.1 ). Although younger people have 
traditionally been more exposed to joblessness, the impact of the current crisis has 
generated concerns about the loss of human capital due to inactivity or emigration 
(González Enríquez and Martínez Romera  2014 ; Navarrete Moreno  2013 ).
 Educational attainment also infl uences labour market opportunities, with unem-
ployment hitting hardest those with the lowest levels of formal education. Still, at 
the end of 2014, 14.3 % of people with higher education could not fi nd a job. The 
A. Bermudez and E. Brey
85
data also shows that migrants have been particularly affected. The unemployment 
rate for the foreign born in 2014 was 33.3 %, more than 10 percentage points above 
the value for those born in Spain (Eurostat). For some groups, such as migrants from 
outside Europe and Latin America, a category which mainly comprises African 
nationals (in particular Moroccans), unemployment is even higher (Oliver Alonso 
 2013 ). 
 Based on this, as a result of the crisis one would expect a reduction of labour 
immigration and increased outfl ows in the form of both return migration and native 
emigration. The Spanish immigration boom was inextricably linked to the eco-
nomic bonanza. Up until the 1970s, Spain was mainly a country of emigration, 
receiving hardly any immigrants (Romero Valiente  2003 ). As emigration started to 
dwindle immigration took off, growing exponentially with the arrival of the new 
century. Until approximately 2009, Spain received an average of almost half a mil-
lion foreign-born individuals annually, thus becoming the second-largest recipient 
of immigrants in absolute terms in the OECD after the United States (Arango  2013 ). 
 Population censuses show the number of foreign nationals in the country to have 
risen from some 350,000 in 1981 to close to 5.3 million in 2011. Data from the 
municipal population registries ( Padrón municipal ) also show how the number of 
foreign nationals in Spain increased steadily until 2008, when it reached 5.6 million 
(12 % of the total population). However, by the end of 2014 the foreign population 
had fallen to 4.7 million. Although this can partly be ascribed to naturalisations, the 
foreign-born population has also shrunk (from 6.7 million in 2011 to just above 6.1 
million) (INE). 1 Thus, stagnation and decline has been due both to a reduction in 
immigration and an acceleration of emigration, which has turned the migratory bal-
ance negative since 2010. Nevertheless, there is controversy about the signifi cance 
and characteristics of these new outfl ows. 
1  Provisional data by 1st January 2015. The Padrón is the most used source in studies of migration 
in Spain but it has some disadvantages. It can overestimate the number of foreign nationals resid-
ing in the country and underestimate emigration fl ows, since there are no incentives for people to 
deregister once they leave the country. This could explain the discrepancy between the number of 
foreign residents estimated by the 2011 Census and those registered by the Padrón in the same year 
(5.7 million) (OPAM  2013 ). 
 Table 6.1  Annual unemployment rates (%) by age group in Spain, 2007–2014 
 2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 
 16–19  28.7  39.4  55.2  61.3  64.0  72.6  74.0  68.6 
 20–24  15.0  20.2  33.3  36.9  42.3  48.9  51.8  50.3 
 25–29  9.0  13.3  21.7  24.7  26.3  31.5  33.3  30.3 
 30–44  7.0  9.9  16.2  18.2  19.7  22.7  23.7  22.0 
 45–54  6.3  8.4  13.4  15.3  17.1  20.5  22.2  21.2 
 55 and more  5.7  7.1  11.5  13.5  14.4  17.3  19.4  19.3 
 Source: Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA), Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) 
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6.3  Recent Emigration: How Many Are Leaving, Where 
and Who Are They? 
 Emigration from Spain has never ceased but it was very much reduced after the 
1970s (Valero-Matas et al.  2010 ). Nevertheless, the number of ‘deregistrations’ 2 
( Estadística de Variaciones  Residenciales , EVR) from the  Padrón from people 
moving abroad has been increasing steadily over the last decade, with annual fi gures 
almost doubling from 2007 to 2014. The external migration statistics ( Estadística 
de Migraciones / Migraciones Exteriores ) also show outfl ows to have risen (see 
Table  6.2 ). 3 In addition, the  Padrón for Spanish nationals abroad (PERE) sets the 
number of this population at almost 2.2 million. This fi gure does not cover the emi-
gration of foreign nationals from Spain, while it includes people who have acquired 
Spanish nationality abroad because of their parents or as a result of the  Ley de la 
Memoria Histórica (Law of Historical Memory, which allows descendants of previ-
ous emigrants to naturalize) (González Enríquez  2013 ; Izquierdo and Chao  2014 ). 
Of the 174,571 ‘new registrations’ recorded in the PERE by 1st January 2015, 
almost two-thirds belonged to people born abroad 4 (INE).
 Based on the above trends, some have argued that the current phenomenon of 
Spanish emigration abroad is not as preoccupant as portrayed (González Enríquez 
 2013 ). Figures suggest that despite the socioeconomic conditions in the country, 
emigration has not become the main response to the crisis. Given the high unem-
ployment rates and increases in poverty and social exclusion (Llano Ortíz  2015 ), 
this could be seen as surprising. 
 However, there are nuances to this argument. The fi rst is that offi cial numbers 
could underestimate actual emigration. As already mentioned, there are hardly any 
incentives for people moving abroad to deregister from the  Padrón in Spain, and in 
the case of Spanish nationals register at consulates. González Enríquez ( 2014a ) 
argues that following recent reforms, emigrants are even less likely to register 
abroad and risk losing their right to healthcare in Spain. This seems to be the case 
especially for EU fl ows. Following a survey of 2,183 Spanish adults who had emi-
grated during 2008–2013, Romero Valiente and Hidalgo-Capitán ( 2014 ) estimate 
their rate of under registration in the PERE to be around 50 %, climbing to 60 % in 
the case of intra-EU mobility and 75 % for the United Kingdom. This is why 
2  Deregistrations ( bajas in Spanish) refer to people who are removed from a particular municipal 
population registry ( Padrón municipal ) because they move to another municipality (within Spain 
or abroad) or for other reasons (death, incorrect registration, expiry date). 
3  Both the EVR and the  Estadística de Migraciones use data from the  Padrón but while the fi rst 
simply reports registrations ( altas ) and deregistrations ( bajas ), the second employs a more sophis-
ticated methodology to try and be more accurate (it estimates the date of emigration abroad, uses 
a coeffi cient of expansion of observed fl ows, adjusts the information in the  Padrón to its own defi -
nition of migration, etc.) (INE  2014 ). As a result, the data from both sources does not necessarily 
coincide. 
4  These could include nationalized migrants who have returned or re-emigrated as well as those 
people who have acquired Spanish nationality abroad. 
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González Ferrer ( 2013a ), using offi cial statistics from countries of origin and main 
destinations, believes that the number of Spanish emigrants since 2008 could be 
closer to 700,000. Nevertheless, Romero Valiente and Hidalgo-Capitán ( 2014 ) 
argue that data from destination countries, especially in the EU, could also overes-
timate the number of Spanish migrants (due mainly to the temporary nature of some 
migratory movements) (see also Aparicio Gómez  2014 ). 
 Secondly, it is important to take into account that emigration is not necessarily 
available to everyone, and especially to those in the direst of circumstances or with 
the lowest qualifi cations. Thus we turn our attention now to who are these new emi-
grants and where are they going. Despite the shortcomings identifi ed, offi cial statis-
tics can still offer some clues. 
 According to the PERE, of the just over two million registered Spaniards abroad, 
almost two-thirds resided in the Americas, mainly in Argentina, followed by 
Venezuela, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico and the United States. The second largest contin-
gent is in Europe, especially France, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom 
(INE). These numbers include those who emigrated long ago and their descendants. 
They refl ect the fact that past emigration from Spain was directed mainly towards 
Latin America, and from the 1960s increasingly to other Western European countries 
(Romero Valiente  2003 ; Valero-Matas et al.  2010 ). These fl ows were later reversed 
following fi rst return migration, and later the movement of foreign nationals from 
Europe (in large part retired people) as well as Latin America and Africa (mainly 
labour migration) to Spain. Data from the EVR (refl ecting deregistrations from the 
 Padrón due to moves abroad 5 ) as well as new registrations in the PERE, show that 
recent Spanish emigration has largely followed the same routes (see Table  6.3 ).
 Within Europe, it is recipients of past Spanish emigration, such as Germany, 
France and Switzerland, as well as the United Kingdom, that register the largest 
absolute and relative increases in deregistrations from the  Padrón . Although there is 
also a large number of deregistrations linked to Romania, one of the main countries 
of origin of recent immigration into Spain, in relative terms the increase over the 
crisis period has been minimal. In Latin America, two of the countries with the 
highest immigrant presence in Spain, Ecuador and Colombia, have also seen the 
largest relative increases in people moving there, while fi gures from Africa and Asia 
are more modest. Still, the number of deregistrations allocated to Morocco is sig-
nifi cant, which could be due largely to return migration. 
 Data from some of these destinations also suggest that emigration could be 
higher than what the Spanish statistics refl ect, although as mentioned before such 
fi gures could be infl ated. In the United Kingdom, Spanish applicants for a national 
insurance number (essential to be able to work) have increased signifi cantly, 
 reaching around 50,000 in 2014 (National Statistics  2015 ). González-Ferrer ( 2013a ) 
5  These fi gures are just an illustration, since the EVR only has information about country of desti-
nation for 26 % of the deregistrations owed to moves abroad. The rest includes cases where the 
country of destination is not known as well as automatic deregistrations (since 2006 foreign 
nationals from third countries without permanent residence must renew their registration every 2 
years, failing that they are automatically deregistered). 
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also shows that non-Germans coming from Spain into Germany increased from 
some 5,000 in 2008 to 30,000 in 2012. According to offi cial Belgian data, 17,354 
Spaniards registered in the country only in the fi rst 4 years of the crisis (DEMO 
 2013 ). In the case of fl ows directed towards Latin America, it is assumed that a large 
part of these movements are of return migrants (Aparicio Gómez  2014 ; González- 
Ferrer  2013b ). 
 If recent emigration refl ected the groups worst affected by rising unemployment, 
it would be expected that a large percentage of emigrants would be young, foreign 
nationals, men and with lower education. However, these are not necessarily the 
groups with the greater access to moving abroad. Once again, despite its defi cien-
cies, available data provide some evidence. First of all, there seems to be differences 
between recent emigration to Europe (or the United States) and to Latin America 
and Morocco. While in the case of the former the latest fi gures indicate that a major-
ity of emigrants are Spanish nationals born in Spain, in the latter it seems to relate 
primarily to return migration of nationalized migrants and foreign nationals (see 
Table  6.4 ). Spaniards born abroad also represent a signifi cant proportion of those 
migrating to other European countries, which implies that re-emigration fl ows are 
important. Secondly, in absolute numbers, the largest age group in the case of most 
destinations is the 25–34 years old, with almost equilibrium or a slight majority of 
men in general.
 Table 6.3  Deregistrations from the  Padrón in Spain as a result of moves abroad and new 
registrations in the PERE in selected destination countries, 2008–2014 
 Deregistrations in Spain 
2008–2014 
 Relative increase 
2008/2014 
 New PERE 
registrations 2014 
 EUROPE  320 , 374  80 %  57 , 209 
 United Kingdom  59,425  191 %  12,731 
 France  45,977  132 %  13,751 
 Germany  45,036  163 %  10,334 
 Romania  38,602  4 %  450 
 Switzerland  19,187  116 %  5,529 
 Belgium  17,837  40 %  4,106 
 Netherlands  12,451  55 %  1,728 
 AMERICAS  232 , 250  78 %  107 , 594 
 Ecuador  49,852  512 %  10,943 
 United States  34,240  71 %  11,626 
 Argentina  24,834  −11 %  21,825 
 Colombia  24,242  196 %  5,806 
 Bolivia  21,815  −9 %  2,387 
 Venezuela  19,483  52 %  8,527 
 Brazil  17,358  0 %  7,252 
 AFRICA  41 , 649  6 %  3,342 
 Morocco  26,464  −1 %  1,508 
 ASIA  27 , 990  56 %  5,247 
 China  9,216  24 %  945 
 Source: Padrón Municipal and PERE (INE) 
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 This picture can be contrasted with the few studies conducted on the topic until 
now. Some suggest that a large proportion of recent emigrants from Spain are for-
eigners or nationalized migrants, male and up to 45 years in age (González-Ferrer 
 2013a ; González Enríquez  2013 ; González Enríquez and Martínez Romera  2014 ). 
A recent investigation focusing on native Spaniards (born in Spain with both parents 
born in the country) supports the idea that a majority of recent emigrants are not 
among the youngest cohorts but closer to the 31–40 age group, with largely a gender 
balance (Aparicio Gómez  2014 ). As to their level of education, Spanish emigration 
towards Europe up to the 1970s was mainly of low skilled workers. However, the 
outfl ows that continued after, in great part linked to Spain’s entry into the UE, were 
more selective and composed by and large of highly educated individuals (Alaminos 
and Santacreu  2010 ; Alaminos et al.  2010 ). There are indications that the new emi-
gration since the crisis started includes also mostly qualifi ed people, but these tend 
to be based on non-representative studies (Aparicio Gómez  2014 ; González 
Enríquez and Martínez Romera  2014 ; Herrera  2014 ; Izquierdo et al.  2014 ; Navarrete 
Moreno  2013 ). Still, the combination of data from secondary and primary sources 
has created some public anxiety about the effects of emigration. 
6.4  Policy Responses to Recent Population Movements: 
The ‘Forgotten Emigration’? 
 Despite the fact that Spain has a long history of emigration dating back to at least 
the nineteenth century, is not until the 1950s during the Franco regime and the eco-
nomic opening of the country that the phenomenon starts to be recognized and 
promoted as positive. Before, emigration was seen as a negative consequence of the 
 Table 6.4  Deregistration from the  Padrón in Spain of people moving to main destinations abroad, 
2014 
 Men 
 Main age 
group 
 Spaniards born 
in Spain 
 Spaniards born 
abroad 
 Foreign 
nationals 
 Germany  50.5 %  25–34  54.2 %  18.7 %  27.2 % 
 France  52.6 %  25–34  54.2 %  27.2 %  18.6 % 
 United Kingdom  49.5 %  25–34  46.6 %  16.7 %  36.7 % 
 Belgium  52.0 %  0–15  47.7 %  25.9 %  26.5 % 
 Switzerland  53.1 %  25–34  64.6 %  23.4 %  12.0 % 
 Morocco  71.3 %  25–34  18.0 %  08.7 %  73.3 % 
 Argentina  51.9 %  25–34  31.5 %  37.8 %  30.7 % 
 Bolivia  50.3 %  0–15  20.4 %  29.9 %  49.8 % 
 Colombia  50.4 %  0–15  25.2 %  42.7 %  32.1 % 
 Ecuador  50.3 %  0–15  33.0 %  53.0 %  24.4 % 
 United States  49.5 %  25–34  58.1 %  30.9 %  11.0 % 
 Source: Estadística de Variaciones Residenciales (EVR) 
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failures of society and a personal tragedy (Fernández Asperilla  1998 ). This change 
coincides with the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation which created a 
large labour force that could not always be absorbed, hence the development of 
population movements inside the country and directed abroad. It was the perceived 
socioeconomic benefi ts of this migration abroad that led to a more active promotion 
and regulation of such fl ows. Benefi ts included a reduction in domestic unemploy-
ment, social savings as family reintegration was encouraged, and the remittances 
sent by emigrants. 
 Thus, from the beginning migration policy in Spain was conceived in utilitarian 
terms, linked mostly to the needs of the labour market; something that was repro-
duced when the country became a recipient of immigration. Another main element 
of migration policy in Spain is its reactiveness (Sánchez Alonso  2011 ): rather than 
being the result of refl exion on the long-term consequences, it reacts to what is hap-
pening at a precise moment. As a result, authors argue that in general migration 
fl ows in Spain have developed outside the legislation (i.e. initially in an ‘irregular’ 
manner). The fi rst emigration policies emerged during the Franco period, under the 
aegis of the Spanish Institute of Emigration (Calvo Salgado et al.  2009 ), mainly to 
regulate fl ows, protect migrants and boost their links with the country in order to 
maximize benefi ts for the nation. In this task, authorized private institutions, such as 
the Catholic Church, played a signifi cant role. The policies in large part consisted of 
bilateral agreements aimed at exporting labour and regulating workers’ rights 
(Fernández Asperilla  1998 ). 
 It was these policies, albeit from a perspective of control and paternalistic assis-
tance, that paved the way for the development later, especially with the restoration 
of democracy, of other measures such as education programmes, support for migrant 
associations, the creation of emigrant councils to promote institutional representa-
tion or actions directed at elderly migrants as well as the second and subsequent 
generations (Calvo Salgado et al.  2009 ). After the 1978 Constitution, emigrants 
became fi rst class citizens with the same rights as other Spaniards, including the 
right to vote. At the regional level, the new autonomous communities in Spain also 
created their own plans to encourage and aid return migration. However, although 
emigration (and return to Spain) continued to be a political and public issue, as 
outfl ows declined some of its relevance was lost and no major legislative advance-
ments were made for the next years. The lack of attention to emigration and emi-
grants persisted and became more blatant as the focus turned towards immigration 
fl ows. This led some experts to use the term “the forgotten emigration” when 
 referring to the large population of Spaniards still residing abroad (Reques Velasco 
and de Cos Guerra  2003 ). 
 It is not until 2004–2008, under the Socialist Zapatero government, that new 
legislation is introduced. These laws responded partly to ideological interests and 
affected the descendants of previous migrants (Alemán and Alonso  2012 ). 6 One 
6  Law 3/2005 offered economic benefi ts to Spanish citizens who left the country as a consequence 
of the Civil War (1936–1939), while Law 52/2007 (Law for Historical Memory) among other 
things allowed former Spanish nationals and their descendants abroad to recover their Spanish 
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immediate consequence was the enlargement of the registered Spanish population 
abroad, as mentioned previously. However, the legislation also provided for the fur-
ther regulation of the social, educational, cultural and participation rights of Spanish 
emigrants (Merino Hernando  2012 ). Mechanisms were designed to promote the 
creation of associations abroad and specifi c budget plans were dedicated to the 
descendants of Spanish emigrants, to reinforce their education, training and cultural 
links with Spain. This way the central government, with the support of regional 
administrations, after years of certain abandonment (except during electoral peri-
ods) tried to strengthen connections with Spaniards abroad as active citizens and 
potential voters. 
 The arrival of the crisis in 2008 and the inauguration of a conservative govern-
ment in 2011 opened up a new period in migration policy. Initially, policies focused 
on the return of immigrants; following the utilitarian conceptions of the past, the 
idea was that if there was not enough work in Spain migrants should leave (thus 
reducing unemployment and social problems). Voluntary return plans had existed 
since 2003, both for humanitarian and other reasons. However, in 2008 the Socialist 
government implemented a new plan for jobless migrants to receive part of their 
accumulated unemployment benefi t in their home countries, with the condition that 
they would not come back to Spain in at least 3 years. Although there is little infor-
mation on the success of such plans, studies suggest that it has been rather modest, 
with return remaining a minority decision and in most cases undertaken outside 
institutionalized channels (Parella and Petroff  2014 ). Still, such outfl ows have 
served to cast recent emigration as a matter of mostly return migration, thus mini-
mizing the phenomenon of the ‘expulsion’ of native Spaniards (or that of natural-
ized migrants, as well as second generation migrants born in the country) by the 
crisis and its potential consequences. 
 At the same time, the spending cuts and policies put in place by the ruling  Partido 
Popular (PP conservative party) to respond to the crisis and reduce immigration 
(especially that of an ‘irregular’ nature) have affected Spaniards abroad, for instance 
through the closing down of consulates (Romero Valiente and Hidalgo-Capitán 
 2014 ). Another example are the new regulations introduced in 2012 to stop migrants 
in an irregular situation from receiving free healthcare that also limit access to 
health services in Spain to nationals residing outside the country. 7 Equally, the elec-
toral reforms of 2011 introduced the need for Spaniards abroad to actively express 
their desire to vote in order to be able to participate in national and regional elec-
tions in the home country (before, ballots were sent to them automatically). The 
result has been a massive reduction in participation (to 5 % in the 2011 general elec-
nationality. Law 40/2006 (Statute for Spanish Citizens Abroad) was promulgated to boost the 
rights of emigrants. 
7  González Enríquez ( 2014a ,  b ) explains that new regulations mean that Spaniards residing abroad 
for over 3 months lose their right to free healthcare in Spain; this could mean that less of them will 
register as permanent residents in the consulates. These new regulations were partly reversed in 
2015, when the central government announced that it would reinstate the right to primary health-
care to all immigrants ( El País 2015). 
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tion, compared with 31 % in 2008) (Ramírez  2015 ; Ruiz González  2014 ). These and 
other related issues have generated controversy in the wider political and public 
context as discussed next. 
6.5  The Wider Political and Public Debates: Ideological 
Differences and Biases 
 Recent emigration from Spain started to become a political issue from 2011, follow-
ing the change of government and publication of data indicating that the country 
was losing population (Nogueira  2011 ). Nevertheless, by and large the political 
debate has been low key and played along ideological lines. The right-wing govern-
ment hardly refers to the phenomenon and when it does it describes outfl ows mainly 
as the result of return migration or of globalisation and mobility within Europe. 
Also, the authorities have made emphasis on the high skill levels of young Spaniards 
and their desire for adventure (ABC.es  2012 ). This discourse has been contested by 
the Socialist opposition (PSOE), who blames the PP for lack of opportunities in the 
country and alert about brain drain and loss of human capital (Quesada  2015 ). The 
left-wing parties also talk about “economic exile” and “economic migrants expulsed 
from Spain”, with  Podemos seeking to court the support of Spaniards abroad 
(Gómez  2014 ). The latest party that has emerged with force, the centre-right 
 Ciudadanos , on the other hand, has not made many pronouncements on this topic. 8 
 With regard to the attention paid by the main political groups to emigrants 
abroad, the traditional parties, PP and PSOE, have a network of supporters and 
institutions dedicated to them that tends to be activated at election time. 9 Recently, 
both have made attempts at attracting the support of new emigrants. The PP, for 
instance, has promoted the idea of a “certifi cate” for emigrants returning to Spain to 
help with their social, health and labour reintegration. The PSOE, on the other hand, 
has asked for increased spending on social and other services for emigrants and the 
elimination of the new restrictions on voting from abroad, as well as proposing the 
creation of a plan for the return of high skilled emigrants. Newer parties such as 
 Podemos include some proposals in its electoral programme, including the creation 
of a census of emigrants, social aid for those expulsed by the crisis and in need and 
mechanisms to make sure that those working in other EU countries do not lose their 
social security rights; while  Ciudadanos hardly makes any references to Spaniards 
abroad in its website. 10 
8  This party is more known for its hostile position on immigration than for its views on current 
emigration (El Mundo 2015). 
9  See information in the parties’ websites: “PSOE en el Mundo” (PSOE in the World)  http://web.
psoe.es/ambito/mundo/news/index.do (Accessed 14 October 2015); PP “En el exterior”(PP 
abroad)  http://www.pp.es/conocenos/en-el-exterior (Accessed 14 October 2015). 
10  Information obtained from parties’ websites and newspapers. PP ( http://www.pp.es/ ), PSOE 
( http://www.psoe.es/ambito/actualidad/home.do ), Podemos ( http://podemos.info/ ), Ciudadanos 
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 By contrast, the space that the new outfl ows have occupied in the wider public 
debates is more signifi cant and varied. In the media, what is referred to as the “new’ 
or “second” emigration has been quite visible. A brief overview of news on “emi-
gration” published since 2011 by the two main newspapers in readership,  El País 
(closer to PSOE) and  El Mundo (more conservative), shows both have written 
numerous articles. The emphasis is on how the crisis is affecting highly educated 
young people as well as fostering return migration.  El País has run a series covering 
the main destinations of recent outfl ows, people’s reasons for leaving, diffi culties 
encountered and family consequences. These stories talk about people been forced 
to emigrate because of the socioeconomic context and government policies (for 
example, cuts in research and university spending leading academics to emigrate). 
This raises questions about brain drain.  El Mundo , on the other hand, also presents 
stories of successful business people and entrepreneurs that have emigrated. Both 
newspapers reported how in 2013 after 10 years Spain became a net receiver of 
migrant remittances again. In addition, there has been increasing concern about 
Spain’s shrinking and ageing population, as immigration falls and emigration 
increases. The media has also echoed political and academic disputes about the 
nature of recent emigration, and fl agged the issue of the external vote in the run-up 
to elections (Garea  2015 ). 
 Internet and the social media, on the other hand, have helped present more alter-
native or public views on the subject, and as a medium for emigrants to have their 
saying. For instance, an emotive video of two young emigrants returning home to 
see their families served to denounce the economic and political situation in Spain 
as a cause of emigration and became an instant success (González  2013 ). 11 Several 
online platforms have also emerged to defend the views and rights of those who 
have left, such as  Marea Granate (Maroon Tide), 12 which describes itself as “a 
transnational movement formed by emigrants of the Spanish state and supporters, 
whose objective is to fi ght against the causes and those who have provoked the eco-
nomic and social crisis that forces us to migrate” (see Chap.  7 ). Other similar alter-
natives include the campaign  No nos vamos ,  nos echan (We don’t leave, they throw 
us out), organized by the group  Juventud Sin Futuro (Youth Without a Future), or  Yo 
también soy una leyenda urbana (I am also an urban myth), launched by AACTE 
( Asociación para el Avance de la Ciencia y la Tecnología en España , Association 
for the Advancement of Science and Technology in Spain), created to protest against 
government comments saying that brain drain in Spain was an urban myth (Ansede 
 2014 ). 13 
( https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/ ). 
11  The video is called  LA SORPRESA :  dedicado a todos los que están lejos , and was made by two 
young emigrants, Jorge and Esther.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qxu5W4bj4I8 (Accessed 
15 February 2015). 
12  This refers to the colour of Spanish passports. 
13  Information obtained from their websites:  http://mareagranate.org/ ,  http://juventudsinfuturo.net/ 
and  http://www.aacte.eu/wp/blog/2014/12/08/leyendas-urbanas/ (Accessed 15 February 2015). 
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 Finally, most of the public representations and discourses, including that of emi-
grants themselves, tend to offer an image of emigration as conformed only by young 
people and professionals. The emigration of the less skilled, poorer, older people 
and families remains almost invisible, referred to only as a thing of the past, some-
how in contraposition to what is supposed to be happening now. Little is being said 
as well about issues such as the fact that many migrants abroad, despite their quali-
fi cations, are working below their skill levels and accessing the most precarious 
jobs, or about nationalized migrants re-emigrating (Domingo and Sabater  2013 ; 
Torres Pérez  2014 ). However, there is evidence that emigration in Spain is touching 
different sectors of society and is not as rosy a picture as some would like to paint. 
6.6  Conclusions 
 The economic crisis has had a clear demographic impact in Spain. Following its 
emigration history, since the mid-1970s the country had enjoyed a positive migra-
tory balance, with the number of people arriving increasingly superior to those leav-
ing. These population movements were strongly linked to developments in the 
labour market, among other factors. Nevertheless, Spain is one of the European 
countries worst affected by the economic and fi nancial crisis that erupted at the end 
of 2007. Although the impact on migration fl ows was not immediate, by 2010 the 
migratory balance had turned negative once again, as a result of both reduced immi-
gration and increased emigration. Outfl ows have not reached the dimensions of the 
past, although offi cial fi gures fail to refl ect their real size. We know little about their 
characteristics as well, apart from the fact that they seem directed mainly towards 
Europe (in the case of native Spaniards) and the Americas (mostly return migra-
tion), and are partly composed of young, high skilled migrants. This generates con-
cerns about the lack of work and opportunities in Spain, brain drain and human 
capital losses, and population ageing. 
 Despite such preoccupations, the political and policy responses have been quite 
subdued. Hardly any measures have been taken to know more about recent outfl ows 
or help new emigrants. Emigration policies have been almost absent from the 
Spanish panorama for decades, while measures implemented recently on healthcare 
or voting have actually proven detrimental to nationals abroad. Although the wider 
public debate has been more prolifi c, by and large it has followed ideological lines 
(for or against the government), as well as giving voice to some emigrants. In gen-
eral, less skilled, poorer emigrants, as well as those returning or re-emigrating, 
remain absent from public debates. Partly, this is because the government presents 
recent emigration as mostly the result of labour globalisation and young people 
widening their experiences, while its emphasis is on demonstrating that the crisis is 
over. An example of this is a recent document of the think tank  Real Instituto Elcano 
analysing Spain’s strategic priorities on international migration, where out of six 
main points only one refers to emigration. This point describes recent outfl ows as 
“an opportunity to extend the presence of our country abroad, to create business and 
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commercial networks and to spread the Spanish culture”, and calls for the need to 
facilitate further external mobility (González Enríquez  2014b : 7). No reference is 
made to the causes of recent emigration or the social and personal consequences, 
especially for the most vulnerable emigrants. Clearly, more in-depth research and 
analysis of recent emigration fl ows from Spain is needed in order to detect the con-
sequences and implement the right policies. 
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 Chapter 7 
 Restrictions on Access to Social Protection 
by New Southern European Migrants 
in Belgium 
 Jean-Michel  Lafl eur and  Mikolaj  Stanek 
7.1  Introduction 
 Since the post-war period, immigration into Belgium has passed through several 
stages: an infl ux of guest workers (predominately from Southern Europe), the clo-
sure of migrant recruitment programmes and subsequent intensifi cation of family 
reunifi cation, asylum seeking, and increased numbers of arrivals of EU migrants. 
Although recent fl ows have seen a predominance of Central and Eastern European 
migrants, Southern European migration to Belgium has also gradually increased. 
Forty years after the end of the guest worker programmes, old migration routes to 
Belgium thus seem to be reopening. 
 The context in which Southern European migration is occurring today is, how-
ever, signifi cantly different. Belgium is not the Member State that has received the 
largest numbers of EU migrants in recent years, and nor has it suffered the most 
from the economic crisis. Nevertheless, public support towards new EU migration 
has greatly decreased over the years (Freedman  2012 ). In particular, fears over the 
competition between native and foreign workers and concerns about the impact of 
the latter on the welfare system have become particularly salient. 
 Suspicion towards Southern European migration is a new phenomenon in 
Belgium. Indeed, following the guest worker era, the successful socio-economic 
and political integration of Southern European migrants had progressively turned 
them into the ideal-type of migrants in Belgian public debates. As we will show, this 
idealization process served mainly to delegitimize the presence of the third country 
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migrants who arrived after them. Newcomers from Southern Europe, however, no 
longer benefi t from the positive image associated with their predecessors. In policy 
terms, this change of attitude has materialized in new measures aiming at keeping 
undesirable EU migrants out. The most controversial of these measures consists of 
the removal of residence permits from unemployed EU citizens considered to rep-
resent an unreasonable burden on the Belgian public fi nances. Although migrants 
from Central and Eastern EU countries have been the most affected, a considerable 
number of nationals from North-Western and Southern EU countries have also been 
expelled. 
 The overall objective of this chapter is therefore to analyse how social policies 
have progressively become instruments of migration control in Belgium within the 
context of the economic crisis. First, we briefl y discuss the recent economic and 
social situation, and explore the impacts of the economic downturn on the Belgian 
welfare system. We then describe past and recent migration fl ows to the country and 
discuss the main socio-demographic features of foreign residents from Southern 
Europe and other EU regions. We also highlight the socio-economic situation of 
Southern European migrants in terms of activity and unemployment rates, and of 
access to selected welfare benefi ts. In the second part of the chapter, we demonstrate 
how the process of idealization of Southern European immigration has taken place 
in Belgium. This process has resulted in an implicit classifi cation between undesir-
able and desirable migrants. Accordingly, stricter immigration and integration poli-
cies are designed to keep the former out while still appearing attractive to the latter. 
We then focus on the specifi c policy of removing residence permits, targeting EU 
jobseekers during the economic crisis. We analyse the effects of this policy and, in 
the process, show that Belgium’s strict welfare provisions not only limit the free 
mobility of workers in times of crisis but also stigmatize new EU migrants as “wel-
fare shoppers”. On examining the mobilization of different organizations, we con-
clude by showing that—while they are numerically fewer—new Southern European 
immigrants are in a better position than other new immigrants to challenge policies 
that affect their freedom of circulation. 
7.2  European Migration to Belgium: Present Meets Past 
7.2.1  The Social and Economic Situation in Belgium 
in the Context of the Recent Global Crisis 
 Similarly to the vast majority of EU Member States, Belgium was hit by the eco-
nomic crisis in the late 2000s. In its initial phase (2008–2009), the turmoil mainly 
affected the fi nancial sector, as Belgian banks faced liquidity and solvency prob-
lems. However, the economic and social setback of the fi nancial system was further 
aggravated by a political crisis following the 2007 federal election, which left the 
country without a government for several months (Rihoux et al.  2011 ). Two 
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indicators illustrate Belgium’s diffi culties at the time. First, the general government 
defi cit rose from −1.3 % of GDP in 2008 to −6.0 % of GDP in 2009. Second, public 
debt increased from 89.6 % of GDP in 2008 to 96.2 % in 2009. In this period, 
Belgium was considered to be at high risk of falling into a long lasting and profound 
economic crisis along with other Member States such as Portugal, Spain, Ireland, 
Greece and Italy. 
 Even though in the years that followed, Belgium began to gradually recover from 
the initially dramatic turmoil, its economic performance remained fragile and 
mostly unstable (OECD  2015 ). As shown in Table  7.1 , the basic indicators of the 
Belgian economy have shown a fl uctuating pattern, with recovery in 2010 and 2011 
and, again, a slight decline in the following 2 years. Overall, Belgium seems to have 
performed just slightly better than the EU and the Eurozone average, as illustrated 
by the fact that the Purchasing Power Parity adjusted Gross Domestic Product per 
capita has remained 20 % above the average EU level throughout the economic 
crisis.
 The fi nancial turmoil in 2008 and 2009 has had negative consequences on the 
labour market in Belgium. Between 2008 and 2009, there was a net loss of 20,000 
jobs, or a net drop of 1.2 % (see Table  7.2 ). During the following 4 years (2010–
 Table 7.1  Evolution of GDP indicators in Belgium and the EU-27 
 GDP per inhabitant as a % of EU 
average: Belgium 
 GDP growth rate: 
EU-27 
 GDP growth rate: 
Belgium 
 2003  124 %  1.5  0.8 
 2004  121 %  2.5  3.6 
 2005  120 %  2.0  2.1 
 2006  118 %  3.4  2.5 
 2007  116 %  3.1  3.4 
 2008  116 %  0.5  0.7 
 2009  118 %  −4.4  −2.3 
 2010  120 %  2.1  2.7 
 2011  120 %  1.7  1.8 
 2012  120 %  −0.5  0.2 
 2013  119 %  0.2  0.0 
 2014  119 %  1.4  1.3 
 Sources: EU Labour Force Survey 2005–2013 
 Table 7.2  Evolution of unemployment rates in Belgium and the EU-27 2005–2013 
 Unemployment rate  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 
 Belgium – total  8.3  7.5  7.0  7.9  8.3  7.2  7.6  8.4  8.5 
 Belgium – long term  4.2  3.8  3.3  3.5  4.1  3.5  3.4  3.9  4.3 
 Belgium – men  7.4  6.7  6.5  7.8  8.1  7.1.  7.7  8.7  9.0 
 Belgium – women  9.3  8.5  7.6  8.1  8.5  7.2  7.4  8.2  7.9 
 EU-27  8.2  7.2  7,0  8.9  9.6  9.6  10.4  10.8  10.2 
 Sources: Eurostat (EU Labour Force Survey), Algemene Directie Statistiek EAK 
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2014), variations in unemployment levels continued to refl ect the volatile socio- 
economic environment (De Mulder and Druant  2011 ). Yet, long-term unemployment 
remained relatively stable throughout this period, which confi rms the conjectural 
nature of these fl uctuations.
 Belgium’s approach to protecting employment during the crisis has consisted of 
keeping a fragile balance between activation policies undertaken on the federal and 
regional level, on the one hand, and austerity measures imposed by the European 
Commission on the other hand (Høj  2013 ). Activation measures have consisted 
mostly of implementing reduced working hours and temporary unemployment 
schemes to encourage employers not to terminate contracts (Hijzen and Venn  2011 ). 
Other measures have included the reduction of wage costs for certain categories of 
workers, full or partial exemption from social security contributions, and further 
training and job search assistance (Starke et al.  2011 ). 1 
 However, the economic slowdown and the instability of the labour market have 
resulted in the deterioration of living conditions and increasing inequalities in the 
country. This, in turn, has exerted a considerable stress on the non-contributory 
social assistance system. As shown in Fig.  7.1 , between 2008 and 2013, the number 
of benefi ciaries of the social integration income scheme ( Revenu d ’ Intégration 
Sociale , hereafter RIS 2 ) incremented by almost 14 % per year (from approximately 
1  In addition to active employment policies implemented before and during the crisis, other contex-
tual factors have mitigated the impact of the crisis. In this respect, we can mention the diversifi ed 
nature of the Belgian economy and the relatively high proportion of public jobs (especially in 
Wallonia). 
2  The social integration income scheme (RIS) provides a non-contributory minimum income for 
people with no suffi cient resources, who are unable to obtain them by their own efforts. Recipients 
are usually required to demonstrate the willingness to work, unless this is impossible for health or 
equity reasons. EU citizens who have a residence permit of more than 3 months in Belgium are 
eligible for RIS. 
0
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 Fig. 7.1  Evolution of absolute numbers within the social integration income (RIS) and right to 
social aid (DAS) schemes (Source: Intégration Sociale  2013 ) 
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141,000 to over 164,000). On the other hand, the number of individuals who 
 qualifi ed for the right to social aid sub-scheme ( Droit à l ’ Aide Sociale , hereafter 
DAS 3 ) incremented by almost 17 %, from approximately 63,000 in 2008 to 76,200 in 
2013 (Intégration Sociale  2013 ).
 The growing need for social assistance in times of crisis, however, has collided 
with the austerity measures imposed by both EU and Belgian federal policies. To meet 
the targets of the budget defi cit reduction plans, employment activation and welfare 
policy expenditure have been accompanied by tax increases and cuts in public spend-
ing in areas such as health care, education and pension schemes (Castanheira et al. 
 2014 ; Pignal  2012 ). In addition, more stringent controls and the supervision of benefi -
ciaries of social assistance have been introduced with the stated objective of reducing 
fraud and misuse of benefi ts (Nelson  2011 ). As we shall see in detail below, several of 
these restrictive measures have specifi cally targeted the immigrant population. 
7.2.2  Migration to Belgium: Historical Overview 
 Belgium’s migration history is profoundly shaped by its industrial history. During 
the nineteenth century and the progressive industrialization of the country, Belgium 
attracted a growing number of foreign workers, mostly from neighbouring coun-
tries. This phenomenon intensifi ed after World War I, which, in addition to migra-
tion from those countries, saw signifi cant numbers of migrants arriving from 
Southern Europe but also from Central and Eastern Europe, a situation that contin-
ued until the late 1930s (Stengers  1993 ). For instance, the number of Polish citizens 
recruited to work in Belgian coalmines grew from 198 in 1922 to almost 12,000 in 
1930 (Caestecker  1990 ). After World War II, the economic recovery fostered 
renewed immigration into Belgium through bilateral recruitment agreements with 
sending countries. The fi rst agreement was signed between Belgium and Italy in 
June 1946 and secured the recruitment of thousands of Italian workers for the coal 
and steel industries. As a consequence, Italians quickly became the largest foreign 
population in Belgium (see Table  7.3 ).
 The growing demand for labour and a dispute with the Italian government over 
the working conditions of Italian workers in the 1950s prompted the Belgian author-
ities to look elsewhere for labour. New agreements were thus signed with Spain, 
Greece, Turkey and Morocco during this period. As shown in census data, the num-
ber of immigrants residing in Belgium almost doubled between 1947 and 1970 and 
accounted for over 7 % of the total population in the eve of the Oil Crisis. Although 
Italians still constituted the largest foreign group (35 % of the total immigrant popu-
lation) in 1970, other Southern Europeans communities—such as Spaniard and 
Greeks—had grown signifi cantly. In the meantime, the Cold War reduced dramati-
3  The right to social aid scheme (DAS) is aimed at covering the basic needs of those sectors of the 
population that do not qualify for the right to social integration benefi ts (e.g. asylum seekers or 
foreigners who have the right to reside in Belgium but are not yet registered in the population 
registry). 
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cally Central and Eastern European migration to Belgium. One last noteworthy fea-
ture of Belgium’s post-war migration is that it explicitly allowed workers to come to 
the country with dependants in the hope that it would facilitate the workers’ adap-
tion to their new country while also addressing the country’s demographic defi cit 
(Bousetta et al.  2002 ). 
 This policy came to an end with the Oil Crisis and the government’s decision in 
1974 to cancel foreign worker recruitment programmes. However, this did not mean 
that migration stopped altogether. Indeed, the foreign resident population grew by 
almost 200,000 between 1970 and 1980 and their share of the total population 
reached 9 %. EU and third country migration to Belgium signifi cantly transformed 
between the Oil Crisis and 2000. First, European migration to Belgium continued to 
intensify with the European integration process. In spite of the slowing down of the 
migration of Italian nationals, who had historically represented the largest European 
population in Belgium, growing immigration from neighbouring countries and from 
Central and Eastern Europe largely compensated for this. The consolidation of the 
role of Brussels as the capital of the EU, together with the growing needs for labour 
force—in both high and low skilled occupations—continued to attract EU citizens 
to Belgium. Overall, the percentage of EU migrants from neighbouring countries as 
part of the total foreign population increased, while that of Southern European 
migrants decreased. Second, family reunifi cation schemes and relatively liberal asy-
lum policies also increased the share of third country nationals in the total immi-
grant population during the same period. 
7.2.3  New Migration of Southern Europeans to Belgium: 
Flows and Stocks 
 As discussed above, Belgium was not the EU Member State that was most affected 
by the fi nancial and economic crisis. For this reason, it has remained a relatively 
attractive destination country since 2008. As shown in Table  7.4 , the total yearly 
 Table 7.4  Migration fl ows in Belgium: infl ows, outfl ows and net migration 2000–2012 
 Infl ows  Outfl ows  Net migration 
 2005  97,888  44,298  53,590 
 2006  101,872  45,573  56,299 
 2007  109,926  45,437  64,489 
 2008  126,069  52,407  73,662 
 2009  126,877  57,873  69,004 
 2010  140,375  55,468  84,907 
 2011  138,071  58,000  80,071 
 2012  125,000  70,357  55,000 
 Source: RN-DGSIE 
7 Restrictions on Access to Social Protection by Migrants in Belgium
106
infl ow incremented from 93,345 to 138,071 between 2005 and 2011. Most of this 
increase was, however, due to recent EU enlargements to the East and the progres-
sive removal by the Belgian authorities of the transition periods limiting the free-
dom of movement of citizens proceeding from those Member States. For instance, 
the absolute number of Polish migrants arriving in Belgium each year increased by 
almost 50 % from 6694 to 9851 between 2005 and 2011. Romanian migration also 
increased in a more dramatic fashion after the 2007 enlargement (from 3059 arrivals 
in 2006 to 11,784 in 2011).
 Available data confi rms that the deterioration of the economic situation in 
Southern EU countries has been a driving factor for the reactivation, after almost 40 
years, of a new wave of migrants from this part of the continent. Although this fl ow 
is still comparatively less pronounced than migration from neighbouring countries 
and from Central and Eastern Europe, the number of new Southern Europeans arriv-
ing in Belgium is gradually increasing. As shown in Table  7.5 , among Southern 
European countries, Spain is currently the nationality with the highest volume of 
infl ow into Belgium. Arrivals of Spanish migrants nearly tripled from approxi-
mately 1900 in 2007 to over 5600 in 2011. In the case of Portuguese and Greeks 
migrants, the increase in arrivals has been signifi cantly less intense when compared 
with the Spaniards and the Italians and, obviously, with nationals from new acces-
sion countries. In 2011, however, arrivals from Southern EU countries represented 
only 11 % of the migration fl ows to Belgium.
 The composition of the immigrant population by nationality has undergone con-
siderable changes in recent years. Following the accession of Central and Eastern 
European countries, nationals from this area accounted for approximately 13 % of 
the total population in 2013 (see Table  7.6 ). The stock of nationals from neighbour-
ing countries, especially France and the Netherlands, has also increased steadily but 
its relative weight has remained unchanged (30 %). Similarly, despite the recent 
 Table 7.5  Immigration into Belgium by nationality 2005–2011 
 Nationality  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
 1  France  10,377  11,570  12,269  15,048  13,306  14,071  14,687 
 2  Romania  2322  3059  5491  4222  3592  8447  11,784 
 3  The 
Netherlands 
 10,109  11,488  11,370  12,321  9436  9654  10,198 
 4  Poland  4815  6694  9393  9183  10,345  9121  9851 
 5  Morocco  7106  7488  7831  8994  9957  10,360  9124 
 6  Spain  1827  1848  1902  3095  3861  4795  5603 
 7  Italy  2459  2613  2708  4499  4399  4747  5227 
 8  Bulgaria  853  797  2625  7257  6568  4553  4740 
 9  Portugal  1933  2030  2293  3541  3218  2910  3442 
 10  Turkey  3389  2999  3180  3965  3852  3914  3265 
 …17  Greece  716  558  495  855  830  829  1201 
 Others  31,481  32,289  33,788  53,089  57,513  66,974  58,949 
 Total  77,387  83,433  93,345  126,069  126,877  140,375  138,071 
 Source: RN-DGSIE 
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intensifi cation of arrivals, the overall stock of nationals from Southern EU countries 
has not shown any growth. In 2005, the total number of Southern Europeans resid-
ing in Belgium was 266,181, while in 2014 it was 266,157. However, given the 
larger infl ux of migrants from Central and Eastern EU countries, the share of 
Southern Europeans in the total population diminished from 30 % to 22 %. Italians 
and, to a much lesser extent, Greeks are two groups that decreased – respectively by 
22,000 and 1000 individuals. This decline is directly related to the ageing of 
migrants that arrived in Belgium during the 1950s and 1960s economic boom, and 
this decline has not been halted by the arrival of new cohorts of migrants from Italy 
and Greece. By contrast, in the period under consideration, the Spanish and 
Portuguese populations increased by over 10,000 each. In these two cases, a long- 
term decrease has been reversed by the intensifi cation of new arrivals since 2009.
7.2.4  Demographic and Socio-economic Characteristics 
of Southern European Migrants in Belgium 
 As has been already stated, the demographic structure of the Southern European 
migration into Belgium is strongly conditioned by the past immigration of guest 
workers. Figure  7.2a–c show the ageing demographic structure with a signifi cant 
predominance of people over 45 years old. This corresponds to the cohorts of post- 
war guest workers. On the other hand, it can be observed that the age structure has 
been changing in recent years. The share of the oldest and the youngest age catego-
ries of Southern Europeans is gradually increasing. In the latter case, this is a result 
of the increasing infl ow of new migrants after the outbreak of the crisis.
 This duality in the age structure of the Southern European population contrasts 
with that of other large populations in Belgium. Nationals from the new accession 
members are concentrated in the categories of young adults and adults (24–44 
years), which is consistent with the fact that this fl ow started relatively recently and 
is economically motivated. Migrants from neighbouring countries (France, 
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) show a relatively balanced age struc-
ture. This is due partly to the diversity of reasons motivating those migrants to move 
to Belgium (work, retirement, family migration, study and a change of tax domicile) 
and partly to the fact that fl ows from these countries have been consistent over time. 
7.2.5  Labour Market Situation and Access to Non-contributory 
Social Benefi ts 
 The demographic structure of the Southern Europeans population is related to their 
socio-economic situation. According to Belgian Social Security statistics, in 2012, 
Southern Europeans had one of the lowest activity rates among all foreign-born 
J.-M. Lafl eur and M. Stanek
109
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
0-17 18-24 25-44 45-64 65+
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
a
b
c
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residents. This can be explained in good part by the age structure of this population. 
Indeed, if we focus specifi cally on the most economically active age categories 
(between 25 and 64), immigrants born in Southern EU countries are, along with 
migrants from the new accession countries, the most economically active popula-
tion (see Table  7.7 ).
 Yet, compared to migrants from other EU countries, Southern Europeans are also 
at higher risk of being unemployed. This phenomenon can be explained, on the one 
hand, by the obstacles faced by newcomers in the initial process of adjusting their 
skills to Belgian labour market needs. On the other hand, it is also possible that the 
new wave of Southern European migrants lacks the support structures and social 
networks that helped the incorporation of their predecessors into the labour market 
because of the considerable time gap between the old and the new migration waves 
(see discussion on this below). 
 Interestingly, the obstacles in the process of the labour market integration of new 
Southern European migrants have had no signifi cant effect on their use of the 
Belgian non-contributory welfare system. As can be observed in Tables  7.8 and  7.9 , 
Southern Europeans rely only to a modest degree on benefi ts provided by the social 
integration income (RIS) scheme, which is the main form of non-contributory social 
assistance in Belgium (see footnote 2). After initial increases in 2008 and 2009, the 
 Table 7.7  Activity and unemployment rates of foreign born populations by origin 2012 
 Activity rate all 
populations 
 Activity rate age 
group 25–64 
 Unemployment rate age 
group 25–64 
 Southern EU  33.5 %  63.5 %  12.9 % 
 EU-12  50.0 %  64.7 %  5.9 % 
 EU neighbour  34.6 %  58.6 %  11.4 % 
 Other EU  32.2 %  48.7 %  6.8 % 
 Third country 
nationals 
 43.1 %  58.3 %  20.1 % 
 Belgium  43.7 %  87.7 %  7.6 % 
 Total  43.0 %  81.6 %  8.9 % 
 Source: Banque Carrefour de la Sécurité Sociale 
 Table 7.8  Proportion of benefi ciaries of the social integration income (RIS) scheme within each 
nationality 
 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013 
 Southern EU  1.4 %  1.6 %  1.8 %  1.8 %  1.8 %  1.8 % 
 EU-12  3.1 %  3.9 %  4.6 %  4.2 %  3.5 %  3.0 % 
 EU neighbour  1.6 %  1.7 %  1.8 %  1.7 %  1.5 %  1.5 % 
 Other EU  0.6 %  0.7 %  0.8 %  0.7 %  0.6 %  0.6 % 
 Non-EU  8.9 %  8.7 %  8.4 %  7.5 %  8.4 %  7.1 % 
 Belgium  1.1 %  1.2 %  1.2 %  1.2 %  1.2 %  1.2 % 
 Total  1.4 %  1.4 %  1.5 %  1.4 %  1.5 %  1.5 % 
 Source: Intégration Sociale ( 2013 ) 
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share of benefi ciaries of this scheme among Southern EU migrants has been con-
stant and has not exceeded 2 % of this population. It is, however, higher than the 
share of Belgians and migrants proceeding from neighbouring countries. On the 
other hand, the share of Southern Europeans who take up social benefi ts from the 
RIS scheme within the total population of Belgium has remained stable, at approxi-
mately 3 %. It remains to be seen, however, whether the limited use of non- 
contributory benefi ts by Southern EU migrants is related to the restrictions and 
controls implemented by the Belgian authorities against EU citizens in recent years 
(Mussche et al.  2013 ).
7.3  Southern European Migrants in Belgium: 
From “Heroes” to “Welfare Shoppers” 
7.3.1  EU Migrants in Belgium: Evolution of a Concept 
 Large waves of immigration from Italy, and to a lesser extent from Spain, Portugal 
and Greece, durably marked Belgium’s immigration history during the twentieth 
century. They have left visible traces until today in many neighbourhoods and many 
of these immigrants and their descendants now occupy visible positions in politics, 
trade unions, civil society organizations and academia. The most noticeable symbol 
of this process of socio-economic integration is the former Prime Minister Elio Di 
Rupo, the son of Italian immigrants who came to work in the Walloon coalmines in 
the 1940s. The visibility process led many observers to conclude that twentieth 
century Southern European immigration into Belgium had been a “success”. In the 
past two decades, old Southern European migration fl ows to Belgium have thus 
been reinterpreted  ex post as a desirable form of immigration in migration debates 
in Belgium. But how has this changed with the infl ux of new Southern European 
immigrants following the 2008 crisis? 
 As the origins of immigration into Belgium from Southern and Central and 
Eastern Europe predate the process of European integration, contemporary distinc-
 Table 7.9  Distribution of benefi ciaries of the social integration income (RIS) scheme by 
nationality within the total population of Belgium 
 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013 
 Southern EU  2.5 %  2.7 %  2.9 %  3.0 %  3.0 %  2.9 % 
 EU-12  1.4 %  2.0 %  2.8 %  3.1 %  3.0 %  2.9 % 
 EU neighbour  3.3 %  3.5 %  3.5 %  3.4 %  3.2 %  3.1 % 
 Other EU  0.2 %  0.2 %  0.2 %  0.2 %  0.2 %  0.1 % 
 Non-EU  19.4 %  17.9 %  17.7 %  17.6 %  17.6 %  17.0 % 
 Belgium  73.3 %  73.6 %  72.9 %  72.7 %  73.0 %  74.1 % 
 Total  100.0 %  100.0 %  100.0 %  100.0 %  100.0 %  100.0 % 
 Source: Intégration Sociale ( 2013 ) 
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tions made between EU migrants and third country nationals have not always guided 
the country’s immigration policies. As discussed in Part I, immigration into Belgium 
from border countries as well as from Italy and Poland fi nds its roots in the indus-
trial development of Wallonia in the nineteenth century and it underwent its fi rst 
acceleration after World War I. However, it was really after World War II that 
labour-intensive industries, such as coal and steel, stimulated demand for immigrant 
workers. The government thus developed a strategy of signing bilateral agreements 
fi rst with Southern European countries and later with Morocco (1964), Turkey 
(1964), Tunisia (1969), Algeria (1970), and Yugoslavia (1970). At the time of the 
fi rst bilateral agreement signed with Italy in 1946, the process of European integra-
tion had not yet started. The European Steel and Coal Community formed by 
Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg was, in 
fact, only founded in 1951. Similarly, when Belgium signed bilateral agreements 
with Spain (1956) and Greece (1957) in order to recruit workers, neither of these 
two countries was yet a member of the European Community. This means that early 
Southern European immigrants did not come to Belgium under Community provi-
sions that would guarantee their freedom of circulation as workers. In other words, 
unlike today, the right of Southern European and North African immigrants to come 
to Belgium was guided by similar rules for most of the twentieth century. 
 This situation changed dramatically over time. The turning point came in 1968 
with the end of visa requirements for EC migrants and the implementation of the 
right to look for employment without a work permit (Martiniello and Rea  2003 ). 
These differences in status between immigrants proceeding from EC countries 
(only Italians at the time) and other immigrants were further reinforced with the 
recession that started in the late 1960s. By then, the government had strictly reduced 
the issuance of new work permits, and on August 1, 1974, it offi cially put an end to 
30 years of  laissez-faire immigration policy by restricting entry only to immigrants 
whose skills were needed. In spite of this measure, the foreign population in Belgium 
continued to increase in the decades that followed through the granting of visas to 
skilled workers, the immigration of students, family reunifi cation and the arrival of 
asylum seekers. 
 As the socio-economic conditions worsened in Belgium throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, extreme-right parties began to build consistent electoral success on an 
anti-immigrant platform. By the early 1990s, the frontier between EC migrants and 
third country nationals was thus already very deep in Belgium. On the one hand, 
Italian and other Southern European migrants—as nationals of EC Member States—
enjoyed various employment, social and even political rights ensured by the trea-
ties. On the other hand, immigrants and their descendants proceeding from other 
parts of the world did not enjoy the same level of protection and were most affected 
by rising unemployment and xenophobia. 
 In this declining socio-economic environment, which affected most particularly 
the industrial region of Wallonia, the legal differences between EC and non-EC 
migrants established by the treaties became progressively associated with normative 
judgements regarding these populations. More precisely, as xenophobia towards 
non-EC immigrants has risen, a process of idealization of old EU immigrants (and 
J.-M. Lafl eur and M. Stanek
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particularly of Italian immigrants) has taken place. In this sorting process between 
desirable and undesirable migrants, two dubious arguments are recurrently being 
used: the motivations behind migration and the “cultural distance” between migrants 
and natives. 
 Let us fi rst address the argument regarding motivations behind migration. Since 
the 1980s, anti-immigration parties have supported the idea that—unlike their pre-
decessors—new immigrants to Belgium do not come to work but to take advantage 
of the welfare system. One party in particular—the Flemish nationalist and xeno-
phobic party  Vlaams Blok ( later renamed Vlaams Belang )—has played a key role in 
the dissemination of this idea. Following on from its initial major success in the 
1987 legislative elections, running on an anti-immigration platform, the party for-
malized its stance through a 70-point programme in 1992. At the core of this pro-
gramme, many measures proposed differentiated access to social security and 
unemployment benefi ts, as well as a different taxation system for EU and for non-
 EU migrants (Erk  2005 ). Rhetorical arguments regarding the cost that third country 
migrants supposedly represent to the Welfare State is historically based on immigra-
tion statistics describing the types of visa granted to third country nationals in order 
to gain access to the national territory. Recent data confi rms that only a minority of 
third country nationals are granted residence permits for employment reasons (7.6 % 
in 2011), while family reasons (42.4 %), humanitarian reasons (10.3 %) and educa-
tion (6.7 %) represent the bulk of registrations (UCL & Centre pour l’égalité des 
chances  2013 ). This administrative data, however, exclusively refl ects the modali-
ties of access to the Belgian territory (e.g. family reunifi cation, study, etc.) and not 
necessarily the intentions of migrants once they get there. In other words, the inabil-
ity to obtain residence permits for employment reasons forces third country nation-
als to use other modalities to gain access to the employment market. 
 The second argument used to differentiate between new and old immigrants 
insists on the supposed inability of the new arrivals to integrate because their reli-
gious beliefs and cultural traits are too different from those of natives. Here too, the 
 Vlaams Belang has repeatedly used this argument to target third country immigrants 
and their descendants (especially those proceeding from Maghreb and Turkey) 
(Meuleman and Billiet  2005 ). Depicting old Southern European immigrants as cul-
turally closer to natives, however, contradicts historical accounts of the fi rst decades 
of Italian presence in Belgium. As shown by Martiniello ( 1992 ) and Morelli ( 1988 ), 
Italian immigrants faced high levels of discrimination in Belgium after World War 
II and were, in fact, frequently accused of being too culturally different and too 
religious to integrate into Belgian society. Moreover, these scholars also showed 
that the high level of socio-economic integration of Italian migrants and their 
descendants must be related to other factors. The more favourable economic 
 conditions in which these immigrants arrived and their ability to organize and 
occupy positions of power in trade unions and political parties are especially 
notable. 
 In spite of its lack of empirical foundations, this classifi cation of immigrants into 
the categories of desirable post-war EU migrants and undesirable third country 
migrants has a strong performative value in Belgian politics. Over the years, clas-
sifying immigrants has been key to justifying selective migration and integration 
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policies designed to continue to appeal to certain classes of foreigners. On the one 
hand, there are those that are considered to be both productive and able to integrate 
(e.g. highly-skilled workers, higher education students, wealthy EU citizens moving 
to Belgium for fi scal reasons, etc.), and public policies aim to attract these migrants 
into the country. On the other hand, there are the other groups that the policies aim 
to keep out (low-skilled immigrants, children and elderly citizens, asylum seekers, 
etc.). The reason for the spread of these ideas among Belgian policy-makers is to be 
found in the growing electoral success of the Vlaams Blok in Flanders. As shown 
by Koopmans et al. ( 2012 ), this party’s success turned migration and integration 
into central political issues, so that other parties also felt compelled to pick up on 
these themes during their electoral campaigns (see also Coffé  2005 ; Adam and 
Torrekens forthcoming). It is certainly the case that Vlaams Blok’s success never 
materialized in the form of government participation at the regional or federal level. 
Nevertheless, its ideas have been co-opted by other Flemish parties such as the 
right-wing nationalists of the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) and the Liberal party 
(VLD), who have participated in several government coalitions since the late 1990s 
(Pauwels  2011 ). 
 With the accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the EU, the 
dichotomy between desirable and undesirable migrants has been applied for the fi rst 
time within the category of EU migrants. In both 2004 and 2007, Belgium—along 
other Northern European Member States—implemented transitional measures to 
delay by 7 years the date at which workers from new EU Member States could enter 
freely into the Belgian job market. As of 1 January 2014, all restrictions have been 
lifted in relation to the mobility of EU-8 and EU-2 workers. Belgian political elites, 
however, continue to question the legitimacy of the arrival of these workers in 
Belgium. First, Central and Eastern European workers continue to be accused by the 
authorities of competing unfairly against Belgian workers. Second, the increased 
visibility of Central and Eastern European migrants in Belgian cities has led to 
increasing accusations of welfare shopping among new immigrants in Belgium. 
This latter consideration, in particular, has led the Government to develop new poli-
cies to control access to welfare in Belgium. A central policy that deserves further 
analysis in this respect is the removal of residence permits from EU citizens claim-
ing benefi ts in Belgium. As we argue in the next section, this policy has led to 
increasing suspicion towards all EU migrants in Belgium and, in particular, towards 
new Southern European immigrants who left their country in the context of the 
economic crisis. 
7.3.2  Expelling EU citizens: The Limits of EU Citizenship 
in Belgium in Times of Crisis 
 The belief among political elites that foreigners could be attracted to Belgium 
because of its welfare system is not new, but it has not always been considered to be 
a policy issue in the country. In fact, Belgium even advertised the advantages of its 
social system in Mediterranean countries after World War II, in order to persuade 
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foreign workers to migrate to Belgium. It is thus only since the 1974 Oil Crisis and 
the subsequent decades of rising unemployment that foreigners have been increas-
ingly depicted as a strain on the country’s welfare system, in spite of a lack of evi-
dence on the matter. 
 Over the years, the belief that welfare benefi ts are drivers of migration has guided 
several policy reforms that have affected both EU and third country nationals. In 
other words, restricting foreigners’ access to social rights has progressively become 
a strategy to curb migration fl ows to Belgium. For instance, the idea that asylum 
seekers preferred Belgium over other destination countries because the benefi ts 
offered in Belgium were supposedly more generous than other countries led to the 
adoption of the 12 January 2007 Law on Asylum Seekers. This legislation strongly 
restricted the individual’s ability to receive any cash-benefi ts during the asylum 
process. 
 Attempting to limit the immigration of EU citizens into Belgium through welfare 
provisions is, however, a much more complex matter, as the right to the mobility of 
workers and citizens has been enshrined in treaties and EU legislation over time. 
Nonetheless, looking at the number of EU citizens who have lost their right to reside 
in Belgium after claiming benefi ts in the country (Table  7.10 ), it can be argued that 
control on welfare use has effectively been turned into an instrument by which the 
Belgian authorities intend to keep undesirable EU migrants out.
 As authorized by  Directive 2004 / 38 / EC on the right of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States , Belgium started in 2011 to remove residence permits from EU citizens on 
the basis that they represent an “unreasonable burden on the social system” of the 
host country. Citizens targeted by this measure are not employees and the self- 
employed but rather unemployed EU citizens. These EU citizens were originally 
granted residence permits in Belgium after they demonstrated that they possessed 
health coverage and suffi cient resources to live autonomously. Nevertheless, because 
 Table 7.10  Number of residence permits removed by nationality on the basis of Directive 
2004/38/EC 
 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 
 Spain  n/a  n/a  75  98  207  323  245 
 Italy  n/a  n/a  5  28  75  265  185 
 The Netherlands  n/a  n/a  60  102  161  305  209 
 France  n/a  n/a  21  32  109  176  n/a 
 Romania  n/a  n/a  43  96  402  816  634 
 Slovakia  n/a  n/a  91  108  73  60  n/a 
 Poland  n/a  n/a  11  n/a  70  66  n/a 
 Bulgaria  n/a  n/a  31  261  236  393  295 
 Other  n/a  n/a  6  817  585  308  474 
 Total  8  61  343  1542  1918  2712  2042 
 Change in %  –  662,50 %  462,30 %  349,60 %  24,40 %  41,40 %  -24,70 % 
 Sources: Offi ce des Etrangers ( 2008 ,  2009 ,  2010 ,  2011 ,  2012 ,  2013 ) 
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at some point after becoming offi cial residents in Belgium, these immigrants 
received some form of social welfare, they began to be expelled. It is striking to note 
that the number of EU citizens expelled on this basis has increased exponentially 
between 2010 and 2013. Indeed, in 2011, the Minister for Social Integration De 
Block issued an executive order allowing an automatic exchange of information 
between the Social Security Administration and the Belgian Immigration Offi ce. 
The consequence of this fl ow of information is visible in the sudden increase in the 
number of residence permits that were removed. 
 As documented in the press, many of these cases concerned citizens who applied 
for a living allowance or asked for social assistance because they faced a specifi c 
diffi culty (e.g. unexpected hospital or utility bills). In other words, it is the category 
of EU citizens considered to be a burden that is being specifi cally targeted by this 
policy. Yet, the defi nition used by the administration to defi ne social assistance is 
extremely lax. For instance, EU citizens hired under specifi c activation schemes 
fi nanced by the Social Security Administration to work in schools or hospitals have 
equally faced expulsion. The rationale was that such publicly-fi nanced jobs are not 
real jobs but rather a hidden form of assistance. The legality of such an interpreta-
tion has already been questioned in Belgium (Mormont and Neven  2014 ). Most 
importantly, however, the European Commission itself has expressed concerns over 
the sudden and dramatic increase in expulsions. It also reminded Belgium that it 
needed to pay more attention to the specifi c circumstances of each case, as expul-
sions should never be the automatic consequence of claiming benefi ts (European 
Commission  2014 ). 
 Looking at the nationality distribution of expelled EU citizens (Fig. 7.10), 
Romanians and Bulgarians have been the most affected by this policy. For these citi-
zens, Belgium’s policy to expel EU citizens who claim benefi ts is a continuation of 
previous policies that aimed to restrict their mobility into Belgium (e.g. through 
provisional measures that were only lifted on 1st January 2012). For this reason, the 
large-scale removal of residence permits among these nationals has failed to trigger 
a signifi cant reaction from either Belgian civil society or the governments of these 
two countries of origin. The reaction has been very different towards the expulsion 
of nationals from old Member States, whose mobility into Belgium had never been 
a contentious issue (Dutch and French citizens) or whose mobility into Belgium had 
been idealized over the years (Italian, Spanish and Portuguese citizens). 
 Southern European migrants in particular have been most adamant in denounc-
ing this new Belgian policy. During our fi eldwork in Brussels, conducted between 
April 2013 and November 2015, we came across three examples that demonstrated 
this. First, the Brussels’ chapter of the Spanish social movements  15  M and  Marea 
Granate (see Chap.  6 ) have organized numerous events in Brussels in order to shed 
light on the issue but also to raise awareness among new immigrants about the 
potential consequences of claiming social security benefi ts in Belgium. In November 
2015, these movements also jointly submitted a petition to the European Parliament 
Committee on Petitions, asking Parliament to remind Belgium that the automatic 
nature of its expulsion policy does not respect Directive 2004/38/EC (Cuartopoder 
10/11/15). Second, two other new associations created in Brussels by young Italian 
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newcomers—Giovani Italiani Europa and La Comune del Belgio—have also orga-
nized numerous events to raise awareness about the diffi culties of new Southern 
European immigrants. For instance,  Giovani Italiani Europa organized two major 
conferences inside the European Parliament calling on European authorities to 
facilitate the mobility of young Europeans but also calling on the Italian govern-
ment to adopt policies that will put an end to what they perceive as a new Italian 
brain drain.  La Comune del Belgio , by contrast, adopted a more pragmatic approach 
by setting up jointly with a Belgian non-profi t organization a free legal aid service. 
There, expelled EU citizens can receive advice on how to challenge the administra-
tive decision that forces them to leave the country. Third, together with a series of 
Belgian non-profi t organizations, the Italian Trade Union INCA–CGIL took the 
initiative to fi le a formal complaint to the European Commission regarding 
Belgium’s widespread expulsion of EU citizens. The letter explicitly asked the 
Commission to initiate an infringement procedure against Belgium. Their hope is 
that this will force the country to abandon or revise a policy that these organizations 
consider to be a breach of Belgium’s EU obligations (Osservatorio Inca  2014 ). The 
Commission responded favourably to this request and started to investigate the mat-
ter in June 2015. 
 Looking at these examples, it is striking to note that, despite being less affected 
numerically by the expulsions than other groups, Southern European immigrants 
have been the most vocal opponents of the policy. In fact, it is these immigrants who 
have managed to give the greatest visibility to the issue in the Belgian and European 
media and have managed to voice their concern in important forums such as the 
European Parliament. Similarly, Southern European migrants have set up the most 
elaborate legal responses to the policy using rights available at the Belgian and EU 
level. This situation can be explained by three factors. First, new Southern European 
immigration into the city of Brussels in particular consists partly of highly-educated 
migrants who come to Belgium in search of employment opportunities within the 
EU institutions and organizations that gravitate around them. It is thus not surpris-
ing that this particular kind of new migrant is more aware of his/her rights as a EU 
citizen but also more capable than others in catching the attention of the EU authori-
ties and the international media in Brussels. Second, even though the members of 
these new Southern European organizations tend to underline the diffi culty in con-
necting with co-nationals settled in Belgium for decades, new Italian immigrants—
in particular—are able to benefi t from an extensive network of Italian associations 
and institutions (trade unions, political parties, consulates, etc.), which have tradi-
tionally defended immigrant rights in Belgium. The support of the Brussels chapter 
of the Italian trade Union INCA-CGIL for the legal challenge against the Belgian 
government is very telling in this respect. Third, these new immigrant organizations 
are characterized by their strong transnational linkages with chapters of the same 
organizations in other destination countries or more simply with other immigrant 
organizations abroad. These linkages are an important resource when trying to chal-
lenge Belgium’s policy at the supranational level: it gives them visibility in foreign 
media and contributes to exposing Belgium at the international level in the hope that 
it will change its policy. 
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7.4  Conclusions: Welfare Policies as Tools for Migration 
Control 
 In this chapter, we have shown that Southern European Immigration into Belgium 
has increased since the beginning of the economic crisis. However, the arrival of 
these new immigrants failed to trigger perceptible fears among the population and 
policymakers. The perceived successful integration of previous immigration waves 
from Southern Europe has certainly facilitated the arrival of these new migrants in 
Belgium. At the same time, as a country characterized by a very open economy that 
also hosts several large international institutions, the number of high-skilled immi-
grants has also kept increasing at a steady rate over the last few years. 
 However, not all newcomers benefi t from an equally positive perception in 
Belgium. The increasing presence of asylum seekers and EU citizens proceeding 
from Central and Eastern Europe has, by contrast, been received from a negative 
perspective, and specifi c policies have been designed in recent years to discourage 
these forms of migration. In particular, access to welfare has been increasingly 
described as a “pull factor” that attracts potential immigrants more interested in 
receiving benefi ts than in working. In this regard, the rhetoric of the former Secretary 
of State for Migration and Social Integration De Block has been crucial in depicting 
Belgium’s social welfare as an overgenerous system that attracts undeserving immi-
grants. For this reason, she has made it a priority “to avoid immigrants coming here 
only to take advantage of the social system” (RTL info  2014 ). 
 However, this process of classifi cation of immigrants as either desirable or unde-
sirable largely precedes the crisis. Starting with the 1974 Oil Crisis and intensifying 
with the growing infl uence of the extreme-right party  Vlaams Belang on Belgian 
politics, Belgium has made gaining access to its territory increasingly diffi cult for 
third country nationals, whilst still adhering fully to the principles of the freedom of 
circulation of workers and citizens within the European Union. This has led to a 
strong differentiation in legal status (and perception regarding the legitimacy of 
their presence) between EU and third country migrants, who had long been treated 
on an equal footing in Belgium until the middle of the twentieth century. The pro-
cess of classifi cation within the category of EU citizens is, however, a more recent 
phenomenon, whose implementation is rendered very diffi cult by the protection 
offered to mobile EU citizens by treaties and directives. The fear of a possible mas-
sive arrival of immigrants after the accession of Central and Eastern European coun-
tries to the EU in 2004 and 2007 pushed Belgium—along with other North-Western 
EU Member States—to restrict temporarily the freedom of circulation of those citi-
zens described either as welfare shoppers or unfair competitors against Belgian 
workers. These restrictions have been progressively lifted, but the fear of invasion 
remains. Consequently, Belgium is now using other measures to keep undesirable 
EU citizens out, such as the intensifi cation of controls on worksites where posted 
workers are traditionally employed. 
 With the economic crisis and the increasing pressure on public fi nance, this pro-
cess of delegitimizing the presence of some EU citizens in Belgium has intensifi ed. 
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As Directive 2004/38/EC offers very little room for restricting the rights of mobile 
EU citizens, the control of EU citizens’ use of welfare rights is increasingly being 
used as a means to restrict access to the territory only to working EU citizens who 
are not considered to compete unfairly with Belgian workers. Whereas this policy 
targets primarily Romanian and Bulgarian citizens, the presence of Spanish, Dutch, 
Italian and French citizens in the list of nationalities most affected by the removal 
of residence permits has triggered strong debates in Belgium. The visibility given to 
this strict policy by the Secretary of State to Migration De Block has only contrib-
uted to reinforce the cliché according to which immigrants move to Belgium to take 
advantage of its welfare system. In addition, it has extended this cliché to EU citi-
zens whose presence in Belgium had never previously been questioned (the French 
and Dutch) or had even been considered as an example of successful integration 
within Belgium (Italians). 
 Previous occasions during which Roma migrants from Romania and Slovakia 
had been removed by the police from houses they illegally occupied had already 
confi rmed that citizens from those Member States were considered undesirable in 
Belgium. To see French and Southern European citizens expelled on similar grounds 
as Romanians and Bulgarians, however, marked a key moment in Belgium’s policy 
towards mobile EU citizens. By applying the strictest interpretation of Directive 
2004/38/EC when it comes to “welfare abuse” by mobile EU citizens, Belgium 
clearly intends to set strict limits on the concept of EU citizenship through its social 
policy. Unlike other groups of new immigrants, Southern European migrants have 
mobilized more visibly and more formally against Belgium’s policy. This greater 
ability to mobilize, we argue, is supported by the specifi c profi le of the new Southern 
European immigrants, their transnational connections and their ability to connect 
with home and host country institutions and organizations that have defended immi-
grant rights for decades. 
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Chapter 8
Southern Europeans in France: Invisible 
Migrants?
Tatiana Eremenko, Nora El Qadim, and Elsa Steichen
8.1  Introduction
France has a long immigration history and has been an important destination for 
migrants from Southern Europe throughout the twentieth century. Faced with labour 
shortages as early as the nineteenth century, France actively recruited workers from 
neighbouring countries until the start of the 1970s. Italians were among the first 
foreign nationals to be recruited, along with Belgians and Polish. They represented 
the largest immigrant community in France in the 1950s. The number of Spanish 
migrants, present in the south of France from the start of the twentieth century, grew 
in the mid-1940s, following the civil war. Portuguese migration took off later, at the 
end of the 1950s and rapidly became the largest migrant community by the mid- 
1970s. However, by the time of the 1974 economic crisis migration flows from 
Southern Europe had declined and they have remained low in the last decades.
The current economic crisis does not appear to have changed this evolution and 
France has not emerged as an important destination for Southern European migrants 
as have Germany and the UK. Although France fared relatively well at the start of 
the current economic crisis, it has experienced low economic growth and high 
unemployment rates in recent years, thus explaining its overall low attractiveness 
for Southern Europeans and EU migrants looking for work. Although their numbers 
have increased and represent a growing proportion of recent flows to France (Brutel 
2014), they remain low compared to numbers in Germany and the UK.
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Despite this statistical reality, EU mobility and more generally the role of the EU 
in economic and social policy have been at the forefront of debates in France since 
the early 2000s. Although these debates are a continuation of historical debates 
regarding immigration in France, they have taken a new intensity in the context of 
the current economic crisis. These debates have targeted two populations – the 
Roma and posted workers – with both groups being portrayed as threats to the 
French welfare state. The number of posted workers has increased threefold between 
2007 and 2013, reaching 212,641 workers posted in France during the last available 
year, and Southern Europeans constitute a growing proportion of this number. 
Although posted workers are, according to official EU definitions, not migrants and 
do not fall within the legal framework relative to intra-European mobility as such, 
their characteristics and experiences are similar to other groups of temporary 
migrant workers. This led us to consider their case as an example of crisis induced 
work mobility in the EU when considering the French case.
Section 8.2 of this chapter provides a brief overview of the socio-economic situ-
ation in France, before analysing the evolutions in the volume and characteristics of 
recent migrants and posted workers since the start of the 2000s. Section 8.3 analyses 
debates concerning intra-European mobility through the lens of two recent debates 
on the Roma and posted workers. In both cases, the issue of the national model of 
social protection is central. Although Southern European nationals have not been 
central to any of the debates – the image of posted workers focused on Eastern 
Europe – they are directly affected by their results and policy changes. Moreover, 
we argue that the focus of political debates on other populations in France has con-
tributed to the relative invisibility of Southern European immigrants in this 
country.
8.2  A Quantitative Assessment of Crisis-Induced Migration 
to France
8.2.1  Socio-economic Situation in France
The current economic crisis did not impact France as hard as other European coun-
tries. In 2009, the GDP decreased by 3 %, but recovered in the following years, 
increasing by 2 % in 2010 and 2011 (Larrieu et al. 2014). However in the most 
recent years, the socio-economic situation has stagnated with a growth rate under 
1 % from 2012 to 2014 (Debauche et al. 2015).
The evolution of the employment situation reflects that of the GDP. In 2009 the 
number of jobs decreased and the unemployment rate went from 7.1 % the previous 
year to 8.7 % (Table 8.1). The creation of government aided jobs and the increase in 
independent activity limited the contraction of the labour market. In 2012 and 2013 
job losses resumed and the unemployment rate started increasing again, reaching 
9.8 % in 2013. This evolution has led to 843,000 additional unemployed persons 
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over the period 2008–2013. The unemployment rate in France was slightly lower 
than the EU average in 2012 (10.6 %), but higher than that of other destinations such 
as Germany (5.6 %) or the United Kingdom (8.0 %) (INSEE 2014).
Prior to the crisis, women had a more disadvantaged situation on the labour mar-
ket than men (higher unemployment rates, lower salaries, more frequent part-time 
jobs). However as activity sectors most hit by the economic crisis employed more 
male workers (construction, temporary work placements…), men’s employment 
has deteriorated to a greater extent. For example in 2008 men’s unemployment rate 
was 0.7 points lower than that of women, but the situation has reversed by 2013.
Young adults (15–24 years old) have been the age group most affected by the 
crisis. Their unemployment rate was significantly higher than average prior to the 
crisis (18.3 % in 2008) and has continued rising since then. In 2013, almost one in 
Table 8.1 Evolution of unemployment (ILO definition) by sex, age, occupation and level of 
education
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of 
unemployed 
(thousands)
2,299 2,320 2,320 2,121 1,970 2,457 2,504 2,474 2,672 2,813
Male 1,123 1,133 1,142 1,062 987 1,281 1,287 1,255 1,405 1,486
Female 1,177 1,187 1,178 1,059 984 1,176 1,217 1,219 1,267 1,327
Unemployment  
rate (%)
8.5 8.5 8.4 7.7 7.1 8.7 8.9 8.8 9.4 9.8
By sex
Male 7.8 7.8 7.9 7.3 6.7 8.7 8.7 8.5 9.4 10.0
Female 9.3 9.3 9.1 8.1 7.4 8.8 9.1 9.1 9.3 9.7
By age
15–24 years 19.8 20.3 21.3 18.8 18.3 22.9 22.5 21.8 23.6 23.9
25–49 years 7.8 7.8 7.6 7.0 6.3 7.8 8.0 8.0 8.7 9.1
50 years or more 5.2 5.0 5.1 4.6 4.3 5.2 5.5 5.5 5.9 6.5
By educational level
Tertiary 6.4 6.2 5.9 5.5 4.5 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.6 na
Secondary 8.2 8.1 8.1 7.2 6.9 8.8 8.8 8.8 9.8 na
Less than secondary 12.3 12.9 13.1 12.2 11.7 14.2 15.3 15.1 16.0 na
By occupation
Executives 4.1 4.2 3.7 3.0 2.8 3.5 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.9
Intermediate 
occupations
5.2 4.8 4.6 4.4 3.8 5.0 4.6 4.8 5.1 5.2
Employees 8.6 9.0 8.8 7.8 7.0 8.3 8.9 9.2 9.7 10.0
Workers 10.5 10.8 11 10.1 9.8 12.6 12.8 12.3 13.8 14.6
  Skilled workers 7.4 7.7 7.6 7.2 7.0 8.9 9.4 9.2 10.5 11.2
  Unskilled 
workers
15.8 15.9 16.8 15.2 14.7 19.1 18.6 17.7 19.5 20.6
Source: INSEE (2014). INSEE T304
Persons aged 15 or older residing in metropolitan France in ordinary households
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four active young people were unemployed (23.9 %). However this high level of 
unemployment partly reflects the specific situation of this age group as many indi-
viduals are still pursuing their studies and are not counted in the active population. 
Thus the proportion of unemployed among all 15–24 years old is significantly lower 
(8.9 %).
The increase in the unemployment rate has been highest for groups with low 
levels of human capital. It increased by 4.3 points between 2008 and 2012 for indi-
viduals with a less than secondary degree, whereas the rise was only by 1.1 points 
for those with a tertiary degree. Executive staff and intermediate occupations expe-
rienced low unemployment rates throughout the crisis (less than 4 % and less than 
5.2 % in the period 2008–2013), whereas the unemployment rates of workers, and 
particularly unskilled workers, have risen.
8.2.2  EU Migration to France: A Positive, But Limited Impact 
of the Economic Crisis
8.2.2.1  Stocks and Flows of EU Migrants in France
After two decades of relatively low levels of migration flows, arrivals in France 
resumed at the end of the 1990s. At the start of the century, 200,000 migrants on 
average entered France every year (INED 1994–2008). As a result, the total immi-
grant population increased from 4.3 million in 1999 to 5.1 million in 2006 (Table 
8.2). It has continued to increase in the last years, albeit at a lower rate. Since the 
end of the 1990s, growth in the immigrant population has mainly been fuelled by 
migration from outside Europe, primarily Africa and Asia. Conversely, the number 
of EU27 immigrants experienced only a small increase between 1999 and 2011 and 
their share in the total immigrant population declined from 41.5 % to 32.6 %. 
However, since the beginning of the crisis, migration flows of EU27 nationals are on 
the rise: the annual number of entries went from an average of 65,000 in 2006–
2008, to around 91,000 in 2012 (Eurostat 2014).
These changes are mainly due to an increase in the number of Southern European 
migrants since the beginning of the crisis (Brutel 2014). In the previous decades the 
number of Italian, Spanish and Portuguese immigrants residing in France had been 
declining due to a low number of entries, an increase in the number of returns to the 
country of origin and the ageing of the population.1 This can equally be observed for 
the first two groups in the period 1999–2011, whereas the number of Portuguese 
remained stable and then increased. However, since the start of the crisis, entries of 
Southern European migrants have increased and Portuguese migrants represented 
the largest proportion of migrants entering France in 2012 (8 %), surpassing 
1 Greek immigrants in France are not identified as a separate category in statistical sources due to 
low numbers. In the remaining sections they are grouped with “other EU27” nationals and the 
category of Southern European migrants only refers to migrants from Italy, Spain and Portugal.
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Algerians and Moroccans (7 % each) (Brutel 2014). Spanish and Italian migrants 
accounted for 5 % and 4 % of entries.
The numbers of immigrants from Belgium and Germany have stayed relatively 
stable in the last decade, whereas there was an important increase of UK nationals 
(their number doubled between 1999 and 2011). Migration from Eastern and Central 
EU countries to France has remained limited compared to other destination coun-
tries, such as the UK, in part due to the introduction of transitional periods for 
nationals of the new Member States in 2004 and 2007 and the ensuing restrictions 
in their access to the labour market. The number of immigrants from EU8 countries, 
mainly Poland, remained stable during the last decade. Migration from EU2 coun-
tries, mainly Romania, started prior to their EU accession and has grown since their 
entry. The number of Romanians tripled between 1999 and 2011.
In the remainder of this section we compare the characteristics of recent migrants 
in the period prior to and after the start of the current economic crisis.2 As  mentioned 
earlier, we observe an increase of the three groups of Southern Europeans since the 
crisis: in the period 2006–2011, the number of recent migrants from Southern 
2 France does not have a statistical source allowing direct monitoring of flows. In line with the 
national statistical institute (INSEE) that uses the population census to estimate flows and charac-
teristics of migrants, we use the population census to describe this population (Brutel 2014). We 
define recent migrants as immigrants residing in France for less than 5 years. Since 2004 the popu-
lation census is an “annual information collection covering all municipal territories in succession 
over a five-year period”. Data for a given year (for example 2011) comprise information gathered 
over a 5-year period (2009–2013). We use the population census individual database [INDREG] 
for the years 2006 and 2011.
Table 8.2 Immigrant population by country of origin, 1999–2011
Total % col
Annual increase 
(%)
1999 2006 2011 1999 2006 2011
1999–
2006
2006–
2011
EU27 1,786,087 1,790,510 1,826,766 41.5 34.9 32.6 0.0 0.4
  Spain 316,544 269,647 245,013 7.3 5.2 4.4 −2.3 −1.9
  Italy 380,798 329,998 297,740 8.8 6.4 5.3 −2.0 −2.0
  Portugal 570,243 569,600 592,281 13.2 11.1 10.6 0.0 0.8
  Greece 10,157 9,496 9,683 0.2 0.2 0.2 −1.0 0.4
  Belgium 93,395 103,263 111,264 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.4 1.5
  Germany 125,227 128,91 123,313 2.9 2.5 2.2 0.4 −0.9
  United 
Kingdom
74,683 134,052 153,955 1.7 2.6 2.7 8.7 2.8
  Poland 98,566 90,426 92,769 2.3 1.8 1.7 −1.2 0.5
  Romania 23,301 42,219 74,661 0.5 0.8 1.3 8.9 12.1
  Other EU27 47,097 54,206 59,606 1.1 1.1 1.1 2.0 1.9
Third countries 2,522,440 3,345,784 3,778,402 58.5 65.1 67.4 4.1 2.5
Total 4,308,527 5,136,294 5,605,167 100 100 100 2.5 1.8
Source: INSEE – Population census
8 Southern Europeans in France: Invisible Migrants?
128
Europe living in France increased from around 53,000 to 78,000, with a particularly 
strong increase for Portugal (+15,000) (Table 8.3). Although the number of recent 
migrants from the UK remains in second place, it has reduced compared to the 
period before the crisis. The number of Polish nationals remained stable, but we 
observe an increase in the number of recent migrants from Romania, albeit they still 
remain much lower than that from Portugal and the UK.
When analysing the characteristics of recent migrants from Southern Europe to 
France with regards to previous migration waves, it is important to keep in mind the 
historical development of each community and how much time separates the two 
waves of migration (see introduction). Flows of Italian guest workers had declined 
by the end of the 1960s and several decades had elapsed before recent migrants 
started arriving from Italy to France. The situation of Portugal is quite different to 
the extent that migration flows of workers had been declining prior to the country’s 
EU accession, but that they had never fully stopped and thus current flows can be 
considered a continuation of these past waves. Spanish migrants are in an intermedi-
ate situation as their flows developed and declined later than that of Italians, but 
there is nevertheless more discontinuity between the two waves compared to the 
Portuguese case. The extent to which characteristics of recent migrants mirror those 
of past flows – low-skilled work migration, with a dominance of male migrants – or 
present new characteristics associated with EU migration – students, highly-skilled 
workers – largely depend on the history of each community.
Table 8.3 Number and distribution of recent migrants by country of origin, 2006–2011
Number % col Annual increase (%)
2006 2011 2006 2011 2006–2011
EU27 193,748 207,302 30.2 34.0 1.4
  Spain 11,948 16,387 1.9 2.7 6.5
  Italy 14,07 19,665 2.2 3.2 6.9
  Portugal 27,203 42,228 4.2 6.9 9.2
  Belgium 17,583 19,405 2.7 3.2 2.0
  Germany 21,177 17,515 3.3 2.9 −3.7
  United Kingdom 52,283 34,974 8.2 5.7 −7.7
  Poland 9,605 10,247 1.5 1.7 1.3
  Romania 11,287 19,746 1.8 3.2 11.8
  Other EU27 28,594 27,135 4.5 4.4 −1.0
Third countries 447,22 403,198 69.8 66.0 −2.1
Total 640,968 610,500 100 100 −1.0
Source: INSEE – Population census individual database [INDREG]. Authors’ estimations
Immigrants residing in France for less than 5 years
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8.2.2.2  Socio-demographic Characteristics of Recent Migrants in France
EU migrants in France remain concentrated in the 25–44 age group in both periods, 
with the exception of UK nationals, but some differences can be observed since the 
crisis pointing to changes in the age composition of migration flows (Table 8.4). 
Around one in five Portuguese migrants are under the age of 15, thus pointing to an 
important family component. The corresponding proportion was lower for Italy and 
Spain in 2006 (11 % and 13 %), but increased by 2011 (16 % and 20 %) suggesting 
that recent migrations more often comprise entire families and not only single 
adults. The proportion of 15–24 years old declines for Spain and Portugal, but also 
Poland and Romania. As this age group primarily consists of students, this may 
indicate that student mobility has diminished during the crisis due to a rarity of 
resources (institutional but also individual and family). In the case of EU10 nation-
als it also results from a diversification of profiles and the increase in economic 
migration since the end of the transitional period. Nationals from the UK and 
Belgium are on average older, with migrations often taking place for professional 
reasons at a later stage of the career or after retirement. Migrants in this age group 
remain relatively few among Southern Europeans, but their proportion has increased 
among the Portuguese (13 % in 2011 versus 9 % in 2006).
After being a minority among the immigrant population throughout most of the 
twentieth century, women finally represented 51 % in 2008 (Beauchemin et al. 
2013). Among recent migrants their proportion was higher: 53–54 % (Table 8.5). 
Portuguese migration has been male dominated since the beginning and the 
Table 8.4 Age of recent migrants by country of origin, 2006–2011
2006 2011
−15
15–
24
25–
44
45–
64 65+ Total −15
15–
24
25–
44
45–
64 65+ Total
EU27 15.4 17.4 41.8 20.3 5.1 100 16.5 17.4 43.8 18.0 4.3 100
  Spain 13.0 23.8 52.8 8.2 2.2 100 20.0 19.8 49.2 9.7 1.3 100
  Italy 11.3 18.1 53.6 12.8 4.2 100 15.9 16.9 52.7 12.0 2.5 100
  Portugal 22.1 21.6 45.9 8.6 1.9 100 20.8 18.6 46.7 12.7 1.2 100
  Belgium 18.4 13.6 42.5 20.4 5.2 100 18.9 13.8 37.7 23.1 6.5 100
  Germany 13.5 21.6 46.4 15.2 3.3 100 14.3 21.5 45.1 16.0 3.1 100
  United 
Kingdom
15.3 6.6 27.3 39.9 10.8 100 13.9 9.3 26.5 37.5 12.8 100
  Poland 10.6 24.0 57.3 7.6 0.5 100 11.6 18.4 58.8 10.4 0.8 100
  Romania 11.0 26.2 54.9 6.8 1.0 100 14.7 21.9 53.5 9.0 0.9 100
  Other 
EU27
15.1 23.5 39.7 17.7 4.0 100 14.5 21.3 42.3 17.2 4.6 100
Third 
countries
16.3 26.5 48.6 7.2 1.2 100 14.6 26.9 50.1 7.2 1.1 100
Total 16.0 23.8 46.6 11.2 2.4 100 15.3 23.7 48.0 10.8 2.2 100
Source: INSEE – Population census individual database [INDREG]. Authors’ estimations
Immigrants residing in France for less than 5 years
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 proportion of women remains low among recent migrants (45–46 %). On the con-
trary, the majority of Spanish migrants were female in 2006 (55 %), but since the 
start of the crisis their proportion had decreased (51 %) pointing to a larger emigra-
tion of male migrants. The recent migration flow from Italy has been balanced and 
does not appear to be affected by the crisis. Poland and Romania had the highest 
proportions of female migrants in 2006 (57–60 %), but they diminished by 2011 
(52 %), possibly due to the decrease in student migration and the growing propor-
tion of work migrants from these countries.
Southern Europeans represent two extremes in terms of educational levels among 
recent migrants in France, but we can observe a certain homogenization since the 
start of the crisis. A large majority of migrants from Portugal (77 %) had a less than 
secondary degree and only 8 % had a tertiary degree in 2006 (Table 8.6). Conversely, 
the majority of migrants from Spain and Italy held a tertiary degree: 63 % of 
Spaniards and 51 % of Italians in 2006. Although these differences persist in the 
post-crisis period, we see some changes. The proportion of Portuguese migrants 
with a secondary education has progressed (19 % versus 15 %), pointing to a new 
class of workers potentially hit by the crisis and thus deciding to emigrate. On the 
contrary, Spanish migrants with a less than secondary educational level are more 
represented in the recent period, thus suggesting the emigration of low skilled 
migrants compared to recent years. Italian migrants became increasingly holders of 
a tertiary education (56 % versus 51 %).
Table 8.5 Proportion of 
female migrants among 
recent migrants by country of 
origin, 2006–2011
2006 2011
EU27 51.3 50.5
  Spain 54.6 51.1
  Italy 49.1 48.9
  Portugal 44.9 45.9
  Belgium 49.4 49.4
  Germany 52.4 53.4
  United Kingdom 48.9 49.7
  Poland 60.3 55.7
  Romania 56.4 51.8
  Other EU27 56.6 55.8
Third countries 53.9 55.9
Total 53.1 54.1
Source: INSEE - Population census individ-
ual database [INDREG]. Authors’ estima-
tions
Immigrants residing in France for less than 5 
years
T. Eremenko et al.
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8.2.2.3  Labour Market Situation of Recent Migrants in France3
When we compare the situation of recent migrants before and after the crisis, we 
observe an increase of their activity rates – 64 % in 2006 to 74 % in 2011 – which 
may have resulted from a decrease of student migration and increase of workers 
(Table 8.7). By comparison, the activity rates of third country nationals did not 
change in the same period. The activity rates are generally lower for female migrants 
(56 % in 2006 versus 72 % of male among recent EU27 migrants), but women have 
also experienced a higher increase by 2011 (+10 versus +9 points).
EU27 migrants, particularly nationals of EU15 states, benefited from a more 
favourable situation in the labour market prior to the crisis (INSEE 2012). Although 
EU27 migrants remain less concerned by unemployment than third country nation-
als, they have also experienced an increase of this indicator in the last years (unem-
ployment rate increased by 2 points). Spanish and Italian migrants show the largest 
increase of the unemployment rate (+34 % and +30 %), but it remains above average 
for Portuguese (+13 %). Conversely, it has decreased for Eastern Europeans, namely 
Polish (−13 %) and Romanians (−15 %), who faced a much worse situation in 2006.
3 The sample sizes of recent Southern European migrants in the French Labour Force Survey are 
small (for instance, there are 1500 South European immigrants in the 2012 LFS survey, whatever 
their age and period of arrival). Thus, we use the population census to describe the labour market 
situation of recent migrants. However, the information provided in the population census does not 
allow estimating comparable indicators pertaining to this field to other data sources (for example 
unemployment rates according to ILO definition).
Table 8.6 Educational level of recent migrants by country of origin, 2006–2011
2006 2011
Less than 
secondary Secondary Tertiary Total
Less than 
secondary Secondary Tertiary Total
EU27 28.8 29.0 42.1 100 31.0 28.8 40.2 100
 Spain 12.8 24.7 62.5 100 16.8 24.2 59.0 100
 Italy 17.6 31.8 50.6 100 15.3 28.6 56.1 100
 Portugal 76.8 14.9 8.2 100 71.2 19.3 9.5 100
 Belgium 18.9 32.7 48.4 100 20.4 36.5 43.1 100
 Germany 13.4 37.5 49.1 100 12.0 37.9 50.1 100
  United 
Kingdom
30.9 26.4 42.7 100 26.1 26.4 47.6 100
 Poland 21.3 39.8 38.8 100 23.2 36.2 40.6 100
 Romania 30.5 32.4 37.1 100 35.3 32.7 32.1 100
  Other 
EU27
14.6 33.0 52.4 100 17.6 31.6 50.8 100
Third 
countries
41.9 26.1 32.0 100 37.1 26.8 36.1 100
Total 38.0 27.0 35.1 100 35.1 27.5 37.5 100
Source: INSEE - Population census individual database [INDREG]. Authors’ estimations
Immigrants residing in France for less than 5 years aged 15 years or older
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The differences in terms of educational levels of Southern European migrants 
determine their occupation in the labour market. In recent decades Spanish and 
Italian migrants, similarly to North Western European migrants (Belgium, Germany, 
UK), are more likely to hold mid and high-level occupations (INSEE 2012); this is 
equally observed among recent migrants before and after the crisis (Table 8.8). 
Conversely, Portuguese have been concentrated in low-skilled occupations and this 
is still the case among recent arrivals (more than two thirds are in this category). 
Migrants from Central and Eastern Europe are in an intermediate situation.
However these profiles have changed for some groups in the period under study. 
Previously we observed a decrease in the educational level of Spanish migrants, and 
this is paralleled by an increase in the proportion of migrants in low-skilled occupa-
tions (+4 points). Conversely, among Italians who had already held the highest pro-
portion of high-skilled occupations before the crisis, their proportion has further 
progressed and reached 43 % in 2011. Although the census does not distinguish the 
holders of tertiary degrees, other sources point to the presence of a large number of 
Italian PhD holders in academic positions in France. Italians were the largest 
national group working in the National Centre for Scientific Research (332 in 2013, 
19 % of foreign researchers) (CNRS 2013). They also accounted for the largest 
number of recruitments of university professors in the last decade (371 between 
2004 and 2013, 17 % of recruitments of foreigners).
We also observe an increase in the occupational level of migrants from Romania, 
which may result from the fact that since the end of the transitional period, they are 
Table 8.8 Occupation level of recent migrants by country of origin, 2006–2011
2006 2011
Low Mid High Total Low Mid High Total
EU27 28.3 44.7 27.0 100 33.3 42.6 24.1 100
 Spain 15.0 48.6 36.5 100 19.3 47.7 33.0 100
 Italy 20.3 41.5 38.2 100 17.8 39.7 42.5 100
 Portugal 64.8 31.1 4.1 100 62.6 33.5 3.8 100
 Belgium 18.2 53.1 28.7 100 20.9 54.0 25.1 100
 Germany 14.6 49.3 36.2 100 13.0 49.5 37.5 100
 United Kingdom 16.9 50.0 33.1 100 19.2 47.5 33.3 100
 Poland 42.6 41.8 15.5 100 42.7 42.7 14.6 100
 Romania 37.5 45.0 17.5 100 40.5 39.2 20.3 100
 Other EU27 16.2 47.4 36.4 100 22.3 44.7 33.0 100
Third countries 41.3 44.1 14.6 100 36.5 44.0 19.4 100
Total 35.8 44.4 19.9 100 34.9 43.3 21.8 100
Source: INSEE – Population census individual database [INDREG]. Authors’ estimations
Immigrants residing in France for less than 5 years aged 15 years or older and employed at time of 
observation
Low-level occupations refer to unskilled employees and labourers, including agricultural workers. 
Mid level occupations refer to intermediate professions, skilled employees, labourers and trades-
man. High-level occupations refer to directors of companies of 10 or more employees and execu-
tives
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able to access a wider array of occupations. There has been a particularly high 
increase in the number of doctors born in Romania and practicing in France (176 in 
2007, 840 in 2014) (CNOM 2014). This is also the only national group where 
female migrants have higher level of occupation than male migrants (32 % are high- 
skilled versus 13 % of male). For example, Romanian doctors in France are pre-
dominantly female (71 %).
8.2.3  Posted Workers in France: More Southern European 
Working Under This Status Since the Beginning 
of the Economic Crisis
The definitions and data sources used in the previous section allow identifying and 
describing a certain profile of EU migrants, i.e. those having changed their country 
of residence and currently residing in France. However this approach gives only a 
partial evaluation of the extent of crisis-induced immigration from Southern Europe 
to France for several reasons. Firstly, the population census is likely to underesti-
mate the most recent migrants who may think of themselves as being temporarily in 
France and thus not concerned by the data collection, lack individual housing and 
not be identified by the census takers, be reluctant to participate given language 
problems, etc. Secondly, the population census does not cover specific profiles of 
migrants coming for a shorter duration in France, such as seasonal or temporary 
workers. Although the volume and characteristics of these migrants are by defini-
tion less known, different sources point to their increase since the beginning of the 
crisis.
Spaniards and Portuguese constituted the majority of workers recruited by the 
French Office for International Migration (OMI) to carry out seasonal activities in 
the 1960s and 1970s. After the entry of Spain and Portugal into the EU (1986) and 
the end of the transitional period (1992), Spanish and Portuguese workers obtained 
a direct access to the labour market and no longer had to go through the OMI recruit-
ment process, thus disappearing from statistics on this type of workers. However, 
many of them continued working in seasonal jobs and commuting to France during 
certain periods of the year (Michalon and Potot 2008). Anecdotal evidence shows 
that their numbers have also risen since the start of the crisis, particularly in Southern 
regions of France (Picouët 2008; Millien 2014). The long-standing presence of 
workers from these countries in this sector may have facilitated their recruitment.
Another category of workers coming temporarily to France consists of posted 
workers, i.e. workers employed by companies based in other EU countries carrying 
out temporary services for companies or private employers in France (Math and 
Spire 2004). These workers in principle are not migrants, as they do not change their 
place of residence (UN definition). During the period of posting, workers hold a 
contract with their company based abroad and remain affiliated to the social security 
regime in the country where their company is established. Their stay in France is 
T. Eremenko et al.
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temporary, as most missions have a fixed duration, lasting from a few days to sev-
eral months, which cannot exceed the maximal legal duration.4 Moreover these situ-
ations do not fall under the EU jurisdiction related to the freedom of movement to 
the extent that postings are regulated by the Directive 96/71/EC of 16 December 
1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of 
services.
Despite this, characteristics and experiences of posted workers are similar to 
other groups of temporary migrant workers (Clark 2012). The process leading these 
workers to work abroad is also linked to limited economic opportunities in their 
home countries and their willingness to improve their living conditions. Although 
their missions have a limited duration and they are expected to return after each mis-
sion to their origin country, they can end up spending a relatively long time abroad, 
either when carrying out a mission lasting several months or by accumulating sev-
eral shorter missions without returning. They occupy similar jobs to other migrants, 
such as low-skilled jobs in the construction sector or agriculture. Therefore, in many 
cases, it is only their legal status that differentiates them from other migrants, pos-
sibly putting them in a more vulnerable position despite their EU nationality (Math 
and Spire 2004). These considerations have led us to consider their case as an exam-
ple of crisis induced work mobility in the EU, particularly given the fact that their 
presence in France has gained attention in the recent years and has triggered many 
debates (Sect. 8.3).
8.2.3.1  Volume of Posted Workers in France
The number of posted workers has grown continuously throughout the 2000s, going 
from around 16,000 in 2004 to around 213,000 in 2013 (Table 8.9).5 Even though 
part of this evolution is due to a better monitoring of these situations and the statisti-
cal coverage, which itself is a result of the growing attention this issue has raised in 
the recent years, it also indicates that an increasing number of EU nationals come to 
work in France under this regime. It is important to note that the term “posted work-
ers” covers various types of postings – provision of services, temporary placement, 
intra-company transfers, self-employed – with different worker profiles in terms of 
nationalities, skill levels, working conditions, etc. The existing statistics do not 
4 The maximum legal duration for a posting is 24 months after which the worker no longer has the 
right to continue to be affiliated to the social security regime in the country of origin and must be 
registered in France.
5 Companies posting workers in France have to make a declaration beforehand to the local work 
protection administration (number of workers, duration of posting, activity…). This information is 
compiled by the national work protection administration to produce annual statistics. These statis-
tics do not estimate the number of workers coming to France a given year (flows) as the declaration 
covers a “service” (it may include several workers, workers may come to France several times 
during a given year, the duration of the presence in France of these workers varies). For a more 
detailed description of these statistics see Direction Générale du Travail (2014).
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allow us to identify these different groups, although it is possible to make some 
assumptions as we describe below.
There has been an important change in the geographical composition of posted 
workers in France in the last decade. Historically posted workers were mostly high- 
skilled workers from neighbouring countries: in 2004 almost half of posted workers 
came from just two countries, Belgium and Germany. Starting from the mid-2000s 
we see an increase in the number of EU10 nationals. In 2013 Polish workers repre-
sented the largest national group with around 38,000 workers, thus 18 % of the total. 
The number of Romanian workers has also been rapidly increasing since 2009, 
reaching 27,000 workers in 2013 (13 % of the total). However since the beginning 
of the crisis, and particularly in the most recent years, the most important increases 
are seen in the numbers of Southern European workers. Between 2012 and 2013 the 
number of Portuguese progressed by 71 %. Portugal now has the second highest 
number of posted workers in France (34,000 workers in 2013, 16 % of the total) and 
although they remain the second largest group (after Poland), they were expected to 
surpass them in 2014. The number of Spanish workers doubled in 2013 and they 
became the fourth most numerous national group (after Poland, Portugal, Romania).
8.2.3.2  Socio-economic Characteristics of Posted Workers in France
The large majority of posted workers are concentrated in low-skilled occupations 
(86 % are labourers in 2013) (DGT 2014). Intermediate and high level professions 
accounted for 5 % and 2 % respectively, with the remaining proportion undeter-
mined. Most posted workers are employed in construction (42 % in 2013), but there 
is also an important proportion of workers employed by temporary placement agen-
cies covering different sectors (23 %), as well as workers in the industrial sector 
(16 %).
The regions of activity of posted workers in France have also evolved over the 
years. Up until the mid-2000s they were primarily concentrated in border regions in 
the East and North of France. With time however there has been a penetration over 
the entire territory, including the Ile de France region. The increase since the crisis 
has been stronger regions in the South, in regions bordering Spain and Portugal. In 
Aquitaine the number of posted workers has tripled since 2008 (whereas it has dou-
bled in France), with most of the postings being declared by Spanish and Portuguese 
companies in the construction sector (DIRECCTE Aquitaine 2014).
8.3  Policies and Debates in Focus
Immigration has been a recurrent issue of French national debates in the 2000s and 
2010s. These debates have mainly focused on flows from third countries in the 
South or from Eastern European countries, and only indirectly touched upon the 
case of Southern European countries. This section analyses the factors explaining 
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this situation, focusing first on the history of immigration policy in France, then on 
the implementation of EU directives related to the freedom of movement and provi-
sion of services. The analysis of debates related to EU mobility and EU policy, 
precisely that on the Roma and on posted workers, underlines two characteristics of 
the recent debates on intra-European immigration in France: first of all, these 
debates started before 2008 and the economic crisis; second, these debates focused 
on Eastern Europeans, which in turn contributed to the invisibilizing of Southern 
Europeans in France.
8.3.1  History of Immigration Policy in France
The history of immigration policy in France can help explain why policies and 
debates today are not so much focused on immigrants from Southern Europe. The 
state has played a central role in managing immigration policy flows in France since 
the nineteenth century (Weil 1991; Noiriel 1996; Viet 1998; Guiraudon 2000). 
Immigration policy in France in the twentieth century is thus the result of the emer-
gence and variations of three competing logics, each defended by a variety of 
administrations: a policing logic, with the objective of ensuring the safety of the 
territory through the control of borders and foreigners; a labour logic, with the 
objective of providing a sufficient labour force in times of need and in specific sec-
tors, but limiting the presence of foreigners in times of economic crisis; and finally 
a logic of population, concerned with the role of immigration in the French popula-
tion and its fertility, and at times tainted with racial undertones (Spire 2005). These 
three logics are often intertwined and difficult to disentangle in the resulting immi-
gration policy.
These logics were all at play in the gradual favouring of European immigration 
over immigration from the former French colonies (mainly in West and North 
Africa). Immigration to France, initially mainly from Belgium, Italy and Poland, 
comprised more and more workers from the French colonies between the wars, as 
well as Spaniards. After the Second World War, the numbers of immigrants from the 
(former) colonies in Africa grew, in parallel with the number of Spaniards and 
Portuguese. While the slowing down of the economy at the end of the 1960s led to 
limitations in the entry of foreign workers, and eventually to the announcement of 
the end of labour migration in 1974, the preference for European migrants was rein-
forced with the progressive construction of a European market and the promotion of 
the free movement of workers and their families (Sect. 8.3.2). EU law effectively 
created a two-tier system of immigration by distinguishing EU nationals from 
“third-country nationals”.
With the rise of colonial and postcolonial immigration (Sayad 1999), European 
immigration came to be considered as unproblematic, compared to that of other 
immigrants. Gérard Noiriel (1996) showed how successive waves of immigrants to 
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France since the nineteenth century have all progressively been integrated within 
the French nation, by looking at their socio-economic status, their religious (or 
rather non-religious) beliefs and practices, as well as rates of inter-marriage. He also 
explained that debates on non-European immigrants developed along similar lines 
as earlier debates on Polish or Italian immigration, for example. This is why he 
expected the integration of non-European immigrants to follow the same path.
However, this narrative has been questioned by accounts that underline the spe-
cific treatment of postcolonial immigration, as well as the later development of rac-
ist, xenophobic and more recently anti-Muslim discourses in France (Blanchard 
2005; Boubeker 2005; Boubeker and Hajjat 2009). The public debate has very much 
followed a “logic of population” and been framed in terms of “integration”, defined 
on the basis of the French model of citizenship (Brubaker 1998). In this framework, 
extra-European immigration is considered more “problematic” than European 
immigration, including when the arrival of different migrants actually coincided in 
time (as is the case with the Portuguese for example). The differential treatment of 
European and non-European immigrants is thus institutional and systemic, as has 
been shown by the literature on postcolonial immigration and on discriminations 
(see for example De Rudder et al. 2006), and as induced by the process of European 
integration. It is also part of the everyday economic and social life of immigrants, as 
shown in the higher employment rates of European immigrants compared to non- 
Europeans in France (Simon and Steichen 2014). They also tend to occupy different 
jobs: in the construction sector, for example, Portuguese workers are given super-
vising positions, while immigrants from Africa and North Africa are usually 
assigned subaltern tasks (Jounin 2009). This is symptomatic of the privileged posi-
tion of European immigrants in France compared to other immigrants, and of the 
progressive invisibilizing of these immigrants (Cordeiro 1999).
We argue that political debates on intra-European immigration, while singling 
out Eastern Europeans, have reinforced this dynamic and made Southern European 
immigration even less visible. Most policies and debates in the last decades con-
tinue to target extra-European immigrants. However, economic concerns and com-
petition in the labour market were also part of these debates, as is visible in 
campaigns of the extreme-right Front National against immigration. In the 2000s 
and 2010s, both before and after the crisis, these concerns also affected the debate 
on intra-European migration. European migrants came to the fore on various occa-
sions and mostly in relation to debates on the EU’s enlargement and to the question 
of social protection and rights for workers.
8.3.2  Controlling the Access to the Labour Market 
in a Context of Free Movement
One of the ways in which intra-European immigration was favoured in France was 
through European integration. As early as 1957, the Treaty of Rome introduced the 
idea of a free movement of people, more specifically of workers, between European 
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countries. However, the construction and implementation of free movement was 
progressive: the national legal norms transposing this right were only elaborated at 
the end of the 1960s (right of establishment of workers and their families, coordina-
tion of social security regimes…) and discriminations towards workers from 
Member States persisted until the 1990s (Rodier 2001; Math 2004). Despite this, 
limitations on social security or pension benefits, as well as most limitations on 
access to some occupations (for civil service for example) were progressively 
removed.
As a result, the labour markets of member States became almost completely 
open to nationals of other Member States. However political moves were made to 
protect national labour markets, particularly at the time of every EU enlargement. 
Higher salary and social protection levels in “older” Member States were often seen 
as overly attractive to workers of “new” Member States, whose citizens would then 
constitute unfair competition for national workers. This led to the adoption of so- 
called “transitional periods” for new Member States, during which migrants coming 
from these countries benefited from free movement, but could not directly take up 
salaried work and had to ask for a provisional authorisation to do so. In 1986, France 
introduced the maximum transitional period for Spanish and Portuguese workers 
limiting their access to the French labour market for 7 years. During the recent 
enlargements towards Central and Eastern Europe, France introduced a transitional 
period of 5 years, later reduced to four, for EU8 members states (May 2004–
June2008),6 7 years, the maximum authorized duration, for Romania and Bulgaria 
(January 2007–December 2013) and 2 years for Croatia (July 2013–June 2015).
This meant that the European Union was not a two-tier system distinguishing 
between EU nationals and non-EU nationals (or third country nationals), but rather 
a variable geometry system of borders for protecting national labour markets. In fact 
the system is three-tier: “ethnic migrants” from outside the EU are considered the 
most visible and raise concerns about integration and multiculturalism, while “free 
movers” or “Eurostars”, as nationals of pre-2004 Member States, enjoy freedom of 
movement and establishment since a long time. “East-West migrants” from the 
Member States having accessed the EU in the 2000s, fall in between these two cat-
egories: while they enjoy the freedom of circulation, and are given the freedom to 
work in all EU Member States after the end of the transitional period, they are still 
considered as “immigrants” rather than “free movers” (Favell 2009). In spite of the 
transitional period of new Member States coming to an end, the political debate on 
intra-EU immigration and the labour market has remained very much focused on 
nationals from these States, even though Romania came in third position as an 
immigration-sending country to France in the recent period, after Portugal and the 
UK, and Poland in eighth position, way behind Spain, Italy or Germany (see 
Sect. 8.2.2).
This focus has been particularly visible in two recent debates. First, the debate on 
the non-French Roma population culminated in 2010, when the French President, 
6 Among the 2004 accession countries, Malta and Cyprus were not covered by the temporary 
restrictions.
T. Eremenko et al.
141
Nicolas Sarkozy, announced the dismantling of camps and squats, and the 
 deportation of their foreign inhabitants to their origin countries within the 
EU. Although this policy was influenced by a long history of institutional racism 
towards the Roma in France, it also raised an array of arguments relating to free 
movement and the differences in social protection systems in the EU. Second, the 
debate on the Directive on services, also known as the “Bolkestein directive”, 
addressed the issue of posted workers prior to the 2008 economic crisis and re-
emerged in recent years. In both instances, in spite of their focus on Eastern 
Europeans, political debates contributed to shaping political discourses as well as 
policies towards intra- European immigration and as such have had an impact on 
policies regarding Southern European immigration.
8.3.3  Anti-Roma Feeling and the Issue of Social Protection 
in the French Debate on Intra-European Migration
In 2010 the debate over Roma presence in France and the circulation of Roma 
EU-citizens within the European Union made the headlines in France and abroad. 
Indeed, after a gendarme killed a young French Roma and the following attack of a 
police station by dozens of armed French Roma, Nicolas Sarkozy, then President of 
the country, announced the dismantling of 300 illegal camps and squats within 3 
months.7 He also declared that those found to be living in France “illegally” would 
be sent back home. His speech particularly targeted Romanian and Bulgarian Roma, 
who had already been victims of France’s quantitative objectives for deportations in 
the previous years. However, this announcement, by singling out a population along 
ethnic lines and by publicizing the deportation of EU citizens, attracted harsh criti-
cisms. EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding took a stand against these deporta-
tions, and the European Commission warned France that it had two weeks to 
implement the 2004 EU directive on freedom of movement or it would face an 
infringement procedure. Although the Commission did not pursue an infringement 
procedure, Viviane Reding deplored the fact that some policies appeared to target 
and single out Roma populations, thus violating EU anti-discrimination directives 
as well as the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Although anti-Roma feeling is not new, national and local policies have exacer-
bated it in the recent years (Fassin et al. 2014). The existence of a form of “welfare 
tourism” has been one of the central arguments to justify these policies, particularly 
the deportation of Roma citizens back to Romania and Bulgaria (Nacu 2012).
Despite the fact that the EU Directive on free movement stipulates that recourse 
to social assistance cannot be a valid ground for expelling an EU national, French 
law allows the expulsion of EU nationals who have the “primary objective of ben-
efitting from the social assistance system” (Dimitrova 2013). Thus, following a 
7 Nicolas Sarkozy, Speech in Grenoble, 30 July 2010.
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period of opening access to social protection (see Sect. 8.2.2), restrictive conditions 
were reintroduced for some social benefits prior to the first EU enlargement towards 
Central and Eastern Europe: the Revenu Minimal d’Insertion (RMI) (or RSA, 
Revenu de Solidarité Active since 2008), as well as the allocation for single parents 
(API) and for the handicapped (AAH), which all include requirements of a mini-
mum period of residence before they can be claimed. Although many of these 
changes and debates mostly concern extra-European immigrants, their timing sug-
gests that they also targeted intra-EU immigration. The selective implementation of 
certain provisions also shows that specific groups of migrants were targeted. For 
example, the conditions to claim family benefits were modified in 2012 to include a 
provision stating that persons having been the object of an official prefectural deci-
sion (deportation, non-renewal of residence permit for nationals with a transitional 
regime, beneficiaries of a financial aid in the case of return to country of origin) 
could not benefit from them (Demagny and Math 2014). Prior to this change, expul-
sions of EU nationals with insufficient resources had been disproportionately exer-
cised against Romanian nationals (European Parliament 2009), who were therefore 
the most likely to be concerned by this condition. However, these changes are, in 
principle, for all EU migrants in France, and the restrictions on access to social 
revenues affect all of them.
8.3.4  From the “Polish plumber” to Posted Workers: 
The French Debate on the “Bolkestein Directive”
As was described earlier in this chapter, an increasing number of EU nationals, 
particularly Southern Europeans, are coming to work in France as posted workers. 
These workers did not attract much attention at first (the first EU directive regulat-
ing their movement dates back to 1996) as their status was considered a quite tech-
nical issue, and mostly of interest for trade unions, labour inspections and lawyers. 
However, posted workers surprisingly became the centre of a heated debate in 
France in 2004 and 2005 after the European Commission issued a proposal for a 
Directive on services in the internal market, also known as the “Bolkestein Directive” 
(after Commissioner Frits Bolkestein). After the proposal was amended, the issue of 
posted workers once again “disappeared”, although some cases of postings made 
the headlines on a periodical basis. However with the rise of posted workers in the 
context of the current economic crisis, this issue came once again at the forefront of 
debates regarding social and economic EU policies.
Within the more general framework of the Directive 96/71/EC on the posting of 
workers the Bolkestein Directive aimed at reducing national regulations on the pro-
vision of services. First, it provided a framework to facilitate the permanent estab-
lishment of foreign services providers in another Member State (this point was not 
particularly central in the debates). Second, through the “country of origin princi-
ple”, the proposal aimed at facilitating the free movement of workers on a tempo-
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rary basis (Grossman and Woll 2011). This point proved particularly difficult to 
articulate with the protections offered by the existing 1996 directive. In particular, 
by “abolishing many administrative regulations and obligations for posting workers 
abroad, as well as transferring the competence for controls to the country of origin, 
the draft Services Directive was to create a de facto situation in which controls on 
labour law would have been even more difficult than they already were”. The “coun-
try of origin” principle also implied “that a services provider who crosses the border 
to offer a service in another EU country has to abide solely by the rules of its 
Member State of origin, i.e., where it is formally established” (Crespy 2010: 1255).
The “country of origin” principle raised debates and mobilisations in various 
Member States (culminating in a march of almost 100,000 people in Brussels in 
March 2005 to protest against the directive), but nowhere as intense as in France. 
The French outrage over the Bolkestein directive and the country of origin rule can-
not be understood without a closer look at the timing of the debate. Indeed, the 
Bolkestein directive provided opponents to European enlargement and integration 
with ammunition to bolster their position. In 2004, the Eastern enlargement round 
and its consequences – a more unequal European economic area – dominated dis-
cussions on Europe. Enlargement, as well as discussions for the potential accession 
of Turkey, made many weary of the competition of workers from new Member 
States. Moreover, in 2005, the European Constitutional Treaty, which was ulti-
mately rejected by referendum in France was central to French political debates. In 
this context, the Bolkestein proposal was turned into the symbol of the tensions 
between the EU as an economic, market-oriented project on the one hand, and the 
idea of a “social Europe” on the other.
The figure of the “Polish plumber” came to embody the fears related to the direc-
tive on services and the enlargement. After Philippe de Villiers, the head of the 
right-wing party Mouvement pour la France, used this image in a speech against the 
directive in March 2005, it became very popular, including in other European coun-
tries – although the Germans were more concerned about butchers (Nicolaïdis and 
Schmidt 2007; Grossman and Woll 2011). The idea behind this figure was that 
workers from new Member States, with less stringent labour regulations, would 
come to work in older Member States and constitute a form of “social dumping” 
and thus unfair competition (Crespy 2010). However, the use of this image shows 
that fears about the directive on services were not only about the content of the 
directive, but also about the ongoing enlargement process. In the end, European 
governments revised the draft directive, suppressing the country of origin principle, 
but replacing it with a very similar article. It forbids protectionist barriers on the 
provision of services, unless they are non-discriminatory, justified by public interest 
and proportionate.
Thus, despite the initial opposition to the directive, it was nevertheless adopted, 
although in a slightly watered-down version, and the issue of posted workers has 
regularly reappeared in the French public debate ever since. Before the 2014 
European elections, for example, extreme-right and extreme-left parties brought the 
issue of the misuse of posting to the forefront of debates (Balbastre 2014; Gatinois 
2014). During a strike of truck drivers in March 2015 the French media covered the 
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misuse of posted workers by transportation companies based in Central and Eastern 
European countries. A recent trial regarding the misuse of Romanian and Bulgarian 
posted workers for the construction of a nuclear reactor between 2008 and 2011 also 
attracted national coverage. All these events have sustained a European and national 
political attention on this issue.8 The Court of Auditors, the institution controlling 
State finances in France, has singled out fraud in the use of posted workers, and 
estimated the amount of foregone contributions to 380 million Euro (Cour des 
Comptes 2014). After the adoption of an EU directive facilitating the control of 
posted workers in 2014,9 these possibilities were rapidly transposed into French 
legal norms10 to fight against unfair competition (CNLTI 2015). These laws increase 
the legal and regulatory provisions in the fight against the misuse of the system 
(administrative sanctions in case of non declaration of posting, blacklisting of firms 
convicted, extension of the right of action of trade unions and professional organiza-
tions, solidarity of developers and project managers). There is also an important 
reorganization of the control mechanisms for identifying and pursuing frauds con-
cerned with this system (greater coordination between different ministries in charge 
and development of joint controls by multiple institutions such as police, labour 
inspectors, customs; special monitoring service dealing with complex frauds).
8.3.5  Invisible Southern European Migrants?
Despite their growing numbers in France, Southern Europeans have been relatively 
absent from recent debates on EU mobility in France, which have on the contrary 
mainly focused on Central and Eastern European immigration from the most recent 
Member States. This situation has had contrary effects on the situation of Southern 
Europeans.
On the one hand, the changes in the legislation regarding access to the labour 
market, access to social benefits, the regulation of posted workers, now affect all 
European immigrants, including Southern Europeans, for better or for worse. The 
on-going debates on the access to the social security system, though not primarily 
8 Government reports mention the dangers of posted workers. See for example Le Guen (2005) for 
the use of posted workers in the agricultural sector. The Commission of European Affairs of the 
National Assembly (Grommerch 2011) and of the Senate (Bocquet 2013) also turned their atten-
tion to this issue and were both concerned with improving the regulation and control of posted 
work.
9 Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the 
enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation 
through the Internal Market Information System (‘the IMI Regulation’).
10 Loi n° 2014–790 du 10 juillet 2014 visant à lutter contre la concurrence sociale déloyale (also 
called “Loi Savary”). The recent Loi n° 2015–990 du 6 août 2015 pour la croissance, l’activité et 
l’égalité des chances économiques (also called “Loi Macron”) also includes provisions on this 
topic.
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directed at Southern European migrants also concern them. The complexity of the 
administrative procedures and conditions to access certain social benefits (Demagny 
and Math 2014) and the increased risks of unemployment in the context of the cur-
rent economic crisis, result in some of them having difficults in fulfilling residence 
requirements in France (Le Progrès 2014). The posted worker regime under which 
many of them work also raises questions as to their working conditions and social 
rights. Given the complexity of the status, it may be difficult for these workers and 
their families to access certain social rights, such as unemployment or family ben-
efits, whether in France or in their country of origin.
On the other hand, the focus of debates on Central and Eastern European immi-
gration have contributed to the invisibilizing of Southern European immigrants. 
Indeed one could argue that the visibility of Eastern and Central European migrants 
contributed in a way to the relative political invisibility of Southern European ones. 
However, it is difficult to establish a causal link here. Eastern and Central Europeans 
also generated more debates because they were nationals of the newest Member 
States. Thus these debates are as much related to the enlargement process and the 
growing Eurosceptic sentiment in France as they are to debates on immigration. By 
retracing the differential treatment of Southern European and extra-European immi-
grants in the media and in political debates, we can see how the debates on Central 
and Eastern European immigration fit in the longer-term dynamics of political 
debates on immigration in France.
Indeed, as was described above, debates on immigration in France focus mainly 
on extra-European immigration, and have made intra-European immigration com-
paratively less visible. The rise of debates on Central and Eastern European immi-
gration thus came at a moment when the process of making immigrants from older 
Member States less visible in France was already under way. Thus, in line with 
Adrian Favell’s typology of immigrants (described above in Sect. 8.3.1), their posi-
tion has been intermediate: for a while, this was mainly the consequence of restric-
tions on their freedom to work in other Member States, during the transitional 
period. However, once legal restrictions were lifted, the political debate on intra- 
European immigration continued to focus on Central and Eastern immigrants, in 
spite of the relatively high numbers of Southern European immigrants in France. 
Although the debates and the ensuing restrictions affect all EU immigrants to 
France, the framing of the two debates discussed in this chapter, on posted workers 
and on welfare tourism, also paradoxically contributed to the on-going process that 
made Southern European immigrants less visible in France and thus more accepted 
than other groups of migrants.
8.4  Conclusion
Southern European migration and the entailing issues raised by these flows have not 
emerged in France, contrary to other destination countries analysed in this book 
such as Germany and the UK. Did this situation result from their absence or their 
general acceptance in French society? Our chapter shows that given its economic 
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situation, France indeed did not attract as many Southern European migrants as 
neighbouring countries. In spite of this, we do observe changes in the volumes and 
composition of flows since the start of the economic crisis: a larger number of 
entries of Southern Europeans, new profiles of migrants, such as families with chil-
dren. Moreover, the economic crisis and the more limited opportunities for compa-
nies in Southern Europe, especially in Spain and Portugal, combined with the search 
for cost reduction by companies in France, have supported the growth of the posted 
worker system. Although this system is not new and concerned primarily Eastern 
European workers up until the crisis, the recent increase in numbers of posted work-
ers is partly due to the increased participation of Southern Europeans in this sytem.
Yet, in spite of the growing numbers of Southern European workers in France 
since the beginning of the economic crisis, the political debate has mainly focused 
in France on (1) extra-European immigration; (2) specific categories of intra- 
European immigrants, namely the Roma, as well as posted workers from the newest 
Eastern European Member States. Debates in this respect have mainly concentrated 
on issues of unfair competition on the labour market and “welfare tourism”. While 
the legal and political consequences of these debates affect Southern European 
workers in France, the focus on Eastern Europeans has also contributed to make 
Southern Europeans less visible and their presence even less controversial to the 
eyes of many in France.
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Chapter 9
Gastarbeiter Migration Revisited: 
Consolidating Germany’s Position 
as an Immigration Country
Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels and Jutta Höhne
9.1  Introduction
An emerging trend has solidified after the 2008 economic crisis: Germany is, thanks 
to substantial Southern European migration, once again a key migrant-receiving 
country – and, more importantly, now sees itself as such. Positive net migration 
from Southern Europe was reached in 2010 for the first time since 1996, after 
increases since 2006. This post-crisis flow of EU migrants from Southern Europe to 
Germany bears a strong resemblance to the post-war Gastarbeiter (guest worker) 
migration. Then, however, an economic crisis ended the bi-lateral agreements; 
today, a crisis has re-initiated this migration, albeit a more highly-skilled flow than 
in post-war years. This chapter will argue that the post-crisis migration – and, above 
all, the targeted recruitment which is a key component of that migration – has con-
firmed Germany’s position as an immigration country, not only in Europe, but 
internationally.
This chapter will draw on both quantitative and qualitative data to do so. It will, 
first, review the socio-economic situation in Germany, and, second, look at data 
trends of migration to Germany since 2000, when Germany first declared itself an 
immigration country. Third, the chapter will compare contemporary Southern 
European migration flows to that of post-war Gastarbeiter migration. This section 
will also argue that contemporary migration must be seen against the backdrop of 
other migration flows to Germany – not only Gastarbeiter, but also post-war flows 
of German expellees from Eastern Europe, asylum seekers, flows from the German 
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Democratic Republic and, finally, Aussiedler, or ethnic German migrants from 
Eastern Europe.
Finally, the chapter will turn to contemporary debates over migration. In addition 
to other ongoing migration and refugee flows, these include continuing discussions 
about migrant integration – with Turkish migrants and their children usually the 
focus of that discussion. Above all, however, this chapter argues that the discourse 
in Germany today is that of a consolidated immigration country – one where immi-
gration as a phenomenon is widely accepted, and public discussions over type, pro-
file and number of migrants are part of public debate as they are in the United States, 
Canada or Australia.
9.2  Socio-economic Situation in Germany (2000–2014)
By mid-2008, Germany was among the economies hit hardest by recession. Because 
of the country’s strong export dependency, GDP fell sharply by 5.6 % in 2009, an 
even stronger fall than the average European decline of 4.4 %. As a reaction to the 
crisis, the German Federal Government introduced a set of direct and indirect mea-
sures meant to secure and create employment and other business support instru-
ments (stimulus packages 1 and 2) in November 2008 and January 2009, followed 
by a third programme in December 2009 (Growth Acceleration Act) (Stein and 
Aricò 2010: 571). Recovery set in by late 2009, and in 2010, GDP grew by 4.1 % 
and was back to pre-recession levels by early 2011 (Fig. 9.1).
Although Germany was more severely affected by the global economic down-
turn than most other OECD countries, the unemployment rate rose only modestly 
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Fig. 9.1 GDP growth rates, EU 28 and Germany, 2000–2014 (Source: http://stats.oecd.org)
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between 2008 and 2009. Furthermore, in contrast to the increasing average 
 unemployment within the EU 28, unemployment in Germany has been constantly 
declining since 2009 (Fig. 9.2).
This successful stabilisation of employment in Germany is related to several fac-
tors. Stein and Aricò (2010) note that the crisis primarily affected the manufacturing 
sector, but the loss of full-time jobs in that sector was compensated by the creation 
of part-time jobs in the service sector. A set of measures promoting internal flexibil-
ity within firms, e.g. the use of working-time accounts and reduction in over time, 
were a key reason for the stable levels of employment. Most importantly, regula-
tions for short-time work were extended, i.e. companies had more financial incen-
tives to keep their employees during the crisis (workers accepted a reduction in 
hours and payment, and the state covered up to 70 % of the salary), in order to 
maintain a skilled labour force after the recession (Stein and Aricò 2010: 571; 
Hallerberg 2013: 265).
Despite its comparatively good performance, the German labour market has nev-
ertheless taken a problematic turn: job growth is strongly related to an increase in 
non-standard and precarious employment, a trend which started in the early 1990s. 
Between 1991 and 2012, the number of part-time workers rose from 2.5 to over 5 
million, and the number of employees on fixed-term contracts rose from 2 to 2.7 
million workers. Moreover, there were notable increases in the number of temp 
agency workers and “solo self-employed” (self-employed people who do not have 
employees). The group of so-called “Minijobbers”, i.e. employees working part- 
time and earning less than 450 Euros per month, grew from 0.65 to 2.55 million 
(Schulten and Schulze Buschoff 2015: 1–2).
The increase in atypical employment is in part a consequence of changes in the 
German welfare system – the so-called Hartz reforms. Among other measures, from 
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Fig. 9.2 Unemployment rates, EU 28 and Germany, by age groups (15–24 and 15–64), 2000–
2014 (Data for 2000 and 2001: EU 27. Source: Eurostat Database)
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2005, the comparatively generous unemployment compensation, previously 
 calculated as a function of the last wage, was replaced by a needs-tested low-level 
“flat rate” benefit (Hartz IV) for those still unemployed after 1 year, followed by 
further cuts if an individual rejected a job offer. These reforms, explicitly seeking to 
strengthen market forces – assumed to be the best way to create more growth and 
jobs – resulted in a far-reaching deregulation of the labour market. They did gener-
ate more jobs, but led to an increase in precarious employment and growing social 
insecurity (Bispinck and Schulten 2011: 1).
Nonetheless, the German economic position was comparatively strong, and, 
together with the lack of jobs in Southern Europe, triggered a sharp increase in 
intra-EU migration from 2009. Given the precarious situation in their home coun-
tries, EU migrants often accept precarious forms of employment and jobs for which 
they are overqualified. Migrants are overrepresented among the atypically employed 
(see below).
In recent years, labour force inflow to Germany has also been officially encour-
aged, primarily as a means to address a skills gap (Fachkräftemangel). Even before 
the crisis, this shortage of qualified workers and academic specialists had been iden-
tified as a potential problem in the near future (Dietz and Walwei 2007). To combat 
the shortage of skilled workers, the German government decided in 2008 to facili-
tate labour market access for highly qualified migrants, followed by further compre-
hensive legal provisions in 2012 and 2013 to attract high-skilled work force from 
abroad. The December 2014 analysis on labour shortage by the Federal Employment 
Agency (BA) (BA 2014a) stated that, although there was not a widespread lack of 
skilled workers, there were shortages in a number of professions. The Whitelist 
regulating third-country migration into recognised occupations of August 2014 (BA 
2014b) includes a limited number of technical specialisations, as well as profes-
sions in elderly care, health and nursing. Although detailed future projections are 
difficult, a recent governmental report highlights the key role of migration and 
migrant integration for securing employment and growth in Germany (BMAS 
2015).
9.3  Migration Flows: Trends in Immigration to Germany, 
2000–2013
Since 2000, in contrast to earlier periods, immigration to Germany has been charac-
terised by a strong increase in intra-EU immigration. Between 2000 and 2003, the 
majority of new arrivals still came from non-EU countries. From 2004 on, the 
annual inflow from EU 26 countries, Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Switzerland 
(in the following referred to as EU 26+4) always exceeded the number of new arriv-
als from non-EU member states. The migration statistics data in Table 9.1 show that 
EU 26+4 flows to Germany more than doubled, largely due to increased migration 
from Eastern and Southern EU countries to Germany since 2010. Immigration from 
EU-8 countries increased starting with the 2004 EU enlargement. The absolute 
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annual numbers from Southern European countries, which had been decreasing 
until 2006, slowly recovered from 2007 on, and sharply increased between 2010 
and 2013.
In 2013, citizens from EU 26+4 represented 64 % of all new arrivals in Germany. 
Of the 709,686 EU 26+4 migrants in 2013, 69.3 % came from Central and Eastern 
European countries and 19.9 % from the Southern European countries. In the same 
year, 648,911 non-citizens left the country, among them 419,240 people moving to 
EU 26+4 countries. Balancing arrivals against departures, net migration to Germany 
was 459,160 in 2013. The highest positive balances were registered for citizens 
from Eastern EU.
Between 2000 and 2013, the non-citizen population in Germany grew only mod-
erately. While the numbers of Turkish citizens and citizens of the former Yugoslavia 
declined, data show a clear increase for migrants from Eastern EU countries. 
Numbers of Southern Europeans increased slightly only from 2011 (Table 9.2).
Table 9.1 Immigration to Germany, 2000–2013: influx per year and net migration balance (in 
1000s)
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013
Annual inflow
Southern EU 70.5 56.6 43.1 39.0 43.4 57.1 82.8 117.9 141.1
Eastern EU 154.6 165.7 207.4 228.9 237.3 288.4 396.0 454.2 491.5
Northern/Western 
Europe
67.8 62.6 58.5 60.1 64.1 64.7 69.3 72.5 76.0
EU 26+4 293.1 285.1 309.1 328.2 345.0 410.6 548.8 645.4 709.7
Total immigration 649.2 658.3 602.2 558.5 573.8 683.5 841.7 965.9 1108.1
% EU 26+4 on 
total immigration
45.1 43.3 51.3 58.8 60.1 60.1 65.2 66.8 64.0
Net migration balance
Southern EU −3.3 −16.0 −28.2 −13.5 −14.4 8.3 37.4 68.3 81.7
Eastern EU 33.0 30.5 40.8 61.4 19.9 78.6 158.5 184.7 185.7
Northern/Western 
Europe
11.0 6.3 0.4 13.0 3.3 9.9 18.4 21.4 22.2
EU 26+4 40.8 20.9 13.0 61.0 8.8 97.0 214.7 274.9 290.4
Total immigration 86.5 152.8 55.2 74.7 10.7 153.9 302.9 387.1 459.2
Data: Migration Statistics (Destatis 2014)
Southern EU: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain; Eastern EU: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia; Northern/Western Europe: 
Belgium, Denmark, Finnland, France, Ireland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom; EU 26+4: EU 27 countries, Norway, 
Liechtenstein, Iceland, Switzerland
Migration statistics indicate the number of actual changes of place of residence. Since both arrivals 
to and departures from Germany are registered, it is possible to calculate annual net migration 
 balances
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At the end of 2013, 7.6 million non-citizens lived in Germany. Of these, 1.54 
million were Turkish citizens, 609,855 held Polish passports, 552,943 were Italians, 
and the fourth largest group at 316,331 was Greek.
According to 2013 data, first generation immigrants have been living in Germany 
on average for 22.5 years. The highest averages were recorded for immigrants born 
in Italy (31.2 years), Turkey (28.7 years) and Greece (28.3 years) (BAMF 2015a: 
236). Data show, however, that intra-EU migration in particular no longer necessar-
ily involves the idea of long-term or permanent change of the country of residence. 
Instead, EU freedom of movement and unrestricted return options seem to have 
turned migration into a temporary project. 48.9 % of all non-citizens who left 
Germany in 2013 had stayed for less than 12 months. The share of short-term stays 
was highest among Romanians (59.4 %) and Spaniards (58.4 %). Among the Italians, 
Greeks and Portuguese who left Germany in 2013, between 41.9 % and 44.2 % had 
spent less than 12 months there (BAMF 2015a: 112).
9.3.1  Demographic Overview: 2012
In 2012, 15.3 million people, i.e. 19.1 % of the entire population in Germany, had 
apersonal parental history of migration.1 Of those, 10 million were first- generation 
migrants born abroad, another 5.2 million had at least one parent born abroad, i.e. 
belonged to the second generation. 42.4 % of the migrants and their children were 
foreign nationals. Of the working-age population, 20.6 % were first generation 
migrants or their children. About 1.1 million working-age migrants, i.e. 2 % of the 
15–64 years old men and women, arrived between 2007 and 2012.
Migrants living in Germany differ from the native population in terms of age, 
qualifications, and labour market integration. Overall, migrants are on average 
younger than the German population. For first generation migrants this is not the 
case, however, for Aussiedler and for immigrants born in Northern and Western 
Europe or the former guest worker countries. In terms of labour market perspec-
tives, the age structure among recent migrants has become more favourable: in 
2012, migrants’ average ages varied from 28.6 (new Turkish migrants) to 34.8 (new 
migrants from Western and Northern Europe), indicating that in recent years 
Germany has succeeded in attracting young people.
Levels of formal education are overall higher among native Germans than among 
migrants. The share of unskilled labourers among Turkish and Southern EU citizens 
is well above average, due to the fact that many of them are former guest workers 
who were recruited for low-skilled jobs in the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, 
compared to natives, the share of academics is twice as large among migrants from 
Western and Northern Europe. Migrants from non-EU countries other than specified 
in Tables 9.3 and 9.4 have both more unskilled and more highly skilled. Broken 
1 For more details on this concept, see Sect. 9.5.
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down by field of training, migrants are overall slightly overrepresented in engineer-
ing and technical disciplines.
In recent years, Germany has attracted a younger and more highly skilled work-
force. Of the migrants who have come to Germany since 2007, 29.6 % are highly 
skilled. 32.6 % of the recent Southern EU migrants have a university degree. In the 
latter group, Spaniards have the highest qualifications, regardless of period of 
migration. These data confirm the results of an analysis of the qualification profiles 
of EU nationals living in Germany that was carried out by the Expert Council on 
Integration and Migration. It shows that Germany has profited considerably from 
the freedom of movement in the EU as a result of the better qualified and younger 
migrants – on average 10 years younger (SVR 2013: 17–18).
9.3.2  Labour Market Integration
Table 9.5 shows that migrants are, relatively, in a weaker position in the German 
labour market. While Northern and Western Europeans are well-integrated, all other 
groups, including Southern European migrants, have higher rates of unemployment 
and of atypical jobs. Despite higher-than-average levels of formal education, recent 
migrants, especially from non-EU countries, have even greater difficulties in finding 
Table 9.4 Working-age population resident in Germany by origin, period of immigration and 
level of education, 2012 (percentages)
Total working age population
Recent migrants (year of 
immigration 2007 or later)
Origin
Low- 
skilled
Medium 
skilled
High- 
skilled
Low- 
skilled
Medium  
skilled-
High- 
skilled
Natives 13.53 71.05 15.42
Turkey 67.94 28.25 3.81 61.23 24.93 13.84
Aussiedler 23.62 64.95 11.42 27.81 49.84 22.35
Eastern EU 20.28 60.71 19.01 29.33 51.72 18.95
Southern EU 52.89 37.02 10.09 30.83 36.53 32.63
  Greece 54.23 35.64 10.13 35.23 38.18 26.59
  Italy 55.91 36.06 8.03 31.52 33.67 34.80
  Portugal 58.06 37.90 4.03 45.54 43.85 10.61
  Spain 28.69 43.82 27.50 19.23 34.83 45.95
North/West. Europe 15.05 50.32 34.64 12.15 44.40 43.45
Former Yugoslavia 41.25 52.75 6.00 31.65 52.11 16.24
Other non EU 35.27 41.60 23.12 26.36 37.66 35.98
2nd generation 44.87 49.56 5.57
Total 18.30 66.66 15.05 27.45 42.92 29.63
Source: Microcensus 2012, weighted; own calculations
Low-skilled: primary and lower secondary education (ISCED 0–2), medium-skilled: upper and 
post-secondary education (ISCED 3–4), high-skilled: tertiary education (ISCED 5–6)
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jobs and more often have precarious forms of employment. Recently arrived Italians, 
however, have lower rates of unemployment than their long-resident compatriots, 
thus lowering the overall difference between average unemployment and recent 
migrants’ unemployment.
Occupational attainment,2 however, is much stronger among recent migrants – 
most notably among the Southern Europeans – which hints at a possible trend 
towards polarisation in the sense that the highly-skilled are more successful than 
average, while less qualified newcomers experience more problems than the group 
average. Labour market outcomes of Western and Northern Europeans are, how-
ever, less influenced by length of stay, allowing for the conclusion – strongly 
 supported by the high shares of managers and professionals among them – that it is 
rather the pull factors that attract migrants who have good labour market perspec-
tives from these countries. On the other hand, a high incidence of non-standard 
employment, in particular the high rate of temporary jobs, among the other recent 
migrants highlights the importance of push factors for migration to Germany.
Not reflected in the descriptive data, but uncovered by multivariate analyses, is 
the fact that migrants often work in jobs for which they are overqualified, in 
Germany as well as in many other destination countries (Friedberg 2000; Kogan 
2003; van Tubergen 2006; Chiswick and Miller 2008). In Germany, disadvantages 
in occupational attainment are most pronounced for non-EU migrants, but are also 
substantial for EU-10 and Southern European migrants (Kogan 2011; Fleischmann 
and Höhne 2013; Höhne and Schulze Buschoff 2015).
Poor prospects in the labour market and precarious forms of employment among 
migrants are strongly related to risk of poverty and welfare dependency. Data in 
Table 9.6 show that, due to the relative rates of labour market integration, non-EU 
migrants have the highest rate of living on minimum social security benefits.
Labour market indicators show that many migrant groups are still unemployed at 
higher rates and have more precarious employment conditions than German citi-
zens. Lower education levels play a key role, although part of the gap can also be 
explained by language deficiencies and job-qualification mismatches.
9.4  Southern European Migration to Post-War Germany: 
Gastarbeiter Migration in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s
Today’s Southern European migrants are more highly skilled than the post-war 
Gastarbeiter or guest workers – so called because they were intended to stay only 
for several years. This section will discuss key issues relating to this post-war migra-
tion flow, with the next section moving on to similar discussions today.
2 Occupational attainment is measured by the share of persons working as managers, professionals 
or technicians and associate professionals, classified according to the major ISCO groups.
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Germany became virtually synonymous with Gastarbeiter migration (Castles 
1986; Herbert 2003), although, in European comparison, it was a relative late-comer 
to guest worker recruitment, with Switzerland, Austria and Belgium (see Chap. 7 of 
this volume) having established such schemes some years earlier. Initially, labour 
was not needed in Germany, given eight million Germans expelled from former 
German territories in Eastern Europe (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2002: 116). By 
the mid-1950s, however, the Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) that character-
ised post-war Germany was well under way, and more workers were needed.
The first of a series of bi-lateral labour recruitment agreements was signed 
between Italy and Germany in 1955, while the agreement with Turkey, which became 
Table 9.6 Predominant source of income of 15 to 64-year olds, by origin, 2012 (row percentages)
Total working age population
Employment
Pension, 
unemployment 
benefits (ALG I), 
student education 
grants
Family 
support, 
private 
assets
Basic social security 
and basic 
unemployment benefits 
(SGB XII, “Hartz IV”)
Natives 68.40 9.82 16.76 5.02
Turkey 49.59 10.22 24.95 15.24
Aussiedler 68.20 8.44 15.99 7.38
Eastern EU 65.77 6.95 19.13 8.16
Southern EU 65.75 9.43 17.23 7.59
  Greece 61.88 11.81 17.92 8.39
  Italy 66.06 9.49 15.73 8.71
  Portugal 72.20 6.47 16.46 4.86
  Spain 65.69 6.99 23.47 3.85
North/West. 
Europe
68.95 8.24 19.54 3.27
Former 
Yugoslavia
57.73 14.77 17.84 9.66
Other non EU 51.17 7.80 24.50 16.54
2nd generation 42.34 4.69 45.50 7.48
Total 65.92 9.44 18.53 6.10
Recent migrants (year of immigration 2007 or later)
Turkey 33.33 6.68 46.74 13.25
Aussiedler 44.22 6.24 24.33 25.21
Eastern EU 65.52 3.99 23.74 6.76
Southern EU 59.18 5.90 30.00 4.92
North/West. 
Europe
67.44 8.21 22.83 1.53
Former 
Yugoslavia
46.42 15.99 31.20 6.39
Other non EU 33.18 12.62 40.04 14.16
Source: Microcensus 2012, weighted; own calculations
9 Gastarbeiter Migration Revisited in Germany
162
the most significant, was signed in 1961 (Bpb 2010). In September 1964, Germany 
celebrated with fanfare the arrival of the one millionth Gastarbeiter (Schulze 2014). 
Less than ten years later, recruitment was stopped in 1973, following the interna-
tional oil crisis and worldwide recession. Although migrants and governments alike 
had expected the guest workers to return “home” in 1973, instead, their families 
joined them. A number of migrants did return to their home countries, but the overall 
number of non-German citizens in Germany rose from 3.9 million in 1973 to 4.6 
million in 1980, or 7.4 % of the population (Rühl 2009: 49; OECD 1997: 218). In 
1985, Turkish citizens were the largest non-German citizen group, at 1.4 million, 
followed by those from (the former) Yugoslavia at 590,000, Italy and Greece (OECD 
1997: 227). Spain and Portugal were the seventh and eighth largest nationalities 
(OECD 1997: 227). The non-citizen population continued to grow, in part due to 
continued migration, but also due to a lack of jus soli and low naturalisation among 
non-Germans: children born to non-German citizens did not automatically become 
German citizens until 2000 (retroactive to 1990). Germany was heavily criticized 
until 2000 for its comparatively restrictive – in European comparison – citizenship 
policy and for its explicit statements that it was not a “country of immigration”.
Despite the end of guest worker recruitment in 1973, migration to Germany con-
tinued. Family reunification continued to represent a significant number of incom-
ing migrants. 1992 was a high point of net inflow –782,000 (BAMF 2015a: 12) – but 
exceeded by the 1.1 million net migration in 2015 (Destatis 2016). In addition to 
family reunification, the net inflow in 1992 also included flows directly linked to the 
end of the Cold War, with a large number of asylum-seekers (438,000), and migrants 
who were German citizens – 230,000 Aussiedler, or ethnic German migrants from 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Aussiedler migration was restricted sharply 
starting in 1990 (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2009), and declined to 2400 by 2013 
(BVA 2013). This post-Cold War migration flow was a very particular part of the 
history of migration to Germany.
The primary story of the guest worker migration is the shift from recruitment to 
family reunification in the 1970s and 1980s, when Germany was a “reluctant land 
of immigration” (Martin 2014: 224), and to a self-acknowledged country of immi-
gration in 2000. Germany’s historical reluctance to embrace migration is the back-
drop to the more enthusiastic recruitment of Southern European migrant workers 
today.
9.5  Debates in the Twenty-First Century
9.5.1  Integration
The current recruitment of Southern Europeans cannot thus be seen in isolation, but 
must be examined against the backdrop of the ongoing discussions of about the 
integration of post-war migrants and their children. When Gastarbeiter recruitment 
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ended in 1973, the era of family reunification, and with it the integration of 
Ausländer, or foreigners, started, albeit in fits and starts – illustrated by an examina-
tion of the evolution of the terminology used to refer to non-German citizens living 
in Germany. A succession of terms has been used and discarded, reflecting the 
evolving discussion on integration and demonstrating the shift from “reluctant land 
of immigration” to confirmed immigration country. Over time, the term Gastarbeiter 
became seen as inaccurate and even offensive, given the clear settlement of migrants 
in Germany. It was far less common by the early 1980s and was last used in 
Bundestag documents in 1994.
Government documents and speeches shifted as early as 1976 to the use of the 
term Ausländer – many of whom were born in Germany. This term gradually 
became the predominant term, and remained so until the late 1990s. Ausländische 
Mitbürger, or “foreign fellow citizens” (Boehm 1999), first used by German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1987 (Bundesregierung 1987), expressed these indi-
viduals’ formal non-citizen status, yet captured their social inclusion.
Although ausländische Mitbürger is still used, above all by municipalities, 
together with Zuwanderer, or migrants, the current predominant term is the unwieldy 
phrase Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund (“people with a migratory back-
ground”; perhaps best translated as “individuals of migrant origin”). It was first 
used in the 2005 Microcensus, when this group was first defined to include both citi-
zens and non-citizens, referring to any person born outside of Germany after 1949, 
or born in Germany to at least one parent who was him- or herself born abroad. It 
thus – significantly – includes both individuals of non-German origin as well as 
Aussiedler – ethnic German migrants – and their children (Destatis 2013: 6). This 
term includes all of those who have migrated to Germany, whether German or non- 
German, representing a significant step forward in the inclusion of migrants and 
their offspring.
Despite Germany’s clear shift to seeing itself as an immigration country, there 
are, as in all immigration countries, still challenges. In 2014 and 2015, there were in 
Germany, as across Europe, protests against so-called Islamisation, led in Germany 
by Pegida (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, or 
Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West) (Spiegel Online 2014b; 
Braden et al. 2015). At nearly every protest, counter-protestors outnumbered the 
Pegida supporters. Nonetheless, Dresden’s high-tech industry was concerned that 
Pegida protests might deter their much-needed foreign highly skilled workers 
(El-Sharif and Schultz 2015). Chancellor Merkel clearly condemned the demonstra-
tions in her 2015 New Year address, noting that migration “benefits us all” 
(Bundesregierung 2014). Germany’s status as an immigration country was, once 
again, clearly acknowledged and supported by the Chancellor. Germany is also the 
largest receiving country in Europe for Syrian refugees, with clear leadership from 
Chancellor Merkel, despite some opposition. In addition to over 200,000 asylum- 
seekers who filed a claim in Germany in 2014 (BAMF 2015b) and nearly 500,000 in 
2015 (BAMF 2015d), Germany led the EU response to Syrians in 2015, accepting 
31,000 of the 120,000 to be re-located within Europe (BMI 2015) and accepting 
30,000 Syrian refugees from first countries of asylum; nearly two-thirds of the 
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 overall European pledge (UNHCR 2015). In short, Germany, like the classic immi-
gration countries United States, Canada and Australia, has clear family, labour and 
humanitarian streams of migration.
9.5.2  Country of Immigration
German politicians famously stated for many years that Germany was “not a coun-
try of immigration.” A turning point was the Independent Migration Commission’s 
2001 report which noted that “Germany is, in point of fact, a country of immigra-
tion” (Unabhängige Kommission “Zuwanderung” 2001: 1).
This statement reified what had been strongly indicated in 2000 by the passage 
of a heavily revised Citizenship Act introducing jus soli. Following this Act, chil-
dren born in Germany to non-citizen parents, at least one of whom had lived for at 
least 8 years in Germany, received German citizenship at birth. Although naturalisa-
tion had long been possible in Germany, and was facilitated in 1990, 1993 and 2000, 
it often required relinquishing the original citizenship (after 2000 only in about 
50 % of the cases), which was shown to be one factor inhibiting naturalisation for 
non-EU citizens (Böcker and Thränhardt 2006). Taking effect 1 January 2005, a 
new Immigration Law was another important step in Germany’s transition to an 
immigration country. The Immigration Law effectively introduced highly skilled 
migration, which became regulated by law, rather than government ordinances such 
as the Green Card.
There remain significant concerns within Germany about the poorer-than- 
wished-for integration of Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund, as discussed in 
Sect. 9.3 above. Their chances of achieving higher education, work commensurate 
with their education, and employment overall remain lower than those of their 
native German peers (see Tables 9.5 and 9.6), although numerous policies and pro-
grammes are undertaken to address these shortcomings. In 2006, Chancellor Angela 
Merkel developed a National Integration Plan and introduced the annual 
Integrationsgipfel, or Integration Summit. Dismissed by some as “nothing more 
than Kaffeeklatsch” (Conrad 2005), others promoted the event while Chancellor 
Merkel noted that previously disregarded but important issues had been raised 
(Conrad 2005).
Recent German government policy vis-à-vis those of migrant origin – recent 
migrants, long-term residents and their children – is markedly and explicitly more 
inclusive than at any point in post-war German history. Chancellor Merkel’s 2013 
statement “It is not enough to be a country with a high migration rate; we also have 
to become a country of integration” (Die Welt 2013a) is illustrative. Challenges – 
perhaps even the hallmark of an immigration country – remain, such as opposition 
in some quarters over welcoming nearly 500,000 asylum-seekers in 2015, but they 
are recognised and steps are taken to address them.
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9.5.3  Post-Accession Migration
Post-accession migration from Eastern and Central Europe has been significant (see 
Table 9.1), despite restrictions placed on EU-8 migration until 1 May 2011. Above 
all, the migration of Romanian and Bulgarian citizens to Germany, whose freedom 
of movement restrictions expired on 1 January 2014, raised the question of so-called 
“welfare migration” or “poverty migration” – the claim that individuals migrated to 
Germany only to claim benefits. The Institute for Employment Research found that 
only a minority of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants in Germany were claiming 
child benefits (16.7 %) (Spiegel Online 2014a), yet widespread impressions of 
exploitation of the system remained.
Municipalities in Germany were permitted to place restrictions on access to 
Hartz IV social assistance, a decision contested by a Romanian woman. The case 
was heard before the European Court of Justice, which decided that EU citizens did 
not have a right to social assistance during the first 3 months of their stay in another 
EU country and that countries may deny social assistance to EU citizens who move 
for the sole purpose of acquiring that assistance (Spiegel Online 2014c; Curia 2014). 
The deregulation undertaken prior to increased net migration thus continued. The 
decision does not affect EU citizens who have never worked in Germany nor those 
who come to Germany to work.
The post-accession migration, coupled with ongoing discussions about integrat-
ing the children and grandchildren of the post-war Gastarbeiter and later refugees 
and other migrants, is another element of the context in which contemporary 
Southern European migration must be seen.
9.5.4  Highly Skilled Migration in Germany
Post-war Gastarbeiter migration was the result of bi-lateral national-level recruit-
ment of low-skilled individuals, needed in the booming post-war economy. The 
more recent shift toward the recruitment of highly skilled migrants – whether EU 
citizens or not – can be traced back to concern which emerged in the 1990s over the 
Fachkräftemangel particularly in the IT industry (Neubecker 2014). Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder’s unexpected announcement at the 2000 computer fair CeBIT that 
a programme to cover a labour shortage for IT workers, the so-called Green Card,3 
would be implemented immediately (Astheimer 2010), was the first policy reflec-
tion of this concern. The CeBIT announcement sparked debate, sometimes rancor-
ous, as to whether further immigration to Germany was needed, but the Green Card 
was implemented (Spiegel Online 2000), just as Germany was shifting to a 
3 The programme’s name can be assumed to have been intended to invoke the immigration culture 
of the United States, but it is a misnomer – the Green Card in the United States is the identification 
of the permanent resident; the H1-B visa would be the equivalent (Kolb 2005).
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self-recognition as an immigration country. The concern over lack of skilled work-
ers continues to be reflected today in recruitment from Southern Europe and 
further.
Nearly 15,000 non-EU nationals (primarily Indians, Russians and Romanians) 
took advantage of the Green Card programme by mid-2004, a number acclaimed by 
some, but which prompted others to call it a failure – not all 20,000 annual spots 
were filled (Kolb 2005, Creutzberg 2013). Above all, however, the programme re- 
introduced the argument that immigration could be a positive force in Germany 
(Astheimer 2010) and led to positive debate on the need to reform immigration in 
Germany (Kolb 2005). Although intended for Third Country Nationals, not EU citi-
zens, and later subsumed into the Immigration Law passed in 2004, the Green Card 
played a key role in indicating both the willingness of Germany to recruit skilled 
workers as well as demonstrating the needs of the economy.
9.5.4.1  New Recruitment of Southern Europeans in Germany
Young Southern European engineers, healthcare workers and others, many of whom 
do not have further training opportunities at home, are explicitly recruited to fill the 
need for trained labour in a range of professions, thus both providing labour in 
Germany and gaining skills which could be brought back home. This post-crisis 
migration could thus be characterised as having elements of migration and develop-
ment.4 Whether they are able to find commensurate employment in their home 
countries, effectively applying their new training, remains to be seen.
The positive net migration flow from Southern Europe continues, although it is 
considerably smaller than that of Eastern EU countries (141,000 compared to 
491,000; see Table 9.1). This migration flow was widely praised for bringing in 
skilled workers, but it also led to the discussion of access to social welfare with 
respect to Southern Europeans; access to basic social assistance – Hartz IV – was 
restricted first for Greeks, Portuguese and Spaniards before the restriction was 
extended to EU-10 migrants. As the Federal Labour Ministry said, “We want immi-
gration of skilled workers, not immigration into the social system” (Wisdorff 2012). 
The large-scale public debate, however, only emerged strongly with respect to 
EU-10 migrants.
If there is debate about these “model migrants” from Southern Europe (Böcking 
2014), then it is that their migration and integration is seen through the lens of the 
ongoing challenges of integrating the previous waves of migrants (Astheimer 2012). 
As then-Integration Representative Maria Böhmer said, “We must learn from the 
mistakes of the past. … People must feel accepted here. That all belongs to a wel-
coming culture” (Toprak et al. 2012). Although, overall, the government’s tone has 
been a welcoming one, shortcomings in helping migrants to learn German and settle 
4 Migration and development refers to the positive impacts that migration can have upon a sending 
country, here, migrants returning with additional skills. May also refer to remittances or transfer of 
knowledge.
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in have been acknowledged, and improved mechanisms put in place (Spiegel Online 
2014d). In contrast to the post-war flow, it is hoped – by firms and by the 
 government – that these migrants will stay (Kreuzmann and Nienhaus 2013). This 
double recognition – that these highly skilled Southern European migrants are a 
positive force for the German economy and society, and that a top-down positive, 
and long- term, context of reception is crucial for successful integration – is very 
significant in Germany’s still relatively recent position as an immigration country. 
Even so, recruitment is still not yet at the levels the government aims to achieve.
Recruitment occurs on many levels, ranging from the employers themselves to 
the Federal Employment Agency. Some rely on their own personal contacts, as one 
owner of a home health care service with 40 employees does (Siems 2014). Another 
employer, having difficulty in finding apprentices, spoke with the local chamber of 
commerce while on vacation in Mallorca, which led to ever-increasing placements 
of young Spaniards in his construction firm (Bast 2013). Nor is recruitment only 
from the German side; sending-country middlemen, themselves previously unem-
ployed, have emerged, pairing job-seekers with employment in Germany (Die Welt 
2012). Above all, however, recruitment has been coordinated by regions, munici-
palities, chambers of commerce, professional associations and by the Federal 
Employment Agency, all of which attend job fairs in Southern Europe. This recruit-
ment serves a real need in Germany, which recognises that demographic change will 
require more workers, as noted in the government-sponsored “Make it in Germany” 
webpage (Make it in Germany n.d.).
9.5.4.2  Facilitation of Employment
In recognition of both the current lack of skilled workers and the future demo-
graphic need, the German Federal government as well as several EU programmes 
have considerably facilitated the migration of young Southern Europeans and their 
recruitment by German firms.
The Federal Recognition Act (Anerkennungsgesetz), taking effect in 2012, 
sought to simplify the recognition procedure of certain foreign qualifications 
(OECD 2014: 74). While EU citizens enjoy freedom of movement within the EU, 
their qualifications often do not travel as freely, with the result that Spanish “doctors 
may exist as taxi drivers or qualified technicians slave away as laborers” (Siems 
2014). The Act sought to facilitate these recognitions (BGBl 2011). The professions 
affected fell under the federal states’ competence; by mid-2014, laws had been put 
into place in all 16 states (BMBF 2014: 24–25, Anerkennung in Deutschland). The 
Act was criticised by the Expert Council on Migration and Integration for not 
including more professions and for not having wholly addressed the complexity of 
recognition of qualifications (Flohr and Popp 2013), yet prior to the law, it took a 
doctor’s qualifications 13 months, on average, to be recognised, while the Act posits 
a maximum of three (Peters 2013). The government’s initial report on the Act noted, 
moreover, that “With the Federal Recognition Act, the Federal Government created 
for the first time a general right to have the equivalence of a foreign qualification 
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with a German referential profession assessed” (BMBF 2014: 6). The process of the 
recognition of qualifications as well as language training is financed by the German 
Federal Government (OECD 2014: 9).
The Federal Employment Agency, in conjunction with the Federal Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs, has established the programme MobiPro EU, which 
seeks to attract young EU citizens to Germany. Of applicants in 2013, 60 % were 
Spaniards (RKW 2013, p. 4). The programme, started in 2013 and scheduled to run 
through 2018, and its website – Job of My Life5 – seeks to promote “vocational 
mobility of young EU citizens in the European labour market … to contribute to a 
reduction in youth unemployment in Europe and to obtain and secure skilled work-
ers in Germany” (BMAS 2014, no pagination). The programme covers German 
language training in the home country, an introductory internship in Germany and 
further language training – since increased – among other benefits (BMAS 2014; 
Böcking 2014). Effort is made, both on the German and migrant side, to achieve 
success in these migrations. As one migrant said, “We have two apprenticeships” – 
language training and the actual training – (Böcking 2014).
It is unclear how many of the Southern European migrants have been recruited or 
have spontaneously migrated; exact records are not kept (SVR 2013: 95). The same 
mechanism which facilitates recruitment by German regions, cities, companies and 
trade and industry chambers, namely the free movement of workers within the EU, 
also facilitates spontaneous migration.
9.5.4.3  Highly Skilled and Low Skilled Migration Alike
Although the post-2007 Southern European migrants are, on average, both more 
highly skilled than their post-war brethren and native Germans (see Table 9.4), 
those who have primary education do still make up around one-third of the total. For 
those individuals, also affected by high unemployment in their sending countries, 
Germany may not represent a more stable situation. As noted above (see Sect. 9.3), 
the labour market success of recent migrants in Germany is uneven, with skilled 
migrants achieving well, but the low-skilled considerably less so. Indeed, sociolo-
gist Tsianos calls the unstable, low-paid employment in restaurants “a precarious 
form of EU citizens’ labour mobility” (Die Welt 2013b, no pagination).
As noted above (Sect. 9.3), de-skilling plays some role for Southern Europeans 
(Siems 2014). Indeed, the highly-skilled and others may be working far below their 
skill level, pursuing additional degrees or working as au pairs, as one Spanish bio-
chemist chose to do, as a “way to learn the language and then look for a job in 
Germany as a teacher or in a research lab” (FAZ 2012, no pagination). The young 
man profiled in that 2012 story went on to work at his skill level – as a researcher in 
the chemical industry – after his current employer read the newspaper story 
(Petersdorff 2013). At the same time, there is concern, particularly in Italy, over so- 
5 https://www.thejobofmylife.de/en/home.html
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called brain drain; a higher proportion of the migrants have tertiary education than 
the general Italian population (Bremer 2013; see also Chap. 4 of this volume).
9.6  Conclusion
The new Southern European migration to Germany emerges strongly from 
Germany’s awareness of a need for migrant labour and an acceptance – and embrac-
ing – of its status as an immigration country. The backdrop to this migration is the 
ongoing integration of post-war guest workers and their descendants, increasingly 
explicitly addressed and facilitated. It can also be seen in the context of what might 
be called migration and development vis-à-vis Southern Europe. In 2012, Southern 
European countries became net remittance-receiving countries for the first time in 
10 years, indicating that Southern Europeans in Germany and elsewhere are sending 
money home. Overall, 18 billion US dollars were sent out of Germany worldwide 
in 2012 (Weingartner 2013).
It is clear that a new era of recruited Southern European migration to Germany is 
well underway, inevitably inviting comparisons with the post-war Gastarbeiter 
migration. In 2013, Germany became the most important receiving country within 
the European Union for internal European migration; one-third of all internal EU 
migrants went to Germany in 2013 (OECD 2014: 13 and 23). Thanks in part to this 
migration, in 2013, Germany became the OECD country with the second-largest 
absolute number of migrants, second only to the United States (OECD 2014: 19). 
Numerically, as well as philosophically, Germany is a consolidated immigration 
country.
Nor does the migration from Southern Europe show any signs of slowing down; 
rather, further recruitment is encouraged by the government. Whether the migration 
remains a largely circular one or shifts to permanent migration is as yet unclear, 
although it may be assumed that some portion will remain in Germany. What is also 
unclear is how the motivating factors of migration (see Chaps. 3, 4, 5, and 6, this 
volume) and the substantial and increasing labour needs of Germany interact. Above 
all, from a German perspective, the new Southern European migration is seen in a 
context of demographic change and foreseeable ongoing labour shortages: 
“Immigrants are not a threat, but a chance for Germany. Demographic change will 
promote a rethinking over the next few years” (Borstel 2012).
With its recruitment of highly-skilled workers, today’s migration to Germany is 
remarkably similar to that of classic immigration countries such as the United 
States, Canada and Australia. As in all immigration countries, debates – at times 
heated and politically divisive – remain over elements of migration, such as undocu-
mented migration or arrival of asylum seekers, and will continue to do so. In 
Germany, the debate about “welfare migrants”, as opposed to highly skilled young 
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Southern Europeans, remains, as does passionate discussion over asylum seekers. 
Fundamentally, however, it can be said that Germany hopes that migration, particu-
larly from Southern Europe, will continue, and considerable effort and resources 
have been put into ensuring its continuation.
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 Chapter 10 
 UK: Large-Scale European Migration 
and the Challenge to EU Free Movement 
 Alessio  D’Angelo and  Eleonore  Kofman 
10.1  Introduction 
 International migration to the UK in the post-war years had typically concerned 
post-colonial migrants and then, in the 1990s, asylum seekers: both groups were 
third country nationals. Although there had been immigration of displaced people 
from Eastern Europe in the 1940s, and some sizeable fl ows of Italian workers in the 
1950s–1960s, there was no equivalent of the guest worker fl ows in continental 
Europe. European immigration grew steadily in the 1980s and 1990s. Nonetheless 
it only became visible and a major political issue following Eastern enlargement of 
the EU in 2004 and the UK’s opening up without a transitionary period as in most 
other states. Hostility to immigration has always been present, even when levels 
were relatively low (Park et al. 2012), but the large-scale post accession migration 
has once again pushed immigration to the top of the agenda, bolstered by the emer-
gence of a far right party – the UK Independence Party – portrayed as respectable 
unlike the earlier British National Party. 
 In this chapter we argue that Eastern European migration has reframed the debate 
on migration in the UK and led to calls for restrictions on free movement and access 
to welfare. As Southern European immigration grew, it began to be targeted and 
used as grounds for restrictions towards EU free movement. We also ask to what 
extent the recent arrivals from Southern Europe resemble the Eastern European 
migrants of the early 2000s, who were young and fi lled labour demand in less 
skilled occupations, often in areas and regions which had not experienced signifi -
cant immigration in the last few decades. 
 In the fi rst section we set out the current socio-economic situation which, though 
with higher levels of unemployment than during the boom years, has continued to 
be based on a demand for migrants. We then outline the migratory dynamics and 
 A.  D’Angelo (*) •  E.  Kofman 
 Social Policy Research Centre ,  Middlesex University ,  London ,  UK 
 e-mail: A.Dangelo@mdx.ac.uk 
176
socio-demographic characteristics of Eastern European and, particularly, Southern 
European fl ows. In the second part we turn to the debates that have emerged as a 
result of the changing migratory landscape and the implications this will have for 
the new and highly educated Southern European migrants who have been increas-
ingly attracted to the UK as the economic crisis hits their own countries. 
10.2  Socio-economic Situation of the Country 
 A few months after the start of the recession in 2008, UK unemployment started to 
rise sharply. When the global fi nancial crisis hit, the unemployment rate was a little 
over 5 % or 1.6 million. However, in 2009, it reached 7.5 %, to then peak at 8.1 % in 
2011. This was the highest level since the early 1990s – but still about 2 percentage 
points below the European average. The economy has improved since 2012 and the 
unemployment rate has fallen to 6.4 % for April–June 2014. 
 Over the same period of time, youth unemployment also reached an historically 
high level, rising from 15 % in 2008 to 21.3 % in 2011. Though decreasing as with 
adult employment, it remains much higher at 16.9 % for the period April–June 
2014. As elsewhere, the young have borne the brunt of austerity measures and the 
increasing use of insecure work contracts. The diffi culties in obtaining full-time, 
stable employment have made it more diffi cult for them to live independently of 
their parents, which has been exacerbated by the shortage of affordable housing. In 
terms of gender differences, female unemployment has historically been lower than 
for men. This gap was particularly pronounced in 2011 (male unemployment: 8.7 %; 
female unemployment: 7.4 %); however male unemployment has improved more 
rapidly (6.6 % in April–June 2014, against 6.2 % among women), in part because of 
the large scale loss of public sector jobs. 
 During the 2010–2013 period, the unemployment rate among foreign-born 
workers – which since the early 1990s had been slightly higher than among UK-born 
ones (Rienzo  2014 )- registered a widening of the gender gap. Whilst the level of 
unemployment amongst migrant men converged with the natives, the rates among 
migrant women increased compared to UK-born women. 
 Although overall unemployment rates have risen and the number of jobs avail-
able are less than at the peak of Eastern European immigration almost a decade ago, 
the economy still relies on migrant labour across a range of sectors and skills. 
Between January and March 2014, the UK employed 447,000 more UK born and 
292,000 non-UK born workers compared to the same quarter of 2013 (ONS  2014 ). 
The Migration Advisory Committee ( 2014 ) – an independent body to the govern-
ment – suggests that the demand for migrant workers in the UK is infl uenced by a 
broad range of institutions and public policies, such as low level of labour market 
regulation in some sectors, lack of investment in education and training, low wages 
and poor conditions in some publicly-funded sector jobs, poor job status and career 
tracks, and low-waged agency work. Moreover, a large number of zero-hours con-
tracts, that is without fi xed hours from week to week, has been created in recent 
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years. These give no stability or ability to plan ahead for the worker. The Offi ce for 
National Statistics recently estimated that employers held 1.4 million contracts with 
workers that did not guarantee a minimum number of hours. The UK came to be 
seen as “the self-employment capital of western Europe” (IPPR  2014a ). Two-fi fths 
of all new jobs created since 2010 were self-employed; the incomes of these work-
ers have fallen to a much greater extent than of those in regular employment (14 % 
compared with 9 %). 
 Examples of the high use of migrant workers include the construction sector, 
where increased migrant labour may be the consequence of inadequate vocational 
training, or the care sector, characterised by low wages, lack of training and rapid 
turnover (Ruhs and Anderson 2010). At the skilled level, cuts in training places in 
healthcare arising from reduced budgets for the National Health Service (NHS) 
have resulted in renewed shortages, as with nurses who have been recruited from 
Portugal and Spain as well as non-EU countries such as the Philippines (Donnelly 
and Dominiczak  2014 ). 
10.3  Migratory Dynamics and Volume of Flows 
from Southern Europe 
 The UK’s patterns of immigration have been distinctive compared to other European 
countries. It had traditionally relied on fl ows from its former colonies in the 
Caribbean, South Asia and Ireland, whilst the fl ows of immigrants from the rest of 
Europe have been limited and much lower than those experienced, for example, by 
countries such as Germany, France or Belgium. Migration from Southern Europe, 
in particular, had been numerically limited in the post-war years, with the exception 
of a moderately steady infl ow of Italian workers during the 1950s and 1960s 
(D’Angelo  2007 ; King  1977 ). These migrants, for the most part coming from 
Southern Italy, settled in industrial towns such as Peterborough, Nottingham, 
Coventry, Sheffi eld and Bedford (attracted by the local brick-making industry). 
 If the 1970s and 1980s were mainly characterised by a limited number of 
European migrants, including young people coming to study or for short work expe-
riences as well as highly skilled professionals, from the 1990s intra-European 
migration became increasingly more signifi cant. Between the 1991 and 2001 cen-
suses, the number of French-born residents increased by 80 %, the Spanish by 41 %, 
the Dutch by 35 %, and the Italians by 17 %. Already in this decade the UK became 
the preferred destination for Southern Europeans. Morgan ( 2004 : 102), writing 
about the 1990s, suggested that in relation to the Spanish, this was due to the cre-
ation of freedom of mobility, the abolition of work permits, cheap travel, higher 
educational levels of young Spaniards, buoyancy of the British labour market, com-
paratively higher levels of unemployment in Spain, and the continuing rise of 
English as the lingua franca of the business community. More and more profession-
als, especially in education and health care, came to fi ll shortages in the labour 
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market for which there was active recruitment, especially of nurses. There was a 
distinct increase in professionals amongst migrants from Southern European coun-
tries from 19.4 % in 1992 to 26.6 % in 2000 and a sharp decline in manual workers 
from 62.5 % to 45 % in the same period. About 43 % of females and 38 % of men 
had a tertiary degree (Morgan  2004 : 140). Another trend had been the increasing 
proportion of female migrants to over 50 % from a number of European countries. 
 The accession of ten new countries to the EU in 2004 reshaped European migra-
tion patterns. The UK was one of three countries (in addition to Ireland and Sweden) 
which immediately opened up to the accession states, without imposing any transi-
tory restriction. This was seen as a means of reorienting migratory supply for low 
skilled labour away from UK’s traditional sources such as Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
Non-EU migrants were restricted to skilled labour markets which would be man-
aged through a Points Based System fully implemented in 2008. As spelled out by 
the Home Offi ce in its  Controlling our Borders paper (2005: 21), “migrants must be 
as economically active as possible; put as little burden on the state as possible; and 
be as socially integrated as possible”. 
 Thus between May 2004 and September 2008, 932,000 people from the EU-8 
(for the most part Poles) registered initial applications under the ‘Worker Registration 
Scheme’ especially set-up by the British government to keep track of new employ-
ees from the new EU member states. The total number of those moving to the UK 
was in fact much higher, given that, for example, self-employed workers were not 
required to register (Pollard et al.  2008 : 9). Still, the WRS fi gures were well above 
the original offi cial estimates, which had been for as little as 13,000 per annum. This 
was in part due to the restrictions imposed by most other European countries, which 
led to a large-scale immigration to Ireland and the UK. It created the idea that it was 
impossible to forecast accurately future fl ows and was used subsequently in heated 
debates about how many Bulgarians and Romanians would enter after the end of the 
transition period in 2014 (Migration Observatory  2014 ). 
 In the meantime, the number of A8 workers registering had by 2008 sharply 
declined due to improvements in their economies and decreasing levels of unem-
ployment, declining value of the pound, and the opening up of other EU countries 
to EU8 migrants as from 2006. It was also estimated that about half the arrivals 
between 2004 and 2007 had returned home (Pollard et al.  2008 ). Nonetheless, the 
entry into the labour market of Bulgarians and Romanians following their accession 
was restricted since the A8 were seen as already having fi lled labour shortages 
whilst raising concerns about the impact they had on public services and wages (see 
Sect.  10.5 on “Policies and Debates”). 
 As we have noted, the UK has been a preferred destination for Southern European 
migrants since the 1990s (Gonzalez-Ferrer  2013 ; McMahon  2012 ) but for the period 
1991–2003 net-migration from other EU countries to the UK was very small. This 
contrasts with an average annual net-migration from non-EU countries to the UK of 
over 100,000 migrants for the same period (Migration Observatory  2014 ). However, 
the numbers of those entering for work has increased sharply in the 2010s. 
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 According to the latest Census, in 2011 there were over 7.5 million foreign-born 
(i.e. non-UK) residents in the whole of England and Wales. 1 Of these – as shown in 
Table  10.1 – about 2 million were EU-born and in particular 135,000 were from 
Italy, 88,000 from Portugal, 79,000 from Spain and 35,000 from Greece. The total 
number of Southern European residents (336,353) increased by over 50 % since the 
previous 2001 Census; however the trend has been very different across different 
groups. On the one hand, Greek-born residents have gone up by a mere 3.5 % over 
a decade, whilst over the same period of time Portuguese have increased by 145.8 %, 
Spanish by 53.6 % and Italians by 32 %.
 Breaking down the Census data by year of arrival confi rms the migratory history 
described above. Of all EU-born people living in England and Wales in 2011, 25.4 % 
arrived before 1991, 19.2 % in the 1990s and 55.4 % between 2004 and 2011. The 
proportion of Southern European residents arriving in the latter recent period is 
signifi cantly smaller – for example 31.6 % among Italians. Unlike other European 
countries, the UK does not have a system of compulsory registration of residents, 
thus the best estimate of resident population in a given year – beyond the Census 
data collected every 10 years – is given by the Annual Population Survey (APS), a 
yearly dataset combining results from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) with a num-
1  These detailed Census data are available for England and Wales only rather than for the United 
Kingdom as a whole – i.e. Scotland and Northern Ireland, which together represent over 10 % of 
the UK population, are not included. 
 Table 10.1  Population in England and Wales by country of birth 
 2001 (census)  2011 (census) 
 % change 
2001–2011  2013 (APS)  CI +/− 
 % change 
2011–
2013 
 All countries  52,041,916  56,075,912  7.8 %  55,595,000  388 k  −0.9 % 
 UK  47,406,411  48,570,902  2.5 %  48,254,000  363 k  −0.7 % 
 Non UK  4,635,505  7,505,010  61.9 %  7,341,000  …  −2.2 % 
 Non EU  3,953,829  5,469,391  38.3 %  4,944,000  …  −9.6 % 
 EU*  681,676  2,035,619  n.a.  2,397,000  …  17.8 % 
 A8  n.a .  882 , 748  n.a .  936 , 000  …  6.0 % 
  Poland  58,107  579,121  896.6 %  581,000  39 k  0.3 % 
 A2  n.a .  125 , 580  n.a .  176 , 000  …  40.1 % 
  Bulgaria  n.a.  45,893  n.a.  49,000  11 k  6.8 % 
  Romania  7,203  79,687  1006.3 %  127,000  18 k  59.4 % 
 South 
Europe 
 222 , 674  336 , 353  51.1 %  355 , 000  …  5.5 % 
  Greece  33,224  34,389  3.5 %  35,000  9 k  1.8 % 
  Italy  102,020  134,619  32.0 %  134,000  19 k  −0.5 % 
  Portugal  35,867  88,161  145.8 %  103,000  17 k  16.8 % 
  Spain  51,563  79,184  53.6 %  83,000  14 k  4.8 % 
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ber of regional ‘boosts’. The APS data for 2013 – see Table  10.2 – show a further 
increase of residents born in Southern Europe, against an overall population which 
appears almost unchanged. 2 
 A good estimate of the most recent fl ows is offered by the offi cial statistics on 
National Insurance Number (NINo) registrations. Under the UK system, a NINo 
registration is generally required by any overseas national looking to work or claim 
benefi ts or tax credits. Figure  10.1 , which include NINo yearly data between 2012 
and 2013, clearly shows a dramatic increase of registration by Spanish, Italian and 
Portuguese migrants, particularly since 2011, with an annual infl ow almost qua-
drupled over the decade. Overall, NINo registrations from Southern European coun-
2  The confi dence interval for the four Southern European populations is between ±9,000 and 
±19,000; thus the minor changes indicated in Table  10.2 should be read with caution. 
 Table 10.2  NiNo registrations – top 20 nationalities (years ending June) 
 Year to June 
2010 
 Year to June 
2013 
 Year to June 
2014 
 % change 
2010–2014 
 Total  604,347  572,876  565,719  −6.4 % 
 European Union  284,822  398,027  420,646  47.7 % 
 EU Accession States  187,328  213,893  248,852  32.8 % 
 Non European 
Union 
 318,930  174,427  144,181  −54.8 % 
 Top 20 nationalities 
 Poland  68,721  96,481  91,561  33.2 % 
 Romania  17,040  17,688  63,432  272.3 % 
 Spain  15 , 084  47 , 320  41 , 065  172.2 % 
 Italy  15 , 341  35 , 834  38 , 534  151.2 % 
 India  82,156  30,781  25,916  −68.5 % 
 Portugal  10 , 177  26 , 126  24 , 135  137.2 % 
 Bulgaria  11,784  9,986  21,593  83.2 % 
 Hungary  11,923  25,215  20,233  69.7 % 
 France  17,254  21,900  20,022  16.0 % 
 Rep of Lithuania  27,377  26,611  19,341  −29.4 % 
 Rep of Ireland  11,155  15,829  14,779  32.5 % 
 Pakistan  26,761  15,295  10,683  −60.1 % 
 Slovak Rep  12,837  11,686  10,676  −16.8 % 
 China Peoples Rep  12,878  11,843  10,067  −21.8 % 
 Rep of Latvia  25,868  13,257  9,594  −62.9 % 
 Nigeria  16,722  10,389  9,575  −42.7 % 
 Germany  10,966  10,978  9,448  −13.8 % 
 Australia  13,203  11,638  9,146  −30.7 % 
 Greece  2 , 415  8 , 957  8 , 303  243.8 % 
 Czech Rep  7,901  8,435  7,909  0.1 % 
 Others  186,784  116,627  99,707  −46.6 % 
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tries represented about one fi fth of all overseas registrations in 2012–2013, compared 
to less than 10 % between 2002 and 2010.
 As shown in Table  10.2 , in the fi rst half of 2014 Spanish, Italian and Portuguese 
registrations were among the top 6 groups: respectively with 41,000, 38,500 and 
24,000 new registrations. 3 These yearly values are around one and a half times 
higher than those registered in 2010 (during the same period, the number of yearly 
registrations from the EU as a whole increased only by 50 %, whilst the overall 
number of overseas registrations has slightly decreased). 
10.3.1  Secondary Migration 
 It is diffi cult to establish the exact degree of secondary migration, which includes 
two categories: that of citizens of another EU country and third country nationals. 
The UK has been a popular destination for TCNs gaining citizenship in another 
country, for example, Somalis from Netherlands and Sweden (Lindley and van Hear 
3  A change to the process of recording NINOs during the quarter April to June 2014, means that the 
volume of NINo registrations recorded is lower in this quarter than would otherwise be the case 
(estimated to be around 15–25 % lower in the quarter April to June 2014 and 2–5 % lower for the 
year to June 2014). Hence, comparisons of NINo registrations for the latest periods should be 
viewed with caution. 
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 Fig. 10.1  NiNo registrations of Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish nationals (2002–2013) 
(Source: Authors’ data analysis of Department for Work and Pensions data: adult overseas nation-
als registering for a National Insurance number for the purposes of work, benefi ts or tax credits) 
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 2007 ; van Liempt  2011 ). Some migrant rights organisations, such as Latin American 
Women’s Rights Services, report an increasing number of Spanish citizens of Latin 
American origin coming for advice and living in very poor housing conditions. It is 
also likely that this population may have different socio-economic characteristics 
than many of the highly educated young Spaniards. Amongst the Portuguese too 
there are many born in former colonies such as Brazil. 
 In relation to the mobility of third country nationals, a European Migration 
Network study ( 2013 ) notes that there are limited relevant statistics and lack of com-
parability. However, existing evidence suggests an increasing trend. In the UK, the 
long-term migration of non-EU citizens whose country of last residence was the EU, 
migrating for all reasons, appears to have increased by some 200 %, from approxi-
mately 1,000 in 2007 to 3,000 in 2011. At the same time it was estimated that long-
term migration of EU citizens had declined from 154,000 in 2007 to 147,000 in 2011 
(EMN 2012:11). Thus the percentage of third-country mobility in relation to the 
overall intra-European mobility of both groups has increased from 0.6 % in 2007 to 
2 % in 2011. We also know that the number of those applying for work permits from 
third country nationals residing in another member state rose from 2,940 in 2008 to 
3,320 in 2010 but then fell to 2,560 in 2011, the fi rst full year of the Conservative-led 
coalition government (EMN  2013 : 55). Indians constituted the single largest group. 
 By cross-tabulating 2011 Census data by country of birth and nationality, it 
appears there are signifi cant numbers of people with Italian, Portuguese and Spanish 
passports who were born in countries different from their citizenship. In particular, 
27 % of UK residents with a Portuguese passport were born in a non-European 
country (14 % in Africa and 6 % in India), some of whom may have been born in 
overseas Portuguese territories before de-colonisation. The proportion of non- 
European born is 15 % for Italian citizens and 12 % for Spanish ones. 
 It should be noted that the UK has opted out of the major Directives facilitating 
the mobility of third country nationals such as that regarding third-country nationals 
who are long-term residents (Directive 2003/109/EC); that on third-country national 
holders of an EU Blue Card for highly qualifi ed employment in one Member State 
(Directive 2009/50/EC); those for researchers (Directive 2005/71/EC); and students 
(Directive 2004/114/EC) (EMN  2013 :19). 
10.4  Socio-demographic Characteristics and Labour Market 
Inclusion 
 According to the 2013 Annual Population Survey estimates, UK residents born in 
Southern Europe appear fairly balanced in terms of gender, with an estimated 48.6 % 
females among Italians, 49.5 % among Portuguese and 55.4 % among Spaniards. 
Interestingly, the NINo (2013) data on most recent arrivals suggest a reduction of 
the female component (see Table  10.3 below) with, for example, only 40 % of 
women among new entries from Italy. In terms of age, these recent fl ows – not sur-
prisingly – appear fairly young, with about 80 % of new registered workers from 
Italy and Spain being aged between 18 and 34 years and only 6 % aged 45 or over. 
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The picture is however somewhat different for Portuguese migrant workers: with 
64 % aged between 18 and 34, 21 % aged 35–44 and 13 % aged over 45 years.
 The areas of settlement of Southern European migrants follow the broader pat-
tern of all non-UK and non-EU residents, with about 40–45 % living in the areas of 
Greater London and about 15 % in the South East of England and the others fairly 
spread across the rest of the country. The role of London as the main pole of attrac-
tion for Southern European migrants appears to have increased in recent years. 
Among Italians in particular, 68.9 % of those who registered for a NiNo in 2013 
were based in London. The data for the same year shows 51 % of Spanish and 
44.2 % of Portuguese new arrivals working in the capital. 
 Detailed information about labour market participation are available from the 
Labour Force Survey. The data from the second quarter of 2014 shows very differ-
ent profi les for the four Southern European populations (see Table  10.4 below). 
Italian-born, with an activity rate comparable with that of the UK-born population, 
has a much smaller unemployment rate: 3.7 % against 6.0 %, whilst for Spanish- 
born the unemployment rate is exactly the same as among the native population 
(with a slightly higher activity rate). For those born in Portugal and Greece, how-
ever, the registered unemployment rate is around 8.5 % or 2 percentage points above 
the national average; interestingly, these two groups have also a much smaller pro-
portion of inactive population (about 20 % compared to a national average of 40 %).
 When compared to the latest Census data, these sample-based LFS fi gures sug-
gest a signifi cant reduction in the unemployment rate among Italian-born residents 
(5.2 % in 2011; 1.5 percentage points higher) but very little change among 
Portuguese-born (8.2 % in 2011). Finally, the Census data by year of arrival reveals 
much lower unemployment rates among those who have been living in the UK for a 
long time. Among Italian-born, the rate is just around 3 % for those who fi rst arrived 
before the 1970s and between 4.5 and 5.5 % for those arriving in the 1970s–1990s. 
 Similar differences between groups are found when looking at the data by type 
of occupation (Table  10.5 ). The proportion of Italians working as managers and 
senior offi cials (14.8 %) is signifi cantly higher than the national average (10 %) and 
the proportion of professionals (31.2 %) is over 10 percentage points above the aver-
age. As for Spanish workers, if the proportion of managers (8.1 %) is slightly above 
 Table 10.3  NiNo registrations (2013) by country of birth, age and gender 
 Italy  Spain  Portugal 
 #  Age%  F%  #  Age%  F%  #  Age%  F% 
 <18  354  1 %  46 %  374  1 %  51 %  612  2 %  47 % 
 18–24  18,444  42 %  42 %  17,503  34 %  51 %  8,217  27 %  50 % 
 25–34  17,215  39 %  42 %  23,546  46 %  47 %  11,083  37 %  43 % 
 35–44  5,277  12 %  34 %  7,243  14 %  41 %  6,205  21 %  39 % 
 45–54  2,269  5 %  29 %  2,544  5 %  39 %  2,788  9 %  41 % 
 55–59  343  1 %  31 %  364  1 %  40 %  632  2 %  46 % 
 >60  218  0 %  37 %  172  0 %  60 %  593  2 %  51 % 
 Total  44,120  100 %  41 %  51,746  100 %  47 %  30,130  100 %  44 % 
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the average, those working in ‘professional occupations’ are over 42 %: more than 
double the national average. At the other end of the spectrum, only 3.9 % of 
Portuguese-born workers are in the top group, whilst the proportion of those in 
‘elementary occupations’ (32.6 %) is almost three times the national average. Thus 
the different nationalities exhibit different insertions into the labour market. Italians 
in particular have a high proportion working in the managerial and professional 
groups (1–3) together with high levels in low level service employment but negli-
gible in manufacturing, a pattern quite distinct to that of the Portuguese and the 
Polish.
 Furthermore, a comparison with the 2011 Census data suggests an increase of 
the proportion of Italians working in the top 3 categories of about 5 percentage 
points. The Census data can also be broken down by year of arrival, revealing that 
the most recent Italian migrants are those more likely to work as managers or pro-
fessionals: between 30 and 40 % of those who arrived up to the early 1980s, against 
over 55 % for those who arrived in the 1990s, 2000s and, again, 2010s. Conversely, 
the proportion of Portuguese migrants in the top categories is between 20 and 30 % 
 Table 10.4  Population by country of birth and economic activity (LFS 2q2014) 
 In employment  Unemployed  Inactive  Unemployment rate  Activity rate 
 UK  58.6 %  3.8 %  37.6 %  6.0 %  62.4 % 
 Non UK  63.2 %  5.0 %  31.9 %  7.3 %  68.1 % 
 Greece  74.7 %  7.1 %  18.2 %  8.6 %  81.8 % 
 Italy  62.6 %  2.4 %  35.0 %  3.7 %  65.0 % 
 Portugal  73.0 %  6.8 %  20.2 %  8.5 %  79.8 % 
 Spain  65.7 %  4.2 %  30.1 %  6.0 %  69.9 % 
 Total  59.3 %  3.9 %  36.8 %  6.2 %  63.2 % 
 Table 10.5  Population by country of birth and occupation (LFS 2q2014) 
 UK  Non UK  Greece  Italy  Portugal  Spain  Total 
 1  10.2 %  9.1 %  1.9 %  14.8 %  3.9 %  8.1 %  10.0 % 
 2  19.3 %  22.8 %  45.8 %  31.2 %  22.9 %  42.2 %  19.9 % 
 3  14.7 %  10.4 %  20.9 %  10.3 %  2.9 %  11.9 %  14.0 % 
 4  11.2 %  7.6 %  11.3 %  8.4 %  3.6 %  6.7 %  10.7 % 
 5  11.3 %  9.0 %  3.9 %  7.1 %  9.0 %  2.2 %  10.9 % 
 6  9.3 %  9.7 %  3.0 %  4.3 %  8.2 %  8.2 %  9.4 % 
 7  8.1 %  6.3 %  6.8 %  7.2 %  5.9 %  6.5 %  7.8 % 
 8  5.9 %  8.2 %  0.0 %  0.0 %  11.0 %  2.1 %  6.3 % 
 9  10.0 %  16.8 %  6.4 %  16.6 %  32.6 %  12.2 %  11.0 % 
 Total  25,684,348  4,775,419  35,684  85,633  70,724  68,949  30,459,767 
 Note: 1 ‘Managers, Directors And Senior Offi cials’; 2 ‘Professional Occupations’; 3 ‘Associate 
Professional And Technical Occupations’; 4 ‘Administrative And Secretarial Occupations’; 5 
‘Skilled Trades Occupations’; 6 ‘Caring, Leisure And Other Service Occupations’; 7 ‘Sales And 
Customer Service Occupations’; 8 ‘Process, Plant And Machine Operatives’; 9 ‘Elementary 
Occupations’ 
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for each decade of arrival from the 1960s to date (Detailed 2011 Census data for 
Spanish migrants is not available). 
 The distribution by occupational status is partially refl ected by the data on the 
highest qualifi cation of workers (Table  10.6 ). In particular, among Italian and 
Spanish-born people, the proportions of those with tertiary education – respectively 
62.5 % and 70.7 % – are almost double the UK national average (35.1 %). On the 
other hand, Portuguese-born have a lower than average proportion of people with 
tertiary and secondary education and a proportion of those reportedly with no quali-
fi cation which is much higher than all other Southern European countries.
 Unlike the abundant literature on immigration from the accession countries, and 
in particular Poland (Ciupijus  2011 ; Ryan et al.  2008 ; Sumption and Somerville 
 2010 ), there is little published academic research on recent and very recent Southern 
European fl ows. Since late 2012, there have been a number of journalistic accounts 
with titles such as ‘PIGS do fl y’ (PIGS = Portuguese, Italians, Greeks, Spanish) 
(The Economist  2013 ) and the ‘Return of the Spanish Armada’ (The Daily Telegraph 
2013). These tend to focus on Southern European migrants working in low skilled 
jobs in the hospitality, retail and construction sectors, but as the quantitative data 
presented in this chapter show, many have managed to fi nd jobs commensurate with 
their education and training. National media has generally represented the young 
Southern Europeans as forced to fl ee their countries because of lack of opportunities 
in a fairly favourable light. In some cases – like in the above mentioned report by 
the Economist – they are presented as unlikely to remain for long due to their pur-
ported strong attachment to family and thus not likely to make claims on public 
services such as schools for their children. In reality, research evidence on their 
migration plans and family circumstances is missing (see Chap.  6 by Bermudez and 
Brey on Spain in this volume where they comment on the gap between Spanish data 
on emigration and UK data on immigration). It should also be noted that there is a 
tendency by British journalists (The Economist  2013 ) to present a somewhat inac-
curate history of Spanish migrants, stating that they are predisposed not to migrate 
except in the early Franco years, thus erasing the earlier European fl ows of the 
1960s to France, Germany and Switzerland. However, as we shall see in the follow-
 Table 10.6  Population by country of birth and qualifi cation (LFS 2q2014) 
 UK  Non UK  Greece  Italy  Portugal  Spain  Total 
 Tertiary  33.1 %  46.1 %  78.0 %  62.5 %  29.3 %  70.7 %  35.1 % 
 Secondary  47.9 %  23.2 %  9.5 %  17.7 %  29.3 %  12.1 %  44.0 % 
 Other  7.9 %  19.7 %  8.0 %  14.9 %  29.0 %  12.7 %  9.7 % 
 No qualif.  10.1 %  10.4 %  4.4 %  2.2 %  12.0 %  3.9 %  10.1 % 
 Did not 
know 
 1.1 %  0.7 %  0.0 %  2.7 %  0.3 %  0.7 %  1.0 % 
 Total  37,349,283  7,003,680  47,207  118,458  91,332  97,320  44,352,963 
 Note: Tertiary: degree, higher education or equivalent; Secondary: GCE, A-level, GCSE grades 
A*-C or equivalent 
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ing section, the growing hostility towards EU immigration, and more generally the 
EU, means that the conditionalities being proposed will affect all EU migrants. 
10.5  Policies and Debates 
 The debate about immigration and ensuing policies needs to be placed within a very 
rapid growth of intra European migration although, as we shall see, hostile attitudes 
were prevalent before this happened. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, estimates 
of the modest numbers of workers (13,000) arriving in Britain post accession were 
wildly wrong 4 (Dustmann et al.  2003 ) and were spectacularly eclipsed by the arrival 
of 1.5 million migrants EU8 from 2004 until 2011. 
 The Conservative-led Coalition government, elected in May 2010, had pledged 
to bring down net migration to tens of thousands, that is the level of the 1990s. 
However its only room for manoeuvre was with non-EU migrants, where it has 
tightened regulations for skilled labour migration and abolished the ability for the 
highly skilled to enter without a job offer. Less skilled jobs had already been 
reserved for EU workers under the Points Based System. Students, who count as 
migrants, have been very hard hit as have family migrants of both UK citizens and 
permanent residents through the income requirements introduced in July 2012. The 
Government also could not control the level of emigration, which is part of the net 
migration fi gure, except to the extent of not renewing work permits of those already 
in the country; hence the restrictions placed on moving from temporary to perma-
nent residence permits for skilled migrants and intra-company transferees, which 
now depend on the level of income. 
 The national media and many politicians pointed out the fact that EU migration 
could not be controlled almost as a shocking revelation. By 2012 it was estimated 
that about 872,000 A8 migrants were resident in the UK. The tabloids took this as 
the cue for employing their favourite liquid metaphors of fl oods, deluges, inunda-
tions, swamps, and streams, not to mention hordes and invasions, to describe the 
new arrivals from Eastern Europe (Fox et al.  2012 ). Subsequently, the ending of the 
transitionary period for Bulgarian and Romanian migrants generated another moral 
panic over ‘tidal fl oods of new immigrants’. The Telegraph, a right-wing newspa-
per, warned that “Britain [is] powerless to stop tens of thousands of Bulgarians and 
Romanians moving to UK”. The Sun, a populist tabloid, talked about “Romanian 
and Bulgarian immigrants … threatening to swamp Britain – and fl ood our over-
stretched jobs market”. A Government e-petition implied that as many as 600,000 
people could come, often to seek benefi ts (cited in Duvell  2013 ). A number of stud-
ies suggesting that potential emigration from these countries was fairly limited were 
dismissed (Duvell  2013 ). 
4  Dustmann maintains that his estimate was based on the assumption that Germany in particular 
would open its borders, at least partially (Lowther  2013 ). 
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 Hostility to immigration is not new and was high even before the large scale 
immigration from accession countries in 2004. According to the British Social 
Attitudes Survey (Park et al.  2012 ), the proportion of respondents favouring some 
reduction in migration rose from 63 % in 1995 to 72 % in 2003 (with 40 % wishing 
to see a substantial reduction). The fi gure increased to 78 % in 2008, just before the 
beginning of the economic crisis. Attitudes among the British public had grown 
increasingly polarised between 2002 and 2011, with those who were educated being 
more comfortable with immigration compared to those with little education. The 
polarisation was more evident on views about the economic impact of immigration. 
Economically and socially insecure groups had become dramatically more hostile 
although all groups had become at least somewhat more negative about the cultural 
effects of migration. On the other hand, even for those who were generally negative 
towards immigration, skilled professional migrants were acceptable. 
 Although the main target of UK anti-immigration discourse are EU-migrants in 
general – with those from Poland and, increasingly, Romania and Bulgaria usually 
identifi ed as the main example – more recently members of UKIP started to make 
specifi c reference to Southern European migrants. A party spokesman stated that 
“What we are seeing is a continued huge infl ux from eastern Europe now being 
supplemented by a sharp rise in immigration from southern Europe as citizens from 
countries like Portugal and Spain fi nd that the only way to escape the eurozone 
nightmare is to vote with their feet” (BBC 16 November 2014). 
10.5.1  Controversies Around Free Movement of Labour 
 The growing anti-immigration sentiments in the mainstream political discourse has 
always been juxtaposed – when not confl ated – with a criticism of the EU system of 
free-movement and, more generally, with Euro-sceptic stances. The infl ated fi gures 
and scare stories used by the tabloid papers sustained the growing popularity of far 
right and anti-immigrant parties and particularly of the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP), founded in 1993 by members of the cross-party Anti- 
Federalist League, a political party set up in November 1991. Its aim was to fi eld 
candidates opposed to the Maastricht Treaty whose main primary objective was the 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. It is now led by Nigel 
Farage. Its anti-immigration rhetoric obscures sharply contradictory economic poli-
cies from the ultra-liberal favouring further privatisation to more pragmatic posi-
tions retaining social institutions, such as the National Health Service (Wigmore 
 2014 ). It did well in the 2013 elections but it was in the European election of May 
2014, that UKIP received the largest number of votes (27.5 %) and gained 24 repre-
sentatives. In October 2014 it was the fi rst time in a century that neither the 
Conservatives nor Labour had won the largest number of votes in a nation-wide 
election. It gained its fi rst elected Member of Parliament through a by-election for 
the seat of Clacton, a feat repeated in November 2014 in the constituency of 
Rochester and Strood. Both by-elections were triggered by the defection of 
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Conservative MPs who had joined UKIP. This process has put increasing pressure 
not only on the Conservative Party, which already encompasses a strong Eurosceptic 
current, but also on the other political parties. 
 As from early 2013 David Cameron had promised – in case of a victory in the 
2015 elections – a referendum on British membership of the European Union, fol-
lowing a period of renegotiation with the EU. In the meantime, he announced 
increasing restrictions on welfare rights for EU migrants – stretching current 
European treaties as far as possible. 
 The Liberal Democrats, the coalition partner in the previous government and, 
traditionally, the most pro-European British party, have moved from a pro- 
immigration position to one which supports restrictions on the right to free move-
ment of future entrants as well as restrictions for new entrants coming as 
self-employed (Mason  2014 ). Nevertheless the then party leader Nick Clegg reiter-
ated that freedom of movement among EU states was “a good thing” – although it 
was “never intended as an automatic right to claim benefi ts” – and was opposed to 
leaving the EU which would strike an “immense” blow to UK prosperity. 5 
 However Clegg also supported Cameron’s proposals (The Guardian 29 July 
2014) to restrict access to benefi ts for Jobs Seekers Allowance, child benefi ts and 
child tax credits to 3 months instead of 6 months as from November 2014, and that 
this would only begin after the individual had been in the UK for 3 months. Reports 
from the BBC suggested that ‘at most’ 10,000 people would be affected. It would 
be unlikely to affect EU workers in the UK who lose their job after having made 
National Insurance contributions and would be limited mainly to those arriving here 
in the fi rst instance (Grove-White  2014 ). This measure refl ected the attempt by 
political parties to push the idea that the UK is a welfare magnet, but for which the 
Migration Advisory Committee ( 2014 ) states there is no evidence. 
 The Labour Party also strove to show how tough it had become and argued that 
EU migrants should only be able to access welfare payments if they have paid 
national insurance. The party in government had been accused of allowing uncon-
trolled immigration through its immediate opening up to migrants from accession 
countries. As a response to the Conservative’s attempt to make immigration a major 
issue in 2007, Gordon Brown launched the slogan ‘British jobs for British workers’ 
at the annual Trades Union Conference (Daily Telegraph 11 September 2007). He 
had also pledged to make EU migrants learn English which it was estimated would 
reduce the immigration of the less skilled by about a third. 
 In 2014, Mark Leonard, Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, 
said Labour should push for EU governments to issue social insurance cards to 
more easily control access to welfare, restrict some benefi ts for EU migrants for at 
least a year, and make language tests compulsory for new arrivals. Hence, as UKIP 
gained ground, Labour sought to toughen its stance, and though not turning its back 
on free movement, proposed clamping down on tax credits claimed by working EU 
migrants. The then shadow work and pensions secretary, Rachel Reeves, stated that 
5  Clegg urges restrictions on new EU migrants, BBC 5 August 2014-08-19  http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-politics-28638493 
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the UK social security was not designed for the current level of immigration. 6 She 
has thus proposed an increase to 2 years of contributions, which was more than the 
3 months announced by the Conservatives. Labour had also raised the possibility of 
not paying in work tax credits (for low income households) to EU migrant. 
 It should be remembered that, whilst competence for the coordination of social 
security schemes is ‘shared’ between the EU and Member States, Member States 
have exclusive competence for the design, organisation and funding of their social 
security systems which differ extensively. Within the overarching EU framework, 
they are free to decide who is entitled to be insured, which benefi ts are granted and 
under what conditions, and how benefi ts are calculated. 
 In summer 2014 Cameron (28 July) had also hit out against EURES – the 
European ‘Job Mobility Portal, since of the 2.4 million jobs posted on its web-site, 
over 1.1 million were in the UK. Jobs at UK fi rms including supermarket chains 
Tesco and Sainsbury’s are automatically advertised on the site. In future, jobs will 
only be uploaded to the website if an employer specifi cally requests that the position 
is offered across the EU. Thus Cameron stated (28 July 2014) “So we are banning 
overseas-only recruitment – legally requiring these agencies to advertise in English 
in the UK … and massively restricting this, aiming to cut back the vacancies on this 
portal by over 500,000 jobs” and therefore make easily accessible knowledge about 
job vacancies in the UK. 
 In their repeated attempts to outdo each other in terms of fi rmness on EU migra-
tion policies, British political parties are moving the bar further and further. 
Following his re-election, the former Conservative politician and now UKIP mem-
ber of Parliament, Mark Reckless, suggested that EU migrants currently living in 
the UK might be asked to leave the country under certain conditions, should his 
party be in Government. Although this statement was offi cially rejected by party 
leader Farage, it gave an indication of the extent to which every aspect of EU mobil-
ity had become the object of political discussions and central to the results of the 
parliamentary elections of May 2015, as well as the outcome of the referendum on 
whether the UK should leave the European Union on 23 June 2016. 
 According to an IPSOS-Mori poll conducted late June/early July 2015 (Nardelli 
 2015 ), freedom of movement had become the most contentious issue, and was 
 heavily orienting the vote. The majority of British (60 %) thought that freedom of 
movement should be restricted with 70 % of respondents saying that it was due to 
pressure on public services, 59 % the number coming to the UK to claim benefi ts, 
and 55 % pressure on housing. If it were not limited, the proportion who said that the 
UK should stay in the EU dropped 16 percentage points from 52 % to 36 %, while the 
vote to get out rose by 12 points from 31 % to 43 %. Relatively few (16 %) thought 
that freedom of movement should be kept as it is or with no controls (Nardelli  2015 ). 
Amongst the most popular measures to tackle the perceived problems of free move-
ment was the proposal to place restrictions on EU migrants claiming benefi ts together 
with broader restrictions to access welfare. These elements were at the centre of the 
6  No recourse to public funds applies to non EU migrants who do not have access to a range of 
non-contributory benefi ts until they gain permanent residence i.e. minimum of 5 years. 
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David Cameron’s negotiations with the European Commissionfor a ‘new settlement 
for the UK in a reformed EU’ ahead of the Brexit referendum. This was not seen as 
suffi cient and in the ensuing referendum 51.9 % voted to leave. 
10.6  Conclusions 
 The large-scale immigration of Eastern and more recently Southern Europeans to 
the UK has progressively fed increased hostility towards immigrants and contrib-
uted to the popularity of curbs on free movements and access to welfare. The fi lling 
of low skilled labour from these countries has contributed in particular to such calls. 
However the analysis of quantitative data seems to show that the Italians and Spanish 
in particular are not fi lling the less skilled sectors in the same way as Polish migrants 
have done. They are geographically more concentrated in the large urban centres 
which have long experience of immigration, both of labour migrants and asylum 
seekers and refugees. Even within the lower level service sector, they are often 
working in the hospitality sector and are less likely to be seen as being in competi-
tion with less educated local populations. 
 As has been commented, the current immigration debate demonstrates the loss of 
statistical reasoning. Following a period of large scale immigration from Eastern 
Europe, confl ict over competition in employment, pressure on public services and 
access to welfare have been the issues which have led to increased hostility towards 
immigration aired in the media and increasingly taken up by political parties across 
the spectrum apart from the Greens and the Scottish Nationalist Party. According to 
IPSOS-Mori ( 2014 ) immigration has become the single most important issue of 
concern to the British public and ended up becoming the major issue in the vote to 
leave the European Union, even in areas with low levels of immigration. The results 
of the referendum, which saw a high turnout, revealed profound polarisation, with 
those with lower educational qualifi cations, older people and those living in provin-
cial England, more likely to vote in favour of leave. Outside of London, Scotland 
and Northern Ireland were the only two areas to vote in favour of remaining in the 
EU (Ford  2016 ). The Brexit vote opens up a period of economic and political 
 insecurity and constitutional instability with unpredictable outcomes for the status 
of EU migrants currently in the UK and for the future of intra-European migration. 
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 Chapter 11 
 South-North Labour Migration Within 
the Crisis-Affected European Union: New 
Patterns, New Contexts and New Challenges 
 Jean-Michel  Lafl eur ,  Mikolaj  Stanek , and  Alberto  Veira 
11.1  Introduction 
 For centuries, migration has been a widely spread response to both adversity and 
economic opportunities in Europe. In spite of variations in the size and characteris-
tics of migration fl ows, Europeans have historically moved from less prosperous 
regions to more prosperous ones. Expanding economies, hungry labour markets, 
higher salaries and also political instability are just a few of the factors that have 
triggered European migration over the years. 
 Nowadays, a revival of past South-North migratory routes seems to be taking 
place as a consequence of the ongoing economic crisis. However, three distinctive 
features need to be immediately underlined. First, before the economic crisis, 
Southern European countries had become net receiving countries during the fi rst 8 
years of the twenty-fi rst century. This involved these Member States having to think 
of themselves again as countries of emigration. As we have seen in different chap-
ters of this volume, the very acknowledgement of the existence of crisis-related 
migration is often a controversial topic. Second, the degradation of Southern 
European economies has reduced migration to this area from third countries and 
Central and Eastern European Member States. Third, contrarily to twentieth century 
South-North European migration, Southern European migrants are now leaving 
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countries hard hit by the crisis and moving to countries that have also been affected 
by the economic downturn (although in a signifi cantly lesser extent). In Northern 
European Member States, demand for foreign labour and growing anti-immigrant 
sentiments have created an unwelcoming context for further migration following 
the crisis. For this reason, post-crisis migration from Southern Europe constitutes a 
very novel and challenging research topic. 
 One of the objectives of this volume was to describe the scale, intensity and fun-
damental social and demographic features of this new Southern European mobility 
and to identify the main patterns of the socio-economic integration of Southern EU 
migrants into Northern European destination countries. Throughout this book, this 
objective was pursued through the analysis of the most recent available statistical 
data on fl ows, stocks and profi les of this new migrant category using data sources 
from both sending and receiving countries. While the national chapters explored the 
main traits and particularities of new South-North intra-European migration from 
the specifi c perspective of sending and receiving countries, the purpose of this chap-
ter is to identify and discuss the main features of this new phenomenon on a more 
general level. 
 The statistical data in the country-specifi c chapters shows that there are at least 
two distinctive features that characterize current South to North migration. Firstly, 
its intensity is relatively low if we take into account, on the one hand, the scale of 
the crisis-driven deterioration of the labour markets in southern countries and, on 
the other, the volume of the previous South-North migration in the post-war period. 
Secondly, as shown in previous chapters, new Southern European migrants are pre-
dominantly young and highly educated, particularly when compared with their 
counterparts, who migrated during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. 
 What factors are behind these particularities of the current South-North migra-
tion fl ows? In this chapter, we argue that, while the asymmetric impact of the eco-
nomic crisis throughout the European Union and the unique features of the deeply 
fragmented labour markets of its Southern member countries may be considered 
primordial factors that triggered a renewed South-North intra-European mobility, 
the intensity and composition of these fl aws are also determined by the previous 
structural, demographic, social and economic transformation experienced by both 
Southern and Northern EU countries. We start this chapter with a brief description 
of the unequal effects of the economic crisis in the European Union. We then dis-
cuss the recent history of migratory fl ows in Europe and describe how the recent 
economic crisis has affected intra-EU migratory fl ows. In the sections that follow, 
we explore the features that make current migratory trends signifi cantly different 
from the post-war South-North migratory waves. We also discuss the apparent con-
trasts between the harshness of the economic crisis experienced by the southern 
periphery of the EU and the relatively low intensity of mobility when compared to 
the previous post-war South-North migrations. Finally, we shed some light on fac-
tors underlying the fact that migration has become a strategy adopted mainly 
(although not exclusively) by young and relatively well-educated Southern 
Europeans. 
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11.2  The Economic Crisis in EU Countries: An Overview 
 As shown throughout this volume, the consequences of the economic crisis have 
been particularly devastating for Southern EU members, and have had a signifi cant 
impact on the increase in South-North mobility. The linkages between the state of 
the European economies and migration have emerged as one of the most important 
topics in recent scientifi c debates on migration (Canetta et al.  2014 ; Castles and 
Vezzoli  2009 ; Kahanec et al.  2014 ). A growing number of publications have 
assessed the dynamics of the crisis and its impacts on the mobility patterns of EU 
nationals as well as of third country nationals (see Kahanec and Kurekova  2014 ; 
OECD  2011 ,  2012 ; Kaczmarczyk and Stanek  2015 ). What needs to be emphasized 
is that although in its initial phase, the economic deterioration spread throughout 
most of the developed countries, its consequences are not equally distributed among 
Member States (Kahanec and Zimmermann  2014 ). As can be seen in Table  11.1 , the 
signifi cant economic growth experienced in most of the EU since the turn of the 
present century ended abruptly during the years 2008 and 2009. The table also 
shows that taking as a whole the net growth for the period 2008–2013, important 
differences can be observed. Whereas Southern and Baltic EU countries, as well as 
Ireland, suffered from a major recession, other countries such as Germany and 
Slovakia saw a short-duration economic decline followed by a period of dynamic 
recovery. Poland is the only country in the EU that did not experience any negative 
growth (although its economy did also slow markedly).
 The asymmetric impact of the crisis has also been refl ected in disparities in 
austerity- driven economic policies implemented across the EU. The drop in eco-
nomic growth, together with monetary imbalances resulting from the fi nancial 
crunch of 2007, has affected strongly the fi scal sustainability of national economies. 
The extraordinary growth of public debt and the pressure exerted by EU and inter-
national fi nancial institutions for urgent fi scal consolidation pushed hard-hit 
Southern European countries to reduce radically their public spending. Crucial 
spheres of the Welfare State such as health care and education were particularly 
affected by these measures. Although several crisis-affected Northern EU Member 
States also implemented austerity measures in order to safeguard fi nancial stability 
(i.e. mainly through tax increases and cuts in public spending), their range and 
social impacts were less drastic when compared to those of Southern Europe (Karger 
 2014 ; Matsaganis and Leventi  2014 ). 
 The uneven impact of the economic crisis is also refl ected in unemployment 
data. As shown in Table  11.2 , while unemployment rates have remained stable or 
increased moderately in Northern Europe, Southern European Member States have 
suffered dramatic increases. Although the economic crisis has affected cyclically 
sensitive sectors such as construction, services and some branches of manufactur-
ing, Northern EU countries have generally been more successful in tackling the 
unemployment crisis whether through ad hoc employment policies (see Chap.  7 of 
this volume) or by relaxing labour market regulations (see Chap.  10 of this 
volume).
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 In Southern European countries, job destruction is not only a consequence of the 
crisis; it is also the outcome of the peculiarities of the labour market in those coun-
tries, which preceded the economic crisis. Firstly, Southern European countries are 
characterized by strong labour market fragmentation. This means that the level of 
worker protection varies greatly according to whether employees are under perma-
nent or temporary contracts. The high level of protection afforded to permanent 
workers and, in parallel, the high level of vulnerability experienced by temporary 
workers has led to signifi cant volatility in the labour market: contracting on a fi xed- 
term basis has been seen to expand during periods of economic boom, and intensive 
job destruction has been seen to occur during times of economic crisis 
 Table 11.1  Real GDP growth rate (%) 
 Country  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013 
 Austria  0.8  2.7  2.1  3.4  3.6  1.5  −3.8  1.9  3.1  0.9  0.2 
 Belgium  0.9  3.4  1.9  2.6  3  1  −2.6  2.5  1.6  0.1  0.3 
 Bulgaria  5.4  6.6  6  6.5  6.9  5.8  −5  0.7  2  0.5  1.1 
 Croatia  5.6  4.1  4.2  4.8  5.2  2.1  −7.4  −1.7  −0.3  −2.2  −0.9 
 Cyprus  2.8  4.4  3.9  4.5  4.9  3.6  −2  1.4  0.3  −2.4  −5.4 
 Czech Rep.  3.6  4.9  6.4  6.9  5.5  2.7  −4.8  2.3  2  −0.8  −0.7 
 Denmark  0.4  2.6  2.4  3.8  0.8  −0.7  −5.1  1.6  1.2  −0.7  −0.5 
 Estonia  7.5  6.5  9.5  10.4  7.9  −5.3  −14.7  2.5  8.3  4.7  1.6 
 Finland  2.0  3.9  2.8  4.1  5.2  0.7  −8.3  3  2.6  −1.5  −1.2 
 France  0.8  2.8  1.6  2.4  2.4  0.2  −2.9  2  2.1  0.3  0.3 
 Germany  −0.7  1.2  0.7  3.7  3.3  1.1  −5.6  4.1  3.6  0.4  0.1 
 Greece  6.6  5  0.9  5.8  3.5  −0.4  −4.4  −5.4  −8.9  −6.6  −3.9 
 Hungary  3.8  4.8  4.3  4  0.5  0.9  −6.6  0.8  1.8  −1.5  1.5 
 Ireland  3  4.6  5.7  5.5  4.9  −2.6  −6.4  −0.3  2.8  −0.3  0.2 
 Italy  0.2  1.6  0.9  2  1.5  −1  −5.5  1.7  0.6  −2.3  −1.9 
 Latvia  8.6  8.9  10.2  11.6  9.8  −3.2  −14.2  −2.9  5  4.8  4.2 
 Lithuania  –  –  –  7.4  11.1  2.6  −14.8  1.6  6.1  3.8  3.3 
 Luxembourg  1.2  4.9  4.1  4.9  6.5  0.5  −5.3  5.1  2.6  −0.2  2 
 Malta  2.5  0.4  3.8  1.8  4  3.3  −2.5  3.5  2.2  2.5  2.5 
 Netherlands  0.3  1.9  2.3  3.8  4.2  2.1  −3.3  1.1  1.7  −1.6  −0.7 
 Poland  3.6  5.1  3.5  6.2  7.2  3.9  2.6  3.7  4.8  1.8  1.7 
 Portugal  −0.9  1.8  0.8  1.6  2.5  0.2  −3  1.9  −1.8  −3.3  −1.4 
 Romania  5.5  8.4  4.2  8.1  6.9  8.5  −7.1  −0.8  1.1  0.6  3.4 
 Slovakia  5.4  5.2  6.5  8.3  10.7  5.4  −5.3  4.8  2.7  1.6  1.4 
 Slovenia  2.8  4.4  4  5.7  6.9  3.3  −7.8  1.2  0.6  −2.6  −1 
 Spain  3.2  3.2  3.7  4.2  3.8  1.1  −3.6  0  −0.6  −2.1  −1.2 
 Sweden  2.4  4.3  2.8  4.7  3.4  −0.6  −5.2  6  2.7  −0.3  1.3 
 United Kingdom  4.3  2.5  2.8  3  2.6  −0.3  −4.3  1.9  1.6  0.7  1.7 
 EU28  1.5  2.5  2  3.4  3.1  0.5  −4.4  2.1  1.7  −0.4  0 
 Source: EUROSTAT 
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(Bentolila et al.  2012 ; Garibaldi and Tadde  2013 ). In addition, the fragmentation of 
the labour markets deepened during the economic crisis as a result of the structural 
reforms carried out by Southern European countries under pressure from fi nancial 
markets and from international institutions and creditor countries within the 
European Union. Deregulation of the labour market aimed initially at boosting job 
creation has resulted in increasing temporality and instability of the most vulnerable 
categories of the economically active population, such as the young and women 
(Gutiérrez  2014 ; Moreira et al.  2015 ). On the other hand, the heavy dependence of 
Southern EU economies on labour-intensive and low-productivity jobs has also had 
 Table 11.2  Annual average unemployment rates (%) 
 Country  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013 
 Austria  4.3  4.9  5.2  4.8  4.4  3.8  4.8  4.4  4.2  4.3  4.9 
 Belgium  8.2  8.4  8.5  8.3  7.5  7.0  7.9  8.3  7.2  7.6  8.4 
 Bulgaria  13.7  12.1  10.1  9  6.9  5.6  6.8  10.3  11.3  12.3  13.0 
 Croatia  14.2  13.9  13.0  11.6  10  8.9  9.6  12.3  13.9  16.1  17.3 
 Cyprus  4.1  4.6  5.3  4.6  3.9  3.7  5.4  6.3  7.9  11.9  15.9 
 Czech Rep.  7.8  8.3  7.9  7.1  5.3  4.4  6.7  7.3  6.7  7.0  7.0 
 Denmark  5.4  5.5  4.8  3.9  3.8  3.4  6.0  7.5  7.6  7.5  7.0 
 Estonia  10.3  10.1  8.0  5.9  4.6  5.5  13.5  16.7  12.3  10.0  8.6 
 Finland  9.0  8.8  8.4  7.7  6.9  6.4  8.2  8.4  7.8  7.7  8.2 
 France  8.6  8.9  8.9  8.8  8.0  7.4  9.1  9.3  9.2  9.8  10.3 
 Germany  9.7  10.4  11.2  10.1  8.5  7.4  7.6  7.0  5.8  5.4  5.2 
 Greece  9.7  10.6  10.0  9.0  8.4  7.8  9.6  12.7  17.9  24.5  27.5 
 Hungary  5.8  6.1  7.2  7.5  7.4  7.8  10.0  11.2  11.0  11.0  10.2 
 Ireland  4.6  4.5  4.4  4.5  4.7  6.4  12.0  13.9  14.7  14.7  13.1 
 Italy  8.4  8.0  7.7  6.8  6.1  6.7  7.8  8.4  8.4  10.7  12.2 
 Latvia  11.6  11.7  10.0  7.0  6.1  7.7  17.5  19.5  16.2  15.0  11.9 
 Lithuania  12.4  10.9  8.3  5.8  4.3  5.8  13.8  17.8  15.4  13.4  11.8 
 Luxembourg  3.8  5.0  4.6  4.6  4.2  4.9  5.1  4.6  4.8  5.1  5.9 
 Malta  7.7  7.2  6.9  6.8  6.5  6.0  6.9  6.9  6.4  6.3  6.4 
 Netherlands  4.2  5.1  5.3  4.4  3.6  3.1  3.7  4.5  4.4  5.3  6.7 
 Poland  19.8  19.1  17.9  13.9  9.6  7.1  8.1  9.7  9.7  10.1  10.3 
 Portugal  7.4  7.8  8.8  8.8  9.2  8.7  10.7  12.0  12.9  15.8  16.4 
 Romania  7.7  8  7.1  7.2  6.4  5.6  6.5  7.0  7.2  6.8  7.1 
 Slovakia  17.7  18.4  16.4  13.5  11.2  9.6  12.1  14.5  13.7  14.0  14.2 
 Slovenia  6.7  6.3  6.5  6.0  4.9  4.4  5.9  7.3  8.2  8.9  10.1 
 Spain  11.5  11.0  9.2  8.5  8.2  11.3  17.9  19.9  21.4  24.8  26.1 
 Sweden  6.6  7.4  7.7  7.1  6.1  6.2  8.3  8.6  7.8  8.0  8.0 
 United Kingdom  5.0  4.7  4.8  5.4  5.3  5.6  7.5  7.8  8.1  7.9  7.6 
 EU28  9.1  9.2  9.0  8.2  7.2  7.0  8.9  9.6  9.6  10.5  10.8 
 Source: EUROSTAT 
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a considerable impact on unemployment rates, as low added-value sectors were the 
most hard hit by the economic crisis in Europe (European Commission  2014 ). 
 Finally, rising unemployment has been accompanied by a considerable fall in 
salaries as a direct result of the competitiveness improvement strategies employed 
by Southern European governments, based mainly on cuts in labour costs (Fernández 
 2014 ). All in all, the perception of employment insecurity caused by intensive job 
destruction, the deterioration of welfare state provisions and, fi nally, worsening eco-
nomic working conditions, has led to a generalized perception of a deprivation of 
professional aspirations and life expectations. All these factors combined have 
favoured the intensifi cation of South-North mobility within the EU. 
11.3  Changes in European Migratory Flows 
11.3.1  Historical Context 
 Historically, migratory fl ows in Europe have been characterized by the displace-
ment of workers from relatively underdeveloped rural areas of Northern, Eastern 
and Southern Europe. These workers were attracted to other countries and regions 
where vibrant economic development and urbanization favoured an increasing divi-
sion of labour. This context historically triggered the demand for unskilled or semi- 
skilled labour in growing economic sectors such as intensive agriculture, mining, 
construction and heavy industry. Nonetheless, the main destinations for European 
migrants from the mid-nineteenth century to the 1920s were the Americas and 
Australia. This trend changed with the economic development of Northern European 
countries in the fi rst decade of the twentieth century, which coincided with signifi -
cant reductions in fertility rates and the associated reduction in labour surpluses in 
these countries (Caselli et al.  2003 ). While Southern and Eastern European regions 
continued to lag behind, emigrants from those areas could now fi nd in Northern 
Europe an alternative to trans-oceanic migration. For instance, of the 15 million 
Italians who emigrated between 1876 and 1920, nearly half (6.8 million) went to 
other European countries. Similarly, up to 2.4 million Polish migrants were 
employed as seasonal workers in the German Empire during the same period 
(Castles and Miller  2009 ). World War I—and the ethnic and political migration it 
triggered—as well as the growing restrictions on immigration in the Americas fur-
ther reinforced this trend (Kirk  1969 ). 
 After World War II, the rebuilding of the North European economies in the late 
1940s and the subsequent intensive economic growth supported by the development 
of heavy industries, manufacturing and construction triggered new migration. 
Indeed, those industries required an increasing amount of manpower that native 
workers could not entirely satisfy. Similarly to previous decades, the growing econ-
omies of Northern Europe relied on low-skilled migrants from less-developed coun-
tries and regions to meet the growing demand for labour. Two features characterized 
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these post-war migration fl ows. First, the division of Europe caused by the Cold 
War reduced considerably the fl ow from Central and Eastern Europe countries, 
which had hitherto constituted a traditional reservoir of workers for Northern 
European countries (Fassmann and Münz  1994 ). This created a major dependence 
on workers from Southern Europe. Second, guest-worker programmes became the 
main modality of migration to Northern Europe after World War II. Although these 
programmes had existed before, it was really during the post-war period that state- 
led recruitment programmes began to shape the direction and volume of migratory 
fl ows (Olsson  1996 ). 
 Belgium, the United Kingdom and France were the fi rst to start recruiting in 
Southern Europe by signing bilateral labour agreements with Italy in 1946 (see 
Chaps.  7 ,  8 and  10 of this volume). They were followed by the Netherlands and 
Switzerland a few years later (Akgündüz  2012 ). Interestingly, West Germany—
which became the largest destination country for guest workers—implemented 
these programmes only later. It was only following pressure from employers in the 
industrial sector that the West German government eventually agreed to take this 
route (Petersen  2006 ). These programmes would become the main channel through 
which Italian, Greek, Portuguese and Spanish workers migrated to Northern 
European countries in the 1950s, 1960s and the fi rst half of the 1970s. Within 
Europe, Northern states therefore found in the rural South the necessary supply of 
labour for their economic recovery after World War II. According to rather conser-
vative estimations made by Zimmermann ( 1996 ), from the beginning of the post- 
war migration until the early 1970s, approximately fi ve million people migrated to 
Northern Europe from the Mediterranean countries (including Turkey). However, 
there are reasons to think that the fl ow was even larger. The total volume of fl ow 
from Spain in the period 1956–1971 was approximately 1.5 million (Akgündüz 
 2012 ). According to Venturini ( 2004 ), in the 1960s alone, over 2.3 million Italians 
emigrated to Northern Europe. Between 1965 and 1974, 1,218,000 Portuguese 
migrants moved abroad; of these, 63 % headed to France (Baganha et al.  2005 ). 
Increasing demand for labour favoured the extension of guest-worker programmes 
to countries like Morocco and Turkey. Former colonial powers, like the United 
Kingdom, France and the Netherlands also adopted policies to facilitate a more 
intense migration from former colonial territories (Venturini  2004 ). 
 Over the years, economic development and urbanization in Southern Europe 
gradually reduced the pool of rural and unemployed populations in these areas. This 
trend was reinforced by the 1973 Oil Crisis, which put an end to the period of rapid 
economic expansion in Northern Europe and led these countries to abandon their 
guest-worker programmes. Nonetheless, contrary to government expectations, such 
a policy change did not lead to massive returns of Southern European guest 
workers. 
 In Southern Europe, the gradual improvement of social and economic condi-
tions, the democratization processes in Greece, Portugal and Spain, along with 
weak infl ow control and easy access to the shadow economy, started to attract immi-
gration. Between 1973 and 1989, Southern Europe therefore turned from a major 
migrant-sending region into a receiving one (King  2000 ). In following years, 
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 intensifi cation of immigration fl ows was accompanied by a considerable diversifi ca-
tion of the origins with immigration from Central and Eastern Europe supplement-
ing the earlier migratory waves (Peixoto et al. 2012). Migration from Central and 
Eastern Europe later intensifi ed after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the 
European Union. 
 Initial migratory fl ows from Central and Eastern Europe were directed towards 
the United Kingdom and Ireland, and only later to other Northern EU Member 
States and Southern Europe. EU Labour Force Survey data also shows that within 
the 10 years following the 2004 EU enlargement, the total number of EU12 nation-
als residing in the “old” Member States increased 5.4-fold, from 1.1 million in 2004 
to 6.1 million in 2014. This number can be translated into a total net infl ow of fi ve 
million people from the New Member States (Fihel et al.  2015 ). Overall, the enlarge-
ment of the EU to Central and Eastern Europe contributed decisively to consolidat-
ing the East to West migratory route but also, and most importantly, to establishing 
a new East to South migratory route (Grzymała-Kazłowska  2013 ). 
11.3.2  Migratory Flows in the EU During the Economic Crisis 
 The outbreak of the economic crisis changed considerably the patterns of intra-EU 
mobility. First of all, available data presented in the country chapters of this volume 
showed clear signs of a remarkable increase in South-North mobility, particularly 
between 2011 and 2012, when unemployment levels reached record high levels in 
Southern Europe. Data regarding stock and outfl ows from southern countries sug-
gests that the main destinations for new Southern European migrants have been 
unsurprisingly, the UK and Germany. Data of infl ows from these countries is con-
sistent with this and also reports considerable increases in the numbers of Southern 
Europeans arriving at the beginning of the decade. The lesser importance of France 
as a receiving country, when compared to the role that it played decades ago, may 
very well be a consequence of its sluggish economic performance. 
 In addition, as mentioned in several chapters of this volume, empirical evidence 
suggests that large numbers of New Member State nationals (for example Romanians 
in Spain, Albanians in Greece) and Latin Americans, who once migrated to Southern 
Europe, are currently returning home or re-emigrating towards different EU Member 
States. Finally, it can be observed that the Southern European countries (and Ireland) 
have lost their power of attraction for migratory fl ows. Although in the case of Italy 
and Spain, migratory fl ows from New Member States have continued, their inten-
sity has been signifi cantly lower when compared with the pre-crisis period. By con-
trast, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom represent the 
cluster of countries where the numbers of recently arrived (post-crisis) migrants are 
larger in relative terms than those that arrived between 2003 and 2007. This is 
related to increasing fl ows from the crisis-hit Southern Europe and also to renewed 
migration from New Member States (Fihel et al.  2015 ) (Table  11.3 ).
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11.3.3  Past and Current South-North Flows: Why History Is 
Not Repeating Itself 
 The authors of the country chapters of this volume referred frequently to the contro-
versy regarding the size of the phenomenon under study. On the one hand, it seems 
that, despite the duration and the harshness of the crisis in Southern EU countries, 
the overall volume of South-North migration could be considered relatively low if 
compared with the migrations of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, with the sole excep-
tion of Portugal. On the other hand, data limitations pose the question of whether 
the real numbers of outfl ows and infl ows are greatly underestimated by the available 
offi cial statistics. Particularly puzzling is the estimation of the real size of both cir-
cular and unregistered migration. 
 Table 11.3  Percentages of EU28 nationals living abroad in 2012 by period of arrival to country of 
residence 
 Country of residence  1985–2002  2003–2007  2008–2012 
 Austria  61.71  16.02  22.27 
 Belgium  59.29  15.14  25.57 
 Bulgaria  76.19  4.76  19.05 
 Croatia  91.69  5.45  2.86 
 Cyprus  33.11  22.12  44.77 
 Czech Republic  83.31  9.5  7.18 
 Denmark  39.3  17.94  42.76 
 Estonia  72.37  12.5  15.13 
 Finland  58.69  17.38  23.93 
 France  81.08  9.26  9.66 
 Germany+  64.02  12.69  23.29 
 Greece  54.97  25.83  19.2 
 Hungary  72.54  14.31  13.16 
 Ireland  38.63  33.97  27.4 
 Italy  50.27  33.48  16.25 
 Latvia  89.58  3.1  7.32 
 Lithuania  84.77  5.96  9.27 
 Luxembourg  59.89  16.27  23.84 
 Malta  71.22  15.11  13.67 
 Netherlands  73.09  14.8  12.11 
 Poland  77.04  6.46  16.50 
 Portugal  72.95  16.42  10.64 
 Romania  87.5  6.25  6.25 
 Slovakia  90.24  2.66  7.1 
 Slovenia  91.88  2.38  5.74 
 Spain  54.03  32.87  13.1 
 Sweden  74.99  11.62  13.39 
 United Kingdom  43.8  23.45  32.75 
 Source: EUROSTAT (EU-LFS Survey) 
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 Nevertheless, under the free movement of the labour force granted within the 
European Union by the Treaty, and given the staggering unemployment rates 
observed in the South, one might expect higher rates of internal migratory fl ows, 
even in the offi cial statistics. One plausible explanation for these otherwise “surpris-
ingly” low levels of current South to North migratory fl ows arises when considering 
that international migration is often yet another form of rural to urban migration of 
the young and the middle aged. Due to past declines in fertility rates (see Billari and 
Kohler  2004 ; Frejka and Sardon  2004 ), the size of the 20–34 year old cohorts in 
South Europe decreased substantially between 1965 and 2014 (to around 2.4 mil-
lion smaller in Spain and 0.7 million smaller in Italy). Moreover, as Southern 
European countries are now far more urbanized than in the post-war context, this 
driver of Southern European migration has also lost momentum (Heikkilä and 
Kashinoro  2009 ). Over time, these demographic changes that have affected Southern 
Europe since the 1970s have contributed to a signifi cant reduction in the pool of 
potential migrants from this region of Europe. 
 In addition to this, one must also bear in mind that current potential southern 
migrants often lack informal networks of their fellow countrymen in the destination 
countries, and this limits their ability to establish a foothold there. Demographic 
changes in the South of Europe must thus be related to the lack of availability of 
family networks in destination countries for younger generations of potential south-
ern migrants. Young unemployed southerners are no longer concentrated in rural 
areas lacking basic services, as they were during the post-war years, but instead live 
in well-equipped urban towns and cities, quite often in parental households. Their 
parents did not migrate to northern countries, or else they returned long ago, leaving 
no strong links there. Consequently, nowadays, typically southern family networks 
favour staying at home to cope with unemployment or they take on precarious 
employment rather than migrating. On the other hand, if they do migrate, this may 
be only temporarily, while remaining registered as residents in the parental house-
hold of the native country in order to avoid losing welfare benefi ts, such as free and 
straightforward access to public health care. 
 There is a well-documented literature on the impact of transnational networks on 
migration fl ows and patterns of labour market incorporation. At the individual or 
household level, support from ethnic networks reduces the costs of migration and 
adaptation into the host society and labour market. At the macro-social level, these 
networks determine the direction and intensity of migration fl ows (Gurak and Caces 
 1992 ; Espinosa and Massey  1999 ). However, as established in the literature, the 
durability of transnational links is a critical condition for networks to play a role for 
newcomers. When there are important time gaps between migration waves, the links 
between old and new migration waves may be weak. In this case, the links between 
migrant communities and the home country can become purely symbolic and there-
fore of little use for the socio-economic integration of newcomers (Bruneau  2010 ). 
In this regard, the case of post-crisis Southern European migration is very illustrative. 
The gradual decrease in the volume of emigration from Italy, Spain and Greece after 
the 1970s Oil Crisis created a considerable time gap between the post- war and the 
new cohorts of migrants. We believe that this missing generational link has contrib-
uted to keeping the volume of outfl ows from these countries relatively low. 
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 As shown in Chap.  6 , Portugal offers a counter-example to this situation, as net-
works continue to play an important role in migration decisions and in the integra-
tion of newcomers into the labour market. The relevance of migration networks in 
the Portuguese case can be explained by the fact that migration from this country 
never ceased. This continuous migration maintained dense transnational connec-
tions between the emigrant communities and the home country. This data could 
explain the specifi city of the Portuguese case compared to the other three Southern 
European case studies: new Portuguese migrants are comparatively more numerous 
and less skilled. 
 Southern Europeans lacking informal links (relatives or friends) with northern 
countries may fi nd alternative strategies to cope with unemployment, such as stay-
ing within the parental household in the country of origin, waiting for a job oppor-
tunity, accepting work in the shadow economy or pursuing further education. In 
short, they opt for modalities of adaptation to the crisis that do not involve migra-
tion, or at least, not the type of (permanent) fully regularized migration that is 
refl ected in offi cial statistics. 
 Furthermore, one should not forget that northern countries have experienced a 
deep transformation of their economic structure with subsequent changes in labour 
force demand. The structure of demand for labour in Northern Europe is not the 
same as it was during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, either in quantitative or qualita-
tive terms. Labour-intensive industries have, to a great extent, been delocalized, thus 
reducing employment opportunities for unskilled migrants. At the same time, many 
employment niches have appeared in the service sector for the low skilled (e.g., 
hospitality) and also for the better educated (e.g., health care, fi nance, engineering), 
particularly in the most dynamic Northern European labour markets (the UK, 
Germany). Northern European labour markets no longer require a massive migra-
tion of uneducated people to place in labour-intensive activities such as mining or 
heavy industry but rather workers with specifi c skills. Accordingly, successful 
insertion into these more competitive labour markets is only available to those 
migrants who respond to certain characteristics in terms of education, occupation 
and language profi ciency. The low level of foreign language profi ciency among 
Southern Europeans is therefore an important obstacle to their successful relocation 
in Northern Europe (see EU Skills Panorama  2014 ). Among the highly educated, 
some have specifi c skills that are needed in receiving Northern European countries. 
Others, however, do not have those skills, or simply lack adequate acceptable quali-
fi cations with which to demonstrate them. In addition, while the average educa-
tional level of young Southern European cohorts may have improved over the years, 
it often remains insuffi cient to meet the demands of Northern European employers 
in specifi c sectors (Lüdemann and Richter  2014 ). Finally, compared to the post-war 
context, Southern EU migrants are no longer the only ones to migrate to North 
Western Europe. Indeed, the growing presence of Eastern European and third 
 country migrants has strongly mitigated the demand for Southern EU migrants over 
the years. As suggested by the available data, Central and Eastern European migrants 
occupy mostly low- and mid-skilled labour positions primarily in low value-added 
economic sectors (Kahanec and Kurekova  2014 ). Nonetheless, it should also be 
noted that in the post-enlargement period, the share of EU10 migrants with high 
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educational attainment residing in the EU15 has increased substantially (Kahanec 
 2013 ). An examination of this data therefore suggests that an important number of 
workers accept jobs below their level of qualifi cation. 
 The large volume of Central and Eastern EU migration to Northern EU Member 
States has consequences for the incorporation into the labour market of new 
Southern EU migrants who move to the same area. The concentration of Central and 
Eastern migrants in elementary occupations constitutes an important obstacle to the 
successful incorporation of new low-skilled migrants from Southern Europe. For 
this reason, the skills level is becoming an increasingly important factor driving the 
successful labour market integration of new Southern European migrants, as will be 
shown in the following section. 
11.4  Socio-demographic Composition of South European 
Migrants 
11.4.1  Age Composition 
 Data presented in the country chapters confi rms that newly arrived South European 
migrants are of a particularly young age. Sources from sending southern countries 
report increasing proportions of people of a young age residing abroad, which is 
consistent with employment statistics from the main receiving countries, such as the 
UK or Germany, where sharp increases in the number of southerners fi nding a job 
there correlate with increases in the proportions of the “under 30 age group”. We 
relate this trend, mentioned in previous sections of this chapter, to a strong “insider- 
outsider” fragmentation of the labour market, characteristic of Southern economies, 
whereby precarious employment is disproportionally more prevalent among the 
young, often irrespective of their educational attainment. As will be shown in the 
following sections, current South to North migration cannot be described as the 
result only of the movement of those with the lowest educational or occupational 
profi les, i.e., those who might consider migrating based on “push” factors. Though 
this sort of migration may describe the circumstances of the majority of Portuguese 
or Greek migrants to the UK, it does not refl ect accurately the circumstances of 
most Italians and Spaniards (see Chap.  10 of this volume) and it does not explain 
why many well-educated Greeks are moving abroad. In fact, the data suggests that 
migration is becoming a strategy adopted by an increasing number of young well- 
educated southerners, who move north seeking better career prospects and profes-
sional development, neither of which is available at home. The crisis has exacerbated 
the negative effects on the employability of the young in the segmented Southern 
European labour markets, which have always been unfriendly towards them. From 
this perspective, and as will be argued in the concluding sections of this chapter, the 
migration of skilled South Europeans to Northern Europe may not be regarded 
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exclusively as a new form of “brain drain” but rather as a response by skilled profes-
sionals to avoid their own “brain waste”. 
11.4.2  Educational Attainment 
 New Southern European migrants are not only fewer in number than during the 
post-war context, they also constitute a more diverse group. As Table  11.4 shows, 
an increasing proportion of these migrants are skilled professionals. Indeed, the 
 Table 11.4  Percentages of EU28 migrant population by level of education 
 Country of 
residence 
 University  Secondary  Primary  University  Secondary  Primary 
 2007  2007  2007  2012  2012  2012 
 Austria  23.5  55.74  20.76  24.5  57.06  18.44 
 Belgium  27.97  29.06  42.98  30.75  30.63  38.62 
 Bulgaria  20.27  25.68  54.05  37.5  18.75  43.75 
 Croatia  –  –  –  24.06  45.45  30.48 
 Cyprus  34.26  38.39  27.35  33.4  42.49  24.11 
 Czech Republic  9.59  57.13  33.27  12.96  55.53  31.51 
 Denmark  39.38  39.18  21.44  39.84  35.3  24.85 
 Estonia  42.99  38.32  18.69  51.54  33.85  14.62 
 Finland  –  –  –  26.82  41.67  31.52 
 France  15.92  23.92  60.16  19.23  26.94  53.83 
 Germany+  17.72  40.43  41.85  22.17  44.29  33.54 
 Greece  20.05  49.76  30.18  20.53  46.65  32.83 
 Hungary  17.67  51.36  30.97  25.64  52.08  22.28 
 Ireland  33.98  36.65  29.37  36.73  35.42  27.85 
 Italy  12.46  46.89  40.65  10.94  50.34  38.72 
 Latvia  15.63  44.37  40  18.16  47.26  34.58 
 Island*  30.99  37.14  31.87  28.41  47.02  24.57 
 Lithuania  25.13  50.8  24.06  32.62  58.16  9.22 
 Luxembourg  25.39  30.48  44.13  39.78  30.17  30.05 
 Malta  –  –  –  17.77  31.75  50.47 
 Netherlands  30.25  50.71  19.04  37.09  36.41  26.5 
 Poland  9.75  45.05  45.2  15.12  42.25  37.63 
 Portugal  24.44  29.52  46.03  24.65  33.43  41.91 
 Romania  49.06  30.19  20.75  19.05  35.71  45.24 
 Slovakia  17.41  60.15  22.44  25.57  60.5  13.93 
 Slovenia  25.29  54.6  20.11  23.26  54.04  22.69 
 Spain  26.37  34.11  39.52  27.1  33.28  39.62 
 Sweden  30.31  41.24  28.45  33.3  38.85  27.85 
 United Kingdom  26.71  52.04  21.25  40.77  40.05  19.18 
 Source: EUROSTAT (EU-LFS Survey) 
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educational composition of EU28 migrants has changed signifi cantly during the 
crisis. Between 2007 and 2012, a general reduction in the stock of EU28 migrants 
with only primary education is observed in favour of an increase in the stocks of 
those with a secondary and a university education. However, this shift has not taken 
place equally in all countries. While the United Kingdom and Luxembourg seem to 
have specialized in attracting the highly educated (and reducing the proportion of 
both those with a primary and a secondary education in their labour markets), other 
countries seem to have attracted workers with both a secondary and a university 
education (Germany, France, Belgium).
 Available Eurostat statistics do not differentiate between Eastern and Southern 
Europeans. Nevertheless, the country chapters in this volume, as well as other recent 
studies, do provide relevant data suggesting that the presence of highly-educated 
young professionals is above average among South Europeans. This is particularly 
the case among Italians and Spaniards (see Kaczmarczyk and Stanek  2015 ). In 
Germany, as explained in Chap.  9 of this volume, this has been caused by a signifi -
cant increase in the demand for highly qualifi ed labour, which, to date, has not been 
satisfi ed by introducing either national level recruitment schemes or EU-level regu-
lations, such as the introduction of the EU Blue Card (see Cerna and Czaika  2015 ) 
However, the volume of fl ows has failed to match the expectations of governments 
and employers, and numbers are far below those observed in the UK. Available data 
discussed in the country chapters on Italy and Spain also confi rms a considerable 
increase in the total number and proportion of highly-educated people migrating to 
Northern Europe. This trend should not hide the fact that the unskilled still represent 
an important share of South to North migratory fl ows (about one third in Germany 
and in the UK). In fact, there is some controversy over the extent to which migration 
of unskilled migrants is going largely “undetected” by offi cial statistics, given the 
allegedly higher tendency among the low educated to work in the shadow economy 
or as self-employed and to avoid de-registering as residents in their home countries. 
Nevertheless, taking all these considerations together, it is evident that an increas-
ingly large number of southerners with a university degree are moving north. 
 Even though the higher levels of education of southern migrants may partly 
refl ect the increase in the overall educational level of the young cohorts, other fac-
tors can also be identifi ed to explain the growing presence of the highly educated 
among those who leave Southern Europe. Indeed, we believe that this trend reveals 
an increasing selectivity in current migratory fl ows, which we attribute to changes 
in labour demand. These changes are related fi rstly, to the ever-growing importance 
of knowledge-based sectors in the economic structure of Northern European coun-
tries and secondly, to changes in the socio-demographic characteristics of young 
Southern Europeans. As mentioned in previous sections of this chapter,  low- educated 
Southern Europeans lack informal networks in the main destination countries, 
whose presence might otherwise ease their entrance into local labour markets. 
Moreover, competition from Eastern and Central Europeans also constitutes a major 
factor that limits job opportunities for unskilled southerners. Furthermore, a large 
number of these unskilled Southern Europeans can count on alternative strategies to 
migration, since the conditions in southern countries have improved with respect to 
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the decades prior to the Oil Crisis. Unemployment benefi ts, parental help, employ-
ment in the shadow economy or the pursuit of further education can be reasonable 
alternatives to migration, at least for a period of time. Highly skilled young Southern 
Europeans, by contrast, do have clearer incentives to migrate to northern countries. 
There, the demand for labour is more suited to their skills, making them less depen-
dent on informal networks for their insertion into the labour market. In addition, as 
mentioned previously, career prospects in the typically fragmented labour markets 
of Southern European countries, where young people are often marginalized as 
“outsiders” regardless of their educational attainment, have worsened considerably 
during the crisis, making them more open to the idea of migrating. All these factors 
may have contributed to keeping the levels of migration from South to North rela-
tively low in absolute numbers while favouring an increase in the proportion of the 
highly educated. 
11.4.3  Employment and Occupational Status of South 
European Migrants 
 As indicated previously, the outbreak of the economic crisis had negative conse-
quences on the labour market all over the EU. However, the duration and scale of 
the deterioration of employment opportunities among EU28 migrants has varied 
considerably from country to country. Data presented in Table  11.5 indicates that 
unemployment among EU28 migrants has decreased in Germany (as well as among 
its native population), increased moderately in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark and has increased sharply 
in Southern European countries (especially in Greece and Spain but less in Italy) 
and in Ireland.
 It is worth mentioning that Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom have not 
seen a major increase in EU28 migrant unemployment, despite being the three 
countries where the stock of EU28 migrants has increased the most since the begin-
ning of the crisis. Particularly interesting is the case of the United Kingdom. This 
country seems to have become a remarkably attractive destination for EU nationals, 
who look for better opportunities outside their native countries, a situation con-
fi rmed by data provided in the country chapters on the UK, Italy and Spain. In the 
UK, the proportion of EU28 immigrants arriving between 2007 and 2012 consti-
tuted 32.7 %, although unemployment amongst this group has not increased 
signifi cantly. 
 Although suffi cient data is lacking in order to fully assess the labour market 
attainments of the different educational categories of new Southern EU migrants in 
Northern EU countries, data presented in the country chapters draws a picture of 
increasing diversity. While low-educated migrants seem to have a poor chance of 
successful labour market insertion in Germany, the highly skilled may integrate 
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rather well. This is particularly the case for those recruited by the various agencies 
operating to attract highly skilled professionals into the German labour market, pro-
viding they acquire the necessary profi ciency in the German language. The UK 
seems to be the most attractive country for migrants of all educational levels. Its 
particularly dynamic labour market, combined with the fact that English is the 
 lingua franca in today's Europe, constitute two powerful elements of attraction for 
job seekers from all regions of the world. However, not all highly skilled migrants 
do fi nd jobs appropriate to their level of education, particularly during the fi rst year 
after arrival. Many fi nd themselves working in low-profi le jobs in the retail or hos-
pitality sectors and a non-negligible number of them do return to their home coun-
tries after 1 or 2 years. This may be a disappointing outcome for these migrants, or 
 Table 11.5  Percentages of EU28 migrant population by employment status 
 Country of residence 
 Employed  Unemployed  Employed  Unemployed 
 2007  2007  2012  2012 
 Austria  50.58  2.92  54.52  3.03 
 Belgium  49.47  4.54  51.31  5.3 
 Bulgaria  13.51  2.7  12.5  6.25 
 Croatia  –  –  33.96  7.49 
 Cyprus  56.67  3.73  60.14  10.32 
 Czech Republic  43.55  4.97  37.57  4.99 
 Denmark  63.78  3.29  62.85  7.51 
 Estonia  66.97  0  50  5.97 
 Finland  –  –  73.18  6.36 
 France  43.84  3.71  44.17  4.1 
 Germany  61.02  6.73  63.97  4.85 
 Greece  58.77  5.22  50.5  17.02 
 Hungary  42.55  2.63  43.75  4.88 
 Ireland  69.46  4.14  57.19  12.49 
 Italy  55.14  5.23  55.51  8.63 
 Latvia  44.51  3.99  32.63  6.53 
 Lithuania  51.34  1.07  55.32  4.96 
 Luxembourg  59.73  2.48  64.66  3.39 
 Malta  –  –  41  4.98 
 Netherlands  66.65  2.78  71.75  5.53 
 Poland  13  0.74  14.27  1.16 
 Portugal  61.08  4.89  58.33  11.93 
 Romania  49.06  1.89  16.67  0 
 Slovakia  46.23  1.93  37.44  3.65 
 Slovenia  41.38  0.57  40.09  4.01 
 Spain  63.27  7.16  48.98  21.15 
 Sweden  68.73  4.09  66.06  6.26 
 United Kingdom  61.93  3.57  61.85  4.58 
 Source: EUROSTAT (EU-LFS Survey) 
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it may be what they initially expected. During their stay in the UK, many southern 
migrants acquire the employment experience and profi ciency in the English lan-
guage that will help them to fi nd a job back in their home country, where initial 
access to the labour market is particularly harsh for the young and inexperienced. 
Among those with a secondary level education, some may very well fi nd better 
career prospects in the UK than in Germany, if their profi les match the gaps left by 
the British educational system. Indeed, demand for certain types of professionals in 
the UK in the health care and construction sectors is closely related to a lack of 
vocational training in these areas. Foreign workers holding qualifi cations in these 
fi elds have traditionally been welcomed into the British labour marked for many 
decades and many southerners had been profi ting from this, way before the begin-
ning of the crisis. 
11.5  Concluding Remarks: From Old Routes of Mass 
Migration to New Routes of Individual Mobility 
 The economic downturn in the Southern European countries has undoubtedly con-
tributed to the transformation of migration patterns in Europe in recent years. The 
most salient changes are, fi rstly, the drastic reduction in migration fl ows to Southern 
EU Member States and secondly, the increase in fl ows of South European nationals 
to Northern European countries. Associated with the fi rst of these changes, there 
has been an important increase in former migrants to Southern Europe who either 
return home (mainly to Latin America or Eastern Europe) or re-emigrate to Northern 
Europe. Though Southern Europeans never ceased completely from migrating north 
(particularly the Portuguese), and fl ows from South to North had already begun to 
rise during the years prior to the fi nancial crisis, there is scant evidence that the 
effects of the fi nancial crisis on employment rates in southern countries has greatly 
exacerbated the trend. 
 A more controversial issue is the discussion over the magnitude and nature of 
this trend. As mentioned above, fl ows of South to North migration are fuelled not 
only by migrants born in Southern Europe but also by people born in Eastern 
European or Latin American countries re-emigrating in order to seek better employ-
ment opportunities. Often, these migrants move north while holding on to their 
Southern EU Member State passports. In addition, many native Southern Europeans 
are known to migrate to Northern Europe without de-registering as residents in their 
home countries, or else they move only on a seasonal basis. Such circumstances, 
among many others, contribute to make current offi cial statistics insuffi cient to 
assess the real size and nature of current South to North migratory fl ows. 
 Although some parallels may be established between current South to North 
fl ows and those occurring prior to the Oil Crisis in the mid-1970s, the overall inten-
sity and nature of the new trend are quite different. Southern European migrants 
have changed along with the socio-economic and demographic reality of the South. 
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Nowadays, southern migrants are mainly young and much better educated than their 
fellow countrymen who migrated during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. The causes 
triggering migration are also of a different nature. Current southerners do not come 
from the typical underdeveloped rural areas which were reservoirs of migratory 
outfl ows in the past, nor are they being recruited on a massive scale as cheap 
unskilled labour by employers of the manufacturing and extractive industries of 
northern countries. The mechanisms operating behind the increase in the number of 
southerners migrating north are a bit more complex than those that triggered past 
migratory fl ows between the rural South and the industrialized urban North. Clearly, 
the dramatic rises in unemployment levels in the South, particularly among the 
young, are the cornerstone of the story. The segmentation of the labour market has 
intensifi ed during the crisis, causing many youngsters to lose their jobs and leaving 
closed for many more the doors leading to employment. And this is for an undeter-
mined period of time and with bleak prospects for developing a professional career, 
particularly for the highly educated. 
 Current migratory fl ows may be greater in volume than observed in the offi cial 
statistics, but they are still not comparable in size to the mass migration of the post- 
war decades. By contrast to the past European South-North fl ows, current migra-
tions are no longer collectively organized by bilateral agreements between sending 
and receiving countries in order to satisfy the demands of labour-intensive sectors 
of the economy. Technological innovation and globalization, along with the devel-
opment of national-specifi c institutional settings governing the labour markets in 
northern countries, have created a much more complex landscape of opportunities 
and employment niches for potential migrants from Southern Europe and other 
parts of the EU. Thus, the successful integration into the receiving country’s labour 
market is increasingly dependent on whether immigrant profi les match the specifi c 
demands of the receiving country. This reduces the opportunities for unskilled 
southerners, who have been the most hardly hit by the increase in unemployment 
rates in Southern Europe. It also puts extra pressure on the highly educated, who 
must adjust to specifi c skills requirements resulting from high specialization in high 
value-added sectors typical of Northern European economies. Moreover, potential 
southern migrants nowadays constitute a group less prone to migration, since they 
can gain little benefi t from solid migrant networks in destination countries, due to 
the generational gap between post-war and current migration waves. In fact, family 
or informal networks may be more available if they opt to stay in their home coun-
try, where living conditions are far better than before the Oil Crisis of the 1970s. 
Last but not least, the presence of large numbers of Eastern Europeans in the labour 
markets of Northern European countries constitutes stark competition for available 
jobs, which limits considerably the potential demand for southern labour. 
 Regarding the nature of the current intra-European South-North migrations, 
there is growing evidence showing that an important share of these fl ows is of tem-
porary or circular nature (see Chap.  5 in this volume). Although this characteristic 
may appear similar to post-war migrations of Southern European guest workers, 
differences in the institutional and economic contexts force us to question the con-
tinuity between old and new migration patterns. At the time of guest worker 
J. Lafl eur et al.
211
 programmes, the principal purpose was to ensure rotation by contracting workers 
for a limited periods, restricting family reunion (though not systematically) and 
permitting workers only to access specifi c economic sectors and occupations. As the 
employment and residency permits of foreign workers were renewable and labour 
demand remained high at least until the early 1970s, many Southern European 
workers stayed in the countries of destination over long periods of them. Many of 
them even decided to remain there after guest workers programs fi nally came to an 
end (Castles  1986 ). In the current context, the EU’s freedom of movement, lowering 
costs of transportation and progress in communication technologies, along with the 
increasing deregulation of employment conditions, contributed to diversify mobility 
strategies as well as destinations of new Southern European migrants. In other 
words, South-North EU migrations, similarly to East-West migrations (Engbersen 
et al.  2013 ), now follow patterns of temporary and circular mobility rather than 
long-term migration patterns observed in the post-war period. 
 It is equally diffi cult to draw a clear analogy between the past guest worker pro-
grammes and the current situation of posted workers in the EU. First of all, as shown 
in Chaps.  3 ,  5 and  9 , the volume of Southern European posted workers employed in 
Northern Europe is increasing but is still considerably lower than fl ows of guest 
workers during the post-war period. Second, unlike guest worker programmes in 
which sending and receiving countries’ administrations were actively involved, the 
recruitment of posted workers is mainly managed by temporary staffi ng agencies or 
employers (Mottweiler et al.  2014 ). Furthermore, the recruitment of posted workers 
is not geographically limited but can occur throughout the EU. Overall, posted 
workers may enjoy greater autonomy and fl exibility in their mobility strategies 
compared to post-war guest workers but, as shown in this volume, weaker public 
oversight also exposes them to greater diffi culties when it comes to enforcing rules 
on their employment conditions or on their access to social protection. 
 Given these considerations, new South-North migration has become more selec-
tive and more dependent on individual initiative in contrast with previous decades, 
when it was mostly (although not exclusively) based on bilateral agreements and 
was organized on a rather collective basis. The fl ows are now more open, but they 
are also shaped by factors such as the migrant’s skills characteristics as well as the 
specifi cities of the labour markets of receiving countries and the short-term perfor-
mance of their economies. Thus, successful integration into the receiving country’s 
labour market is increasingly dependent on whether immigrant profi les match the 
specifi c demands of the receiving country. Though routes for mass migration open 
to rural unskilled southerners do not seem to be operating, certain types of profes-
sionals may fi nd clear pathways through which to move north, on an individual 
basis. Engineers seem to be welcomed in Germany, and analysts, managers and 
health care related professionals seem to be in high demand in the UK. Experienced 
construction workers and other types of semi-skilled professionals may also be able 
to fi nd employment opportunities. The migration of such a large number of profes-
sionals might not be necessarily regarded as examples of “brain drain” but rather as 
individual responses to a lack of employment opportunities in the South, where the 
skills of the young are often disregarded by its segmented labour market. 
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 From this perspective, it is noteworthy to point to some dysfunctional features of 
the European Union, which limit mobility and discourage many potential migrants 
from moving abroad, or which favour mobility remaining in the shadows. Too often, 
national level institutional settings regulating the labour market contribute to the 
confi guration of a rather rigid and fragmented European labour market. In addition, 
legislation regulating access to welfare and health care is not designed to suit the 
needs of migrant workers. A lot of work remains to be done by European institu-
tions in order to ease these shortcomings. Bilateral agreements between EU Member 
States could contribute to easing the controversy regarding access to welfare by EU 
migrants. Reforming labour markets in the South and facilitating mechanisms to 
avoid “brain waste” while such reforms remain to be fully achieved should also be 
considered another priority for the near future of the EU Member States. 
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Chapter 12
Lessons from the South-North Migration 
of EU Citizens in Times of Crisis
Jean-Michel Lafleur and Mikolaj Stanek
12.1  Five Lessons from the South-North Migration of EU 
Citizens in Times of Crisis
In this volume, we have demonstrated that—since its inception in 2008—the global 
financial and economic crisis has strongly impacted migration flows to/from/within 
the European Union as well as the way policy-makers and the public have reacted 
to them. While we have noted an intensification of South-North migration flows in 
all the case studies, the political reaction of Northern European receiving countries 
to this increased mobility has often seemed unrelated to the actual size of the phe-
nomenon. Similarly, Southern European countries of origin have also adopted 
diverse responses, ranging from indifference to active engagement towards the ris-
ing level of departure of their citizens.
Over the past few years, the issue of the mobility of EU citizens has become 
increasingly salient and controversial. As demonstrated in this volume, the arrival of 
Southern Europeans has often failed to trigger the same level of animosity in desti-
nation countries as that of post-accession migrants from Central and Eastern Europe. 
Moreover, the renewed influx of asylum seekers to the EU, which intensified expo-
nentially in the summer of 2015, has been seen to precipitate similar high levels of 
hostility. South-North flows of EU citizens, however, pose a series of questions for 
the future of migration in the EU: are we witnessing a repetition of the massive 
South-North migrations that took place two generations ago? Is migration a princi-
pal strategy to cope with the effects of crises within the European Union? How is 
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increasing EU migration shaping the debates and policies in countries of origin and 
destination?
As we bring this volume to a close, we believe that many elements can be found 
in the previous chapters to help provide some answers to these questions. Building 
on our different case studies, we can thus identify five main lessons from the 
renewed migration flows of Southern European EU citizens that are key to our 
understanding of contemporary migration dynamics within the EU. While the 
method that has guided our efforts is not strictly comparative, the comparison of 
elements drawn from carefully selected case studies ensures the validity of those 
conclusions. Similarly, the use of different data sources in the country chapters is 
not an impediment to drawing general conclusions on the characteristics of these 
new migrants. On the contrary, we believe that this diversity of sources has enabled 
us to identify the most salient issues with regard to new Southern European 
migration.
12.1.1  Lesson 1: New Southern EU Migrants Are Different 
from Their Predecessors
The migratory routes that are now leading Southern European migrants to North 
Western European Member States may be similar to those used by guest workers in 
the twentieth century, but the conditions of arrival and the socio-economic charac-
teristics of these new migrants are profoundly different. Post-war migration can be 
seen to have largely occurred in response to recruitment programmes promoted by 
destination countries. In recent times, by contrast, destination countries—except 
Germany—have not explicitly extended an invitation to new migrants, as their own 
economies have also suffered from the effects of the crisis. Whereas Southern 
European guest workers left countries that were barely or partially industrialized 
during most of the twentieth century, the new migrants are leaving their home coun-
tries after several decades of economic growth as EU-15 Member States. 
Unsurprisingly, the different socio-economic contexts in which old and new 
Southern European migration occurred are widely reflected in the socio- demographic 
profiles of citizens leaving during the crisis. As has been shown in Chap. 11, the 
current migrants from Southern Europe are on average better educated compared to 
their post-war predecessors. This is partly related to a general improvement in edu-
cational attainment in these societies as well as to the vulnerable situation of young 
adults in the labour market, who use migration as a coping strategy in times of cri-
sis. However, even though the economic crisis has hit most severely segments of the 
population with low levels of human capital, highly skilled individuals are over- 
represented in the new flows of Southern European migrants because they are the 
ones who are able to better respond to the labour market needs of Northern EU 
Member States. In other words, although it is still unclear how well these new 
migrants are performing in the labour markets, the selectivity of flows according to 
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skills level shows that the transforming structure of demand for labour force in post- 
crisis Northern EU economies may play a crucial role in shaping current South- 
North flows.
Another important factor that determines the profile of current Southern European 
migrants is the decreasing role of networks in migration strategies. This feature 
contrasts clearly with previous waves of South-North migration, when the flows 
were managed on a collective basis within a framework of bilateral agreements. 
Current flows are now more individualized but also more dependent on migrants’ 
skills characteristics and their capacity to adjust to the specific needs of Northern 
EU labour markets.
These trends should not hide the fact that, as shown in the country chapters, cur-
rent South-North migration is far from being homogenous. While statistics on this 
matter are hard to collect, the different country chapters hint at the fact that a share 
of the new Southern European migration has had a previous migration experience. 
Indeed, some new Southern EU migrants are third country migrants who obtained 
citizenship in Southern Europe and either returned to their home country or moved 
North with the economic crisis.
Lastly, transformations between pre and post crisis in migration patterns are not 
uniformly visible in the case of Southern European countries. The case of Portugal 
differs significantly from others due to the larger volume of migration flow com-
pared to its overall population. In addition, migration from Portugal seems to be less 
selective with regard to skills level. Unlike other Southern EU Member States, 
migration from Portugal has never ceased. Although the scarcity of data does not 
allow us to draw categorical conclusions, this fact may explain why the new flows 
of Portuguese emigrants are not so different from the previous ones.
12.1.2  Lesson 2: Migration Is a Strategy Adopted by Citizens 
and States in Response to Crises
As we have clearly shown in this volume, the level of mobility of citizens within the 
EU has significantly increased during the crisis but, overall, only a very small 
minority of EU citizens actually reside in a Member State other than their state of 
nationality, even after the crisis. Considering the harshness of the recession in most 
EU Member States, this data could be viewed as surprising. The case study of 
Greece, for instance, showed that the crisis triggered an increase in migration flows 
but that—in spite of a strong increase in unemployment—flows have remained 
somewhat limited in absolute terms.
Even though migration is a strategy adopted by some in response to the crisis, not 
all sectors of the population in Southern Europe have equal opportunities to emi-
grate. In this volume, we have placed particular emphasis on the process of labour 
market segmentation, which, even before the crisis, had been creating a strong dis-
parity between different groups of workers in terms of protection. Italy and Greece 
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best exemplify this situation. Older workers there tend to hold long-term and stable 
contracts, while young cohorts of workers occupy mostly insecure, highly-flexible 
and low-paid jobs. This segmentation of the labour market in Southern Europe has 
been reinforced with the crisis since contracting and dismissal on the basis of fixed- 
term contracts have become more common.
Throughout this volume, we have thus demonstrated that migration is a strategy 
used by only some EU citizens to deal with the effects of the crisis. Others either do 
not need to take this approach, or make use of alternative strategies that do not entail 
physical mobility. Such strategies have been identified in the various case studies 
featured and they include housing strategies by which young adults return to live in 
the parental home or educational strategies consisting of delaying or suspending 
entry into the job market by resuming tertiary education. Reasons for choosing 
alternatives to migration include the fact that—in Southern Europe as in other parts 
of the world—migration is simply not an option that is available to all citizens who 
find themselves in a situation of vulnerability.
As shown in the case studies here, debates on the skills levels of new Southern 
EU migrants have strongly influenced the reaction of both sending and receiving 
countries to crisis migration. With regard to receiving countries, the case of Germany 
showed that limited skills, issues with the recognition of skills and a low level of 
language proficiency may still discourage would-be emigrants from leaving and 
may hinder the successful socio-economic integration of those who do emigrate. 
Yet, Germany’s reaction also showed that encouraging immigration is a strategy 
followed by states in order to cope with the macro-economic and political effects of 
the crisis. Unlike France, Belgium and the United Kingdom, the German authorities 
clearly saw an opportunity within the crisis to attract highly-skilled workers, who 
are greatly needed in order to maintain the country’s competitiveness. To this end, 
Germany has recruited workers from Southern Europe and provided them with 
training in order to facilitate their integration into the labour market. This strategy 
is, however, only a very partial response to Germany’s labour force needs.
Sending countries, by contrast, have been less eager to promote emigration as a 
solution to unemployment. Unlike other periods in history when Southern European 
governments explicitly encouraged migration as a safety valve, they are now very 
reluctant to even acknowledge the existence of crisis-related migration. The Spanish 
government’s insistence on describing new emigrants as “youngsters in search of 
adventure” is particularly telling in this respect. This attitude illustrates the dilemma 
in which Southern European governments find themselves with regard to crisis- 
related migration. On the one hand, these flows may marginally reduce the pressure 
on social assistance systems and improve unemployment statistics. On the other 
hand, explicitly encouraging emigration could be interpreted as a failure by the 
government to provide an adequate response to the crisis. As shown very clearly in 
the case of Greece, Portugal and Spain, debates on crisis-related emigration have 
often been used by political parties to open up larger debates on austerity and the 
management of the crisis. In other words, emigration data has been instrumental-
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ized by political parties in sending countries to discuss the adequacy of macro- 
economic policy responses in times of crisis.
12.1.3  Lesson 3: The Principle of Freedom of Circulation 
Does Not Apply Equally to All EU Citizens
Freedom of circulation is one of the achievements of the European integration pro-
cess that is most appreciated by EU citizens, in spite of variations in the levels of 
support for this policy across Member States. This right has never been absolute and 
safeguards have always existed to limit the freedom of circulation of undesirable 
EU migrants (e.g. criminals, the unemployed, etc.). With the crisis, Northern 
European Member States have made increasing use of those safeguards and have 
even called for further restrictions upon the freedom of circulation. Those states do 
not, however, uniformly target all EU citizens. Instead, a process of segmentation in 
access to freedom of circulation—which started before the crisis—has been pro-
gressively reinforced with the economic crisis. This segmentation process operates 
along three lines.
First, with regard to occupation, it is important to note that the mobility rights of 
pensioners and students have not at all been questioned in recent years. Also, within 
the category of EU workers, only highly-skilled workers have continued to remain 
desirable in the eyes of governments. As shown with the case of Italian associations 
in Brussels (see Chap. 7), highly-skilled migrants are also those who have access to 
the most resources to mobilize and react when their freedom of circulation is being 
contested. By contrast, posted workers, low-skilled EU workers and mobile unem-
ployed EU citizens have been at the centre of many controversies in Northern 
European Member States. As we have shown in several chapters, these categories of 
migrants have been increasingly depicted as illegitimate EU movers, whose rights 
to circulation should be strongly limited. The most telling example of this discrep-
ancy in the definition of legitimate EU mobility can be seen in the United Kingdom. 
In this country, discourses and policies are becoming increasingly hostile towards 
new EU migrants coming to work in the UK, while the right of retired British citi-
zens to reside in France and in Southern Europe (and to access social services like 
health care in those countries) is not being contested.
Second, Nationality is the second line along which segmentation operates in EU 
citizens’ use of freedom of circulation. Even after the lifting of the temporary 
restrictions on freedom of circulation, the mobility of Central and Eastern European 
EU citizens has usually been more contentious than that of Southern Europeans. 
The sizeable difference in flows provides an explanation for this different percep-
tion. Most importantly however, populist and xenophobic political parties of several 
Member States have used the cliché of the “invasion of Central and Eastern European 
migrants” for over a decade in order to justify their anti-migration stance. The 
“Polish plumber” in France, the “Polish butcher” in Germany or the “Romanian 
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construction worker” in Belgium are the best examples of this rhetorical effort to 
associate perceived negative effects of EU migration with specific nationalities of 
EU citizens.
Southern EU citizens have been affected by restrictive policies applied to all EU 
citizens in times of crisis. These policies undermine their ability to make use of their 
freedom of circulation in Northern Europe. But, in the cases we reviewed, only in 
the United Kingdom did we find explicit negative references made by policy- makers 
towards new Southern Europeans. Underlying this, and this is the third line of seg-
mentation, is the fact that the history of migration has benefited Southern European 
migrants more than those from Central and Eastern European when they moved in 
times of economic crisis. Long-established Southern European migrant communi-
ties did not necessarily generate a higher level of intra-community solidarity 
between old and new migrants. Yet, new Southern European migrant communities, 
such as the Italians in Belgium or the Portuguese in France, have often had a com-
parative advantage when dealing with attacks on their freedom of circulation: they 
are able to benefit from long-established homeland institutions and organizations 
(i.e. political parties, trade unions, immigrant associations, etc.) based in receiving 
countries. Such organizations specialize in defending immigrant rights and have 
built significant connections over the years with other institutions and organizations 
based in destination countries. The mobilization of civil society organizations 
against the removal of residence permits from Southern Europeans living in 
Belgium, who are much less affected by this policy than Central Eastern European 
migrants, is a very telling example of this discrepancy.
12.1.4  Lesson 4: Welfare Is an Instrument for Controlling 
and Delegitimizing EU Migration
Another key lesson of this volume is that social policy, and welfare in particular, are 
increasingly being used by Member States to limit the arrival of the afore- mentioned 
category of “illegitimate EU migrants”. The British and Belgian case studies under-
lined the fear held by Member States of seeing EU migrants abuse their welfare 
systems. In both cases, those fears have led to important policy decisions, whose 
consequences have been to restrict access to welfare for mobile EU citizens. The 
context of crisis, and its associated discourse regarding the need for austerity mea-
sures to bring public expenditure under control, has greatly helped the implementa-
tion of those measures. The crisis has enabled policy-makers to frame a discourse 
on the inability of Member States to respond to the social protection needs of all 
foreigners, and of EU citizens in particular. Restricting the access of mobile EU citi-
zens to social protection does not serve exclusively to reduce welfare spendings. In 
practice, it delegitimizes EU migrants by creating a consistent link between EU 
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migration and “benefit tourism” in spite of the evidence demonstrating that this 
practice is marginal.
In addition to decreasing social protection, we have seen that social policy has 
also become an alternative form of migration policy. As the EU treaties and legisla-
tion leave Member States with little power to limit the freedom of circulation of citi-
zens, controlling EU migrants’ access to welfare has become a new way for states to 
filter undesirable migrants. During the 2015 general election campaign and the 
“Brexit” campaign in the United Kingdom, the centrality of the debate on EU citi-
zens’ access to welfare was very telling of this move towards a management of EU 
migration through welfare. Also, in recent years, Member States have similarly paid 
growing attention to Directive 2004/38/EC on the right to free movement of EU citi-
zens, which allows states to remove the residence permits of EU citizens who rep-
resent an “unreasonable burden on the social system” of their country of residence. 
The Belgium case study showed how radical the change of policy has been in this 
matter following the financial and economic crisis. Having moved on from expel-
ling only a handful of citizens on the basis of the directive in 2007, Belgium has 
subsequently been expelling around 2,500 EU citizens every year since 2012. 
Interestingly, Belgium’s policy sends a clear signal to newcomers and would-be EU 
immigrants to the country: using social protection may serve as a basis for removing 
their residence permit if those migrants are believed to cost more than they contrib-
ute to the Belgian social protection system. While future rulings of the European 
Court of Justice may revoke or set limits on the Belgian policy, this example shows 
how far the implementation of social policies may act as a filter to keep undesirable 
EU migrants out.
12.1.5  Lesson 5: We Need to Talk About Brain Gain and Brain 
Drain Within the EU!
In Europe, migration and development scholars have traditionally been concerned 
with issues of brain drain, but studies have focused mostly on the impact of the 
phenomenon on non-European sending states fearful of losing their highly- educated 
citizens to the benefit of the EU labour market. In the four Southern European coun-
tries studied in this volume, we have, however, noted that policy-makers have 
expressed concerns about a possible South-North internal brain drain being trig-
gered or intensified by the crisis. As shown in this volume, there is some evidence 
of strong participation of highly-skilled workers among the new emigrants, but 
given the limited volume of the outflow, it is still too early to talk about human capi-
tal flight or brain drain.
The fear of losing the best-educated citizens seems to be largely shared in 
Southern Europe, with the possible exception of Spain, where the very idea of 
crisis- related migration has long been repudiated by the Conservative government, 
whilst at the same time being emphasized by opposition parties. Among the expected 
negative outcomes of the current waves of emigration, there is the risk that Southern 
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European countries will find themselves with a lack of a skilled workforce when the 
economic situation improves. This obviously opens up space for debates about the 
legitimacy of high-skilled worker recruitment programmes within the EU, such as 
Germany’s “Job of my Life”. Indeed, even though this programme may offer relief 
to a very limited number of Southern European unemployed citizens (and their gov-
ernments), questions remain regarding the long-term macro-economic effects of 
this loss of work force, whose training was paid for by the sending country’s 
taxpayers.
Beyond espousing discourses, the Portuguese, Spanish and Greek governments 
have done very little to tackle the issue of brain drain. Only the Italian authorities 
seem to have tried hard to address the issue with specific policy measures such as 
tax incentives, pension benefits, access to social housing and seed money pro-
grammes for highly-skilled returnees. In the three other cases, no real policy 
response has been offered to what is described by many within the national political 
arena as an issue of critical importance. Italy’s approach can be explained by a long 
tradition of engagement with its citizens abroad, which has seen the development of 
a very thorough system of representations of emigrants’ interests in the home coun-
try. Such a system, associated with a strong representation abroad of Italian institu-
tions and associations (i.e. political parties and trade unions) has kept the issue of 
emigration and brain drain on the political agenda for over a decade. By contrast, 
Greece has historically had a more ambivalent attitude towards its citizens living 
abroad and has engaged with them to a much lesser extent. It is particularly note-
worthy, for instance, that Greek migrants remain one of the few groups of EU citi-
zens who are deprived of external voting rights in their home country elections 
(Lafleur 2013). Engaging with citizens abroad should, however, be of crucial impor-
tance for sending state authorities in the current socio-economic environment for at 
least two reasons. First and foremost, growing xenophobia and limits on access to 
social protection in destination countries is placing a growing number of their emi-
grants in a position of vulnerability. Accordingly, not only do new Southern EU 
migrants sometimes need assistance, but they also need their home country govern-
ments to enter into a dialogue with Northern European governments when their 
rights are being jeopardized while living abroad. Second, if Southern European 
Member States are serious about involving return migrants in economic recovery 
efforts, a dialogue needs to be opened rapidly with crisis-related emigrants regard-
ing the policies that would facilitate their return to their home country.
12.2  Conclusion: Moving Research and Political Agendas 
Forward
This collaborative book is one of the first attempts to assess comprehensively and 
systematically the main features of crisis-driven South-North EU migration. Even 
though we have explored the impact of this phenomenon on public debates and 
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political agendas in selected sending and receiving countries, several questions still 
require further research efforts and in-depth reflection.
This volume has shown clearly that more systematic and rigorous statistical data 
is needed in order to obtain a more complete and detailed picture of the current 
migratory phenomenon in Europe. Similarly, this book has demonstrated the 
 added- value of conducting focused research with international research teams based 
both in immigrants’ countries of origin and destination.
This book opens the way for explorations of several issues that have not as yet 
been addressed. One of the most important issues is probably the long-term inser-
tion of new Southern European migrants into Northern EU Member States and its 
connections with the large-scale East-West post-accession migration. Throughout 
the book, it has been hypothesized that the patterns of labour market insertion of 
migrants from the new accession countries is one of the factors that explains the 
increasing selectivity in the new flows of South-North migration. However, more 
research is needed to understand the reciprocal influence of these on the type of 
contemporary EU migrations (Kaczmarczyk and Stanek 2015). Examining these 
interactions would not only shed new light on the complex map of current intra-EU 
mobility, it would also help us understand the causal mechanisms that lie behind 
these newer patterns of migration.
In this volume, we have also argued that the full re-establishment of the old 
South-North migratory route depends on a hypothetical continuing divergence in 
economic performance between Northern and Southern EU Member States. If the 
crisis remains strong in the South but eases in the North, rising demand for labour 
may increase Southern European flows. However, the current economic perfor-
mance in the Northern EU Member States under study here revealed that the demand 
for labour is at present insufficient to trigger a complete revival of the post-war 
South-North migratory route.
Future trends of internal mobility within the EU will depend not only on future 
economic performances but also on the evolution of the anti-migration sentiment in 
Northern European societies. As described in this volume, restrictions on migration 
from other EU28 countries are either currently under discussion or have already 
been implemented in several Northern EU Member States. As the growing animos-
ity towards new migrants is being publicized in the Southern European media, 
potential new migrants may be discouraged from making use of their right to circu-
lation. In addition, the large influx of asylum seekers since the Spring of 2015 
and the “Brexit” referendum further demonstrated that immigration is likely to 
remain a topic of contention in the EU in the coming years, even if the economic 
situation improves. The impact of the asylum crisis and of the “Brexit” vote on the 
freedom of circulation of EU citizens is hard to determine at this stage. However, 
this situation indicates that the European Union will be facing the difficult task of 
reflecting simultaneously on its asylum policy and its internal mobility policy in the 
coming years.
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